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Local Law Prohibiting Use of Groundwater Outside Village Preempted by State Law

The Second Department determined a village Local Law which prohibited the removal of groundwater for use outside the village was preempted by state law (Transportation Corporations law, Environmental Conservation Law (ECL)):

As relevant to this case, the Transportation Corporations Law permits water-works corporations to extend their service area to neighboring municipalities by entering “into a contract with the authorities of any city, town or village not mentioned in its certificate of incorporation, but situated in the same county as the city, towns or villages mentioned therein or in an adjoining county” (Transportation Corporations Law § 46). … Notably, the statutory procedure for obtaining a certificate of extension does not require the water-works corporation to obtain the consent or permission of the municipality where it was originally incorporated, an omission which we must conclude the Legislature intended (see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240) and which comports with the long-recognized policy in favor of the extension of water resources to less-advantageously situated municipalities… . … Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature manifested an intent to preempt local laws which have the effect of prohibiting a water-works corporation from transferring water from one municipality to another … .Further, to the extent that the Local Law was enacted, either in purpose or effect, as a measure to regulate withdrawals of groundwater, it is further preempted by article 15 of the ECL. The terms “waters,” as used in ECL article 15, is expansive and includes all surface and underground water within the state’s territorial limits (see ECL 15-0107[4]). ECL article 15 states: “The sovereign power to regulate and control the water resources of this state ever since its establishment has been and now is vested exclusively in the state of New York, except to the extent of any delegation of power to the United States” … . The Legislature declared it to be the public policy of the state that: “The regulation and control of the water resources of the state of New York be exercised only pursuant to the laws of this state” (ECL 15-0105[1] … ), and the Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC) is given jurisdiction “in any matter affecting the construction of improvements to or developments of water resources for the public health, safety or welfare, including but not limited to the supply of potable waters for the various municipalities and inhabitants thereof” (ECL 15-0109). Woodbury Hgts Estates Water Co Inc v Village of Woodbury, 2013 NY Slip Op 07468, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

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