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Emergency Doctrine Did Not Apply to Police Officer’s Striking Plaintiff with Patrol Car​

In reversing Supreme Court, the Second Department determined the emergency doctrine did not apply to a police officer’s striking the plaintiff with his patrol car and ordinary negligence principles applied:

In the instant case, Officer DeMarco acknowledged that he did not see the plaintiff until after he struck him with his car. His conduct – the failure to see that which was there to be seen – was not conduct specified in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) as exempt from the rules of the road …. Accordingly, his conduct was governed by the principles of ordinary negligence …. In any event, since Officer DeMarco acknowledged at his deposition that, at the time he struck the plaintiff, he was “not aware of any emergency situation that needed to be addressed,” the common-law emergency doctrine is not applicable to this case. Accordingly, the fifth affirmative defense, which is based upon Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, and the sixth affirmative defense, which is based upon the common-law emergency doctrine, must be dismissed.

Under the principles of ordinary negligence, Officer DeMarco’s failure to see what was there to be seen established the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability… . Starkman v City of Long Beach, 2013 NY Slip Op 03829, 2nd Dept, 5-29-13

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

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