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A Factually Inconsistent Verdict Did Not Render the Evidence Insufficient to Support the Conviction

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman (over a dissent), the Court of Appeals determined a factual inconsistency in a jury verdict acquitting a defendant of one count and convicting him of another did not render the record evidence insufficient to support the conviction.  The defendant was charged with insurance fraud and arson.  The prosecution’s theory was the defendant burned a building down to recover the insurance proceeds.  The jury convicted the defendant of insurance fraud and acquitted him of arson.  In explaining the difference between a factually inconsistent verdict and a verdict not supported by legally sufficient evidence, the Court of Appeals wrote:

A verdict is factually inconsistent where, in light of the evidence presented, an acquittal on one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another count … .  Factual inconsistency “which can be attributed to mistake, confusion, compromise or mercy – does not provide a reviewing court with the power to overturn a verdict” … .  If a jury renders a factually inconsistent verdict, the trial court “can point out the apparent inconsistency to the jurors, issue further appropriate instructions and ask them to continue deliberations. But a failure to take such action would not be an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” … .

In contrast, a conviction not supported by legally sufficient evidence should be overturned.  A conviction is legally insufficient where, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is no “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt” … .

Factual inconsistency and legal insufficiency are analytically distinct.  One may inform the other – i.e., in some instances, a reviewing court may consider a jury’s acquittal on one count in reviewing the record to determine if a factually inconsistent conviction on another count is supported by legally sufficient evidence … . But it does not follow that such factual inconsistency in the verdict renders the record evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction.  Put another way, an acquittal is not a preclusive finding of any fact, in the same trial, that could have underlain the jury’s determination.

Therefore, even assuming, as submitted by the defendant, that the jury’s verdict in this case presented a factual inconsistency, it does not affect the propriety of his conviction. People v Abraham, 192, CtApp 11-26-13

 

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