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Petition for Retention for Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Granted

In determining the hospital’ petition for retention of a patient for involuntary psychiatric care should have been granted, the Second Department wrote:

Paulina D. is a 23-year-old woman who suffers from severe anorexia nervosa. She has been at Elmhurst Hospital (hereinafter the Hospital) “continually” for 15 months. At one point during that period, Paulina D. weighed only 52 pounds. Orders were issued directing her involuntary admission and retention at the Hospital pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.27 and 9.33. In January 2013, the Hospital petitioned for an order authorizing Paulina D.’s continued involuntary retention pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33. …

“Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33, the Supreme Court may authorize the retention of a patient in a hospital for involuntary psychiatric care upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the patient is mentally ill and in need of further care and treatment, and that the patient poses a substantial threat of physical harm to himself [or herself] or others” … .  Matter of Paulina D, 2013 Slip Op 01988, 2012-02212, Index No 500039/13, 2nd Dept 3-22-13

 

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