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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / Syracuse Police Officer Did Not Have Authority to Arrest in Town of DeWitt,...
Criminal Law, Evidence

Syracuse Police Officer Did Not Have Authority to Arrest in Town of DeWitt, Judge Abused Discretion During Jury Selection.

A City of Syracuse police detective was assigned to a security detail for a college athletic event.  The detective saw codefendant walk toward the gymnasium, turn around and walk back the way he came.  The detective followed the codefendant to a car. The detective then approached the codefendant and asked to speak with him.  Defendant, who had been in the car, got out of the car.  The detective smelled burnt marihuana and both codefendant and defendant admitted they had been smoking marihuana.  A consent search of the car turned up a loaded revolver leading to the defendant’s and codefendant’s arrest.  The encounter with the City of Syracuse detective actually took place in the Town of DeWitt, not the City of Syracuse.  The Fourth Department held, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section 140.50 (1), the City of Syracuse detective did not have statutory authority to stop and question the defendant outside “the geographical area of such officer’s employment…”.  The physical evidence was suppressed and the indictment dismissed on that basis.  The Fourth Department went on to hold that there was a valid alternative ground for reversal.  The jury selection process went very fast, proceeding group to group.  The judge told counsel that once the peremptory challenges for a particular group were finished, there would be no further opportunity to challenge anyone in that group.  One of the defense attorneys told the judge that the jury selection process was moving too fast and the defense did not want one of the jurors in the previous group.  The judge refused to allow a challenge of that juror.  The Fourth Department held the judge’s refusal was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal stating:  “ ‘We can detect no discernable interference or undue delay caused by [the] momentary oversight [of the attorneys for defendant and codefendant] that would justify [the court’s] hasty refusal to entertain [their] challenge….’ ”.  People v McGrew, 1453, KA 09-01308 Fourth Dept. 2-1-13

vehicle stops, street stops

February 1, 2013
Tags: Fourth Department, GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTION, JUDGES, JURORS, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, STREET STOPS
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