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Trial Court’s Batson Ruling Re: Pretextual Reasons for Exclusion of White Jurors Upheld

In upholding the trial court’s ruling that the proffered reasons for the exclusion of certain white jurors were pretextual, the Second Department wrote:

In Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79, 94-98), the United States Supreme Court formulated a three-step test to assess whether peremptory challenges have been used to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race, gender, or other protected categories …. In step one, the moving party must make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by “showing that the facts and circumstances of the voir dire raise an inference that the other party excused one or more jurors for an impermissible reason” … . If the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the inquiry proceeds to step two, and the burden shifts to the adversary to provide a facially neutral explanation for the challenge. If the nonmoving party “offers facially neutral reasons supporting the challenge, the inference of discrimination is overcome” … . Once facially neutral reasons are provided, the inquiry proceeds to step three, and the burden shifts back to the moving party to prove purposeful discrimination, and ” the trial court must determine whether the proffered reasons are pretextual'” …, including whether the reasons apply to the facts of the case, and whether the reasons were applied to only a particular class of jurors and not to others … . Here, the trial court’s determination that the proffered reasons for challenging certain white jurors were pretextual is entitled to great deference on appeal and is supported by the record… . People v Carrington, 2013 NY Slip Op 02587, 2006-09951, Ind No 369/05, 2nd Dept 4-17-13

 

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