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Court’s Sua Sponte Transfer of a Zoning-Related Case to Another County Was Improper; The Denial of a Request for a Variance Does Not Affect Real Property within the Meaning of CPLR 507

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court erred in transferring a case to another venue sua sponte and in determining that an action seeking to annul the denial of a variance affected real property within the meaning of CPLR 507:

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul two determinations of respondent made in connection with petitioner’s application for an area variance from a provision of the Town of Whitestone’s Zoning Ordinance. The proceeding was commenced in Supreme Court, Onondaga County, and by …order …that court, sua sponte, transferred the proceeding to Supreme Court, Oneida County, pursuant to CPLR 507. We agree with petitioner that the court erred in transferring the proceeding sua sponte. CPLR 509 provides that the place of trial may be changed to another county “by order upon motion, or by consent.” CPLR 510 provides the grounds for the change of the place of trial, upon a motion. A court “is authorized to change venue only upon motion and may not do so upon its own initiative” …. Additionally, a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul a determination denying a request for an area variance does not affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property, and thus the court erred in relying on CPLR 507 in transferring the proceeding.  Matter of Mimassi v Town of Whitestone Zoning Board of Appeals, 189, CA 12-01652, 4th Dept. 3-22-13

 

 

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