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Refusal to Allow DSS Workers Into Apartment Did Not Constitute Neglect

The Second Department reversed Family Court’s neglect determination against father.  The sole basis for the neglect finding was father’s refusal to let DSS Emergency Services workers into his apartment, which, the father explained, was based upon his fear the workers were not who they claimed they were:  The Second Department wrote:

“To establish neglect pursuant to section 1012(f)(i)(B) of the Family Court Act, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired, or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and (2) the actual or threatened harm to the child is due to the failure of the parent or caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship”…. Any determination that a child is a neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 1046;…).   Here, while the DSS properly sought access to Joshua under its order of supervision, it failed to prove at the fact-finding hearing by a preponderance of the evidence that the father neglected Joshua…. The evidence did not establish that Joshua’s physical, mental, or emotional condition was impaired, or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired, as a result of the father’s refusal to allow the DSS Emergency Services workers into his apartment. Moreover, the evidence established that the DSS Emergency Services workers found Joshua to be clean, healthy, and safe. Matter of Joshua J, 2013 NY Slip Op 04606, 2nd Dept, 6-19-13

 

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