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Theory of Damages in Contract Action​

The Second Department explained the theory underlying damages for breach of contract and noted that damages are usually ascertained as of the date of the breach:

It has long been recognized that the theory underlying damages for breach of contract is to make good or replace the loss caused by the breach… . Damages are intended to return the parties to the point at which the breach arose and to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as it would have been had the contract been performed (…Restatement [Second] of Contracts §§ 347, comment a; § 344). Thus, damages for breach of contract are ordinarily ascertained as of the date of the breach… .. Seidman v Industrial Recycling Props, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03659, 2nd Dept, 5-22-13

 

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