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Court-Ordered Period for Bringing Summary Judgment Motion Which Was Shorter than the Statutory Period Cannot Be Modified Absent Good Cause—Law Office Failure Not Enough

The First Department determined that the court-ordered deadline for bringing a summary judgment motion could not be modified absent good cause, even though the court-ordered deadline shortened the statutory 120 period:

As the Court of Appeals has repeatedly reiterated, court-ordered time frames are requirements to be taken seriously by the parties … . Contrary to the distinction defendant seeks to draw, it does not matter whether a motion for summary judgment has been made more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue or after the expiration of a shorter time limit set by a court order or stipulation. Whatever the source of the deadline with which a party fails to comply, the lateness may not be excused without a showing of good cause within the meaning of CPLR 3212(a)—a showing of something more than mere law office failure… . Quinones v Joan & Sanford I Weill Med Coll, 2014 NY slip Op 00882, 1st Dept 2-11-13

 

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