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Witness’s Hearsay Statement Should Have Been Admitted as a Statement Against Penal Interest/No Need for Declarant to Be Aware of Specific Violation of Law

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a dissent, the First Department determined a (hearsay) statement by a witness indicating she (not the defendant) was driving when the property-damage accident occurred should have been admitted as a statement against penal interest.  The central question was whether the declarant was aware she was admitting to a violation of law when the statement was made:

The decision whether to admit a declaration against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule requires, among other factors, that the declarant be aware at the time of its making that the statement was contrary to his or her penal interest. The issue in this case is whether a statement in which an individual admits to conduct constituting an offense is a statement against penal interest, where the individual believes that the conduct may be illegal but does not know whether it is or not. It arose in the context of a DWI case where the defense was that defendant, who was intoxicated, was not the driver of the car, but a passenger. Specifically, the driver, a 19-year-old woman with no prior criminal history and only a learner’s permit, who met defendant approximately eight hours earlier, made a statement to a defense investigator indicating that she, and not defendant, was driving defendant’s car at the time it collided with a parked car, but refused to testify at trial on Fifth Amendment grounds. We find that the statement was a declaration against penal interest notwithstanding that some of the witness’s apprehension in making the statement was based on her fear that her parents would learn of her involvement with defendant or that, as the court noted, her exposure to criminal liability was relatively minor. The court therefore erred in keeping the statement out. * * *

…[W]e hold that regardless of whether [the witness] was specifically aware that the conduct she admitted constituted a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600, which prohibits an operator of a motor vehicle who causes property damage from leaving the scene, or whether she was specifically aware that she faced a penalty of up to 15 days’ imprisonment and a fine for that offense, the evidence established that her statement satisfied this hearsay exception. Her expressions, at the time of or immediately after her statement, of apprehension that she could get in trouble for her conduct, including repeated inquiries about consulting with a lawyer, sufficed to satisfy the requirement that “the declarant must be aware at the time of its making that the statement was contrary to his [or her] penal interest”… . People v Soto, 2013 NY Slip Op 08217, 1st Dept 12-10-13

 

 

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