New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Defamation2 / Qualified Privilege in Defamation Action Against School District Expla...
Defamation, Education-School Law, Employment Law, Privilege

Qualified Privilege in Defamation Action Against School District Explained

In the course of a lengthy decision dealing with many issues raised by a defamation/stigma-plus proceeding brought by a school district employee against a school district, the Third Department explained qualified privilege in this context. The plaintiff was a coach whose boyfriend [Broxmeyer] had raped a student at another school.  Plaintiff alleged that defendant Arbes, principal of the high school, “stated at a meeting with several staff members that plaintiff should avoid private one-on-one  conversations with students and should take a leave of absence ‘for the safety of the students.’ “.  The Third Department wrote:

Qualified privilege provides a  complete defense to a claim of slander, and attaches to an otherwise defamatory statement “made to persons who have some common interest in the subject matter” … .  A privileged communication is one which, but for the occasion on which it is uttered, would be defamatory and actionable'”….The  defense does  not apply, however,  “where the motivation for making such statements was spite or ill will (common-law malice) or where the ‘statements [were] made with [a] high degree of awareness of their probable falsity’ … .Arbes made the statement at issue at a meeting where she, plaintiff and three other individuals were present. Plaintiff acknowledges that Keeler, the junior varsity field hockey coach and union president, had a common interest in the subject, as did a union employee who was present.  The third individual may have had the same interest because Keeler averred that the individual was a union representative. Additionally, she was a guidance counselor, and Arbes averred that guidance counselors were being made available to students who may have had difficulty dealing with the situation surrounding  Broxmeyer’s arrest, the police investigation and plaintiff’s suspension and later termination.  As all of the persons present for the meeting had a common interest in the subject matter and the record lacks any evidence of malice, Supreme Court correctly determined that Arbes’ statement at the meeting was not actionable based on the qualified privilege.  Wilcox v Newark Valley Central School District, 515906, 3rd Dept, 6-6-13

 

June 6, 2013
Tags: Third Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2013-06-06 12:02:522020-12-04 22:57:52Qualified Privilege in Defamation Action Against School District Explained
You might also like
THE CLAIM OF SEXUAL ABUSE UNDER THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT MET THE PLEADING CRITERIA OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT; THE FOUR-YEAR TIME FRAME WAS SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE; THE FACTS ALLEGED SUFFICIENTLY STATED THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT).
Custody Should Not Have Been Awarded to Nonparent
Petitioner Denied Right to Assistance of Counsel—Dismissal and Expungement Ordered
THE UNLAWFUL SURVEILLANCE CONVICTION DID NOT INVOLVE “SEXUAL CONTACT” AS DEFINED BY THE PENAL LAW; THEREFORE THE 20 POINT ASSESSMENT FOR “SEXUAL CONTACT” WAS ERROR (THIRD DEPT).
DEFENDANTS’ EXPERTS’ CLAIMS THAT DEFENDANTS PROVIDED PROPER CARE AND ADVICE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WERE BELIED BY THE MEDICAL RECORDS AS EXPLAINED BY PLAINTIFF’S EXPERTS; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH MOTHER VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HER SUSPENDED JUDGMENT, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE TERMINATED HER PARENTAL RIGHTS WITHOUT A FINDING, BASED UPON A HEARING, THAT TERMINATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (THIRD DEPT).
CLAIMANT WAS NOT A NECESSARY EMPLOYEE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW, NO OBLIGATION TO TRANSFER HER AFTER HER POSITION WAS ABOLISHED.
DEFENDANT’S OMISSIONS, INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AND LIES AFTER A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP JUSTIFIED THE CANINE SNIFF.

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Disparaging Allegations in Complaint Protected by Judicial Privilege Lane Abutting Properties Was Not Owned by Property-Owners
Scroll to top