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All But Rape First Charges Were Time-Barred—Different Statute of Limitations for Rape First

The Fourth Department determined all charges but the Rape in the First Degree charge had to be dismissed as time-barred.  A change in the statute of limitations for Rape First applied to all such charges not time-barred at the time of the statutory change:

In 2002, when the crimes were committed, the statute of limitations for the charged offenses was five years (see CPL 30.10 former [2] [b]).  Because he was not charged until more than seven years later, defendant raised a facially viable statute of limitations defense, and the burden thus shifted to the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute of limitations was tolled or otherwise inapplicable  We conclude that the People satisfied their burden with respect to the charge of rape in the first degree.  As the People correctly contend, the legislature amended CPL 30.10 in 2006 so as to abolish the statute of limitations for four sex offenses, including rape in the first degree and criminal sexual act in the first degree (see L 2006, ch 3, § 1).  The amendment applied not only to crimes committed after its effective date of June 23, 2006, but also to offenses that were not yet time-barred (see L 2006, ch 3, § 5 [a]).  People v Burroughs, 690, 4th Dept 7-5-13

 

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