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Failure of Sentencing Court to Inform Defendant of Period of Post-Release Supervision Required Release after Sentence Served

The Department of Corrections cannot remedy a court’s failure to impose a period of post-release supervision.  In this case the prisoner’s habeas corpus petition was granted and the prisoner, who had served his sentence, was released.  The Fourth Department determined that the sentencing court’s statement—“the supervisory period under the violent felony offender sentencing statute will be five years, which means when you come out on parole, you will be on five years of parole at the conclusion of the ten-year sentence”—did not pronounce the period of post-release supervision as required by Criminal Procedure Law 380.20.  People ex rel Finch v Brown, 23, KAH 11-00862, 4th Dept. 3-15-13

 

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