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Verdict Properly Set Aside Based Upon Trial Court’s Own Denial of Defendant’s Request for an Adjournment to Retain New Counsel/Criteria for Trial Court’s Setting Aside a Verdict Explained

The Fourth Department, after explaining the criteria for setting aside a verdict, ruled the trial court had properly set aside the verdict in this case due to the trial court’s own erroneous denial of defendant’s request for an adjournment to seek new counsel:

“Pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1), following the issuance of a verdict and before sentencing a court may set aside a verdict on ‘[a]ny ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court’ ” … . “The power granted a Trial Judge is, thus, far more limited than that of an intermediate appellate court, which is authorized to determine not only questions of law but issues of fact . . . , to reverse or modify a judgment when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence . . . , and to reverse ‘[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of justice’ ”… . * * *

In our view, the court’s refusal to grant defendant’s request for an adjournment was “an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” and effectively denied defendant the fundamental right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing …   On the date scheduled for suppression hearings, defense counsel, who had been retained by defendant’s family while defendant was incarcerated, withdrew defendant’s requests for suppression and sought an expedited trial without defendant’s knowledge or consent.  At the next court appearance, defendant requested an adjournment of the expedited trial to afford him time in which to retain another attorney.  The court, in denying that request, did not afford defendant “[a] reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice”…, particularly in view of the fact that the trial was expedited without defendant’s knowledge or consent… .  Inasmuch as we conclude that defendant was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, reversal of the judgment of conviction on that ground would be required as a matter of law upon an appeal therefrom (see CPL 330.30 [1]), and the court therefore properly set aside the verdict. People v Rohadfox, 1367, 4th Dept 2-7-14

 

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