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Proof Requirements for Lack of Constructive Notice of Dangerous Condition Explained

The Second Department reiterated the summary-judgment proof-requirements for a lack of constructive notice of a hazardous condition in a slip and fall case:

A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall or trip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it did not create the hazardous condition which allegedly caused the fall, and did not have actual or constructive notice of that condition for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . In order to meet its burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the accident site was last cleaned or inspected prior to the plaintiff’s fall … . A movant cannot satisfy its initial burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff’s case … . Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it lacked constructive notice of the hazardous condition which allegedly caused the plaintiff’s fall because it offered no evidence as to when the subject stairway was last cleaned or inspected.. .  Campbell v New York City Tr Auth, 2013 NY Slip Op 05553, 2nd Dept 8-7-13

 

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