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Experts’ Use of Unreliable Hearsay in Article 10 Trial Violated Due Process

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera (with a concurring opinion) determined the use of unreliable hearsay by the People ‘s experts in an Article 10 civil commitment trial of a convicted sex offender violated the offender’s right to due process of law.  The court explained that hearsay related to convictions was reliable, hearsay supported by admissions is reliable, hearsay related to acquittals and otherwise unsupported uncharged accusations is unreliable, and hearsay about criminal charges that result in neither acquittal nor conviction require close scrutiny (probative value versus prejudicial effect):

Due process requires any hearsay basis evidence to meet minimum requirements of reliability and relevance before it can be admitted at an article 10 proceeding.  In article 10 trials, hearsay basis evidence is admissible if it satisfies two criteria.  First, the proponent must demonstrate through evidence that the hearsay is reliable.  Second, the court must determine that “the probative value in helping the jury evaluate the [expert’s] opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect” (cf. Fed Rules Evid rule 703).  These reliability and substantial relevance requirements provide a necessary counterweight to the deference juries may accord hearsay evidence simply because an expert has propounded it.  The requirements prevent an expert from serving as a passive conduit for hearsay, yet allow the jury to evaluate expert opinions by considering reliable and probative evidence.  This rule gives the judge an active role in managing the article 10 proceeding and preserving its integrity.  Matter of State of New York v Floyd Y, 182, CtApp 11-19-13

 

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