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THE PETITIONER SEEKING TO MODIFY A CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT MUST MAKE A THRESHOLD SHOWING THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE LAST CUSTODY ORDER WAS ISSUED; HERE, FATHER’S WANTING MORE PARENTING TIME TO DEVELOP A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WAS NOT A CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined father did not meet his burden of showing changed circumstances warranting an increase in parenting time. Father’s simply wanting more parenting time is not a changed circumstance:

Family Court found that a change in circumstances existed — namely, that the father wanted to have a closer relationship with the child and the amount of parenting time provided in the January 2019 order was insufficient to develop that relationship. Even crediting the father’s testimony, the father’s mere dissatisfaction with the amount of parenting time provided in the January 2019 order and the desire for more time do not constitute a change in circumstances … .. Furthermore, the record fails to show any “new developments or changes that have occurred since the [January 2019] order was entered” … . Accordingly, because the father did not satisfy his threshold burden of establishing a change in circumstances, the modification petition should have been dismissed … . Matter of Joshua KK. v Jaime LL., 2022 NY Slip Op 02847, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: A party seeking a modification of a custody order must make a threshold showing of changed circumstances. Here father’s wanting more parenting time to develop a closer relationship was not a changed circumstance. Therefore father’s petition should have been dismissed.

 

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FOR PURPOSES OF A PERMANENT NEGLECT/TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS PROCEEDING, DIRECT PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD WITH A SUITABLE PERSON MEETS THE DEFINITION OF PLACEMENT IN THE “CARE OF AN AUTHORIZED AGENCY” SUCH THAT A PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDING IS AVAILABLE AFTER DIRECT PLACEMENT FOR ONE YEAR; ALTHOUGH RESPONDENT’S PARENTAL RIGHTS HAD BEEN TERMINATED WHEN THIS APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED, THE “EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE” WAS INVOKED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, considering the appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine in this neglect/termination-of-parental rights proceeding, determined that direct placement of the child with a suitable person met the definition of placement in the “care of an authorized agency” for purposes of the pre-requisite for a permanent neglect proceeding seeking to terminate parental rights. Family Court had ruled placement with a suitable person was not placement in the “care of an authorized agency” and dismissed the permanent neglect proceeding on that ground. The Third Department, after finding the permanent neglect proceeding should not have been dismissed, went ahead and ruled on the merits, finding that mother had permanently neglected the child:

… [W]e find Family Court’s interpretation of Social Services Law § 384-b too narrow and calling for a result that is “unnecessarily circuitous” … and ultimately contrary to the stated legislative intent (see generally Social Services Law § 384-b [1] [a]-[b]). A proceeding for termination of parental rights may be originated by an “authorized agency” such as petitioner … , seeking an order for guardianship and custody when a child is a permanently neglected child … . A “permanently neglected child” is defined as “a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period of either at least one year or [15] out of the most recent [22] months . . . substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child” … .

Regarding the phrase “care of an authorized agency,” courts have consistently held that a direct placement authorized by Family Court, like the order of fact-finding and disposition issued … pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1055, falls within the purview of Social Services Law § 384-b. Matter of Frank Q. (Laurie R.), 2022 NY Slip Op 02843, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: For purposes of the prerequisite for a permanent neglect/termination-of-parental rights proceeding, a child’s direct placement with a suitable person meets the definition of placement in the “care of an authorized agency” such that the permanent neglect proceeding is available after direct placement for one year. Here, the mother’s parental rights had been terminated at the time the appeal was considered, but the “exception to the mootness doctrine” was invoked because the issue was deemed likely to recur.

 

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THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED HEARING INCLUDED 80 QUESTIONS POSED TO A WITNESS BY COUNSEL BUT ONLY FOUR ANSWERS WERE AUDIBLE; NEW HEARING WITH A STENOGRAPHER ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the record on appeal was insufficient and ordered a new hearing with a stenographer. The hearing was electronically recorded. Counsel ask a witness 80 questions but only four answers were audible. Matter of Jereline Z. v Joseph AA., 2022 NY Slip Op 02848, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: If a hearing is electronically recorded but most of a significant witness’s answers are inaudible, the appeal cannot be considered. Here a new hearing with a stenographer was ordered.

 

PETITIONER WAS CHARGED WITH MAKING A COMMENT TO A FELLOW EMPLOYEE AT A SOCIAL GATHERING, WAS FOUND GUILTY AND WAS TERMINATED; THE EMPLOYEE TESTIFIED THE REMARK WAS MADE AT THE WORKPLACE; THEREFORE PETITIONER WAS FOUND GUILTY OF CONDUCT THAT WAS NEVER CHARGED; DETERMINATION ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the determination terminating petitioner’s employment with the state, found that petitioner’s due process rights were violated because he was found guilty of conduct that was never charged. Petitioner was charged with making a comment to a fellow employee at a social gathering. But the employee testified the remark was made at the workplace:

Pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 (1), a civil service employee “shall not be removed or otherwise subjected to any disciplinary penalty . . . except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon stated charges.” “The standard of review of such a determination made after a disciplinary hearing is whether it is supported by substantial evidence” … . “The first fundamental of due process is notice of the charges made. This principle equally applies to an administrative proceeding for even in that forum no person may lose substantial rights because of wrongdoing shown by the evidence, but not charged” …  Fundamentally, the determination made in a disciplinary proceeding “must be based on the charges made” and it is error to find a public employee guilty of uncharged specifications of misconduct and impose a penalty thereon … . Matter of Kiyonaga v New York State Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs, 2022 NY Slip Op 02850, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: Pursuant to the Civil Service Law, a state employee charged with official misconduct is entitled to due process, including notice of the charges. Here the petitioner was charged with making a comment to a fellow employee at a social gathering. The employee testified the remark was made in the workplace, conduct that was never charged. Petitioner was improperly found guilty of misconduct that was never charged and was terminated. The determination was annulled.

 

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THE CURRENT GOVERNOR AND LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, AS WELL AS FORMER GOVERNOR CUOMO, ARE NECESSARY PARTIES IN THIS SUIT PURSUANT TO THE STATE FINANCE LAW CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SALARY INCREASES FOR THOSE PARTIES (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action under the State Finance Law challenging the constitutionality of the salary increases for governor and lieutenant governor should have included the current Governor and Lieutenant Governor, as well as former Governor Cuomo, as necessary parties:

CPLR 1001 (a) provides that “[p]ersons . . . who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants.” When such a person “has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him [or her] summoned” … . This requirement protects the right to due process by providing such a person the opportunity to be heard before his or her interests are adversely affected … .

… [T]he interests of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are not necessarily being represented or protected by defendant and his counsel — the Attorney General, who would also typically represent those other state officials … ;. We cannot determine whether the Governor and Lieutenant Governor will necessarily support and integrate defendant’s argument that the resolution is constitutional; indeed, they may argue against its constitutionality, to establish precedent that would prevent a potential future intra-term diminution of their salaries. Accordingly, and as the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are subject to its jurisdiction, Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s request that those officers be joined as necessary parties and ordered them summoned (see CPLR 1001 [b] …). Arrigo v DiNapoli, 2022 NY Slip Op 02845, Third Dept 4-28-22

Practice Point: Pursuant to CPLR 1001, parties within the jurisdiction of the court must be added as necessary parties if the ultimate ruling could have an adverse effect on them.

 

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THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THE DEFENDANT PUNCHED THE POLICE OFFICER AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS SPRAYED IN THE FACE WITH PEPPER SPRAY; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE TO THE ASSAULT CHARGE; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, over a two-justice dissent, determined the justification-defense jury instruction should have been given in this assault case. The defendant punched a police officer after the defendant was sprayed in the face with pepper spray:

… [T]he People introduced into evidence a video recording of the assault, in which defendant can clearly be seen punching a police sergeant after defendant is sprayed in the face with pepper spray. Testimony revealed, and the video corroborated, that the pepper spray was deployed because defendant was refusing to take off his shoes and change into footwear provided by the jail so that an officer could finish searching him before bringing him into the jail. However, the video depicts a very brief time period between the initial directive for defendant to remove his footwear and the deployment of the pepper spray. Based on this fact, combined with other circumstances surrounding the incident, we find that there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the use of the pepper spray constituted excessive force in this scenario. People v Heiserman, 2022 NY Slip Op 02588, Third Dept 4-21-22

Practice Point: Here there was evidence that the police officer’s spraying defendant in the face with pepper spray constituted the use of excessive force. Defendant punched the police officer after the defendant was sprayed and was charged with assault. The failure to instruct the jury on the justification defense was reversible error. Two dissenters disagreed.

 

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ALTHOUGH INFORMATION PROVIDED FOUR DAYS BEFORE TRIAL PURSUANT TO A DEFENSE SUBPOENA INCLUDED BRADY MATERIAL, THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE DEFENSE HAD A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE INFORMATION TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE PEOPLE’S WITNESSES; THE DISSENTER DISAGREED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined that the People’s failure to turn over Brady material in this sexual-offense prosecution, which the defense received four days before trial pursuant to a subpoena, did not require reversal:

“‘[W]hile the People unquestionably have a duty to disclose exculpatory material in their control,’ a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is not violated when, as here, he [or she] is given a meaningful opportunity to use the allegedly exculpatory material to cross-examine the People’s witnesses or as evidence during his [or her] case” … .. Defendant, by way of a subpoena, received the records from the victim’s evaluation four days before trial. Defendant asserts that these records contain two pieces of allegedly exculpatory information. The first is that a physical examination of the victim, performed three months after the incident, was “normal” and did not reveal any corporeal injury. The second is that the victim, during an interview related to the physical examination, disclosed allegations of prior sexual abuse by two different individuals, which defendant asserts were fabricated.

From the dissent:

… [I]n my view, the withheld evidence was clearly material and defendant was prejudiced. As a result of the Brady violation, defendant was denied an opportunity to pursue other strategies with defense counsel. He was denied, among other things, the opportunity to investigate and interview other potential defense witnesses well in advance of trial, or to develop a more detailed argument on the issue of whether he could cross-examine the victim and call certain witnesses without running afoul of the Rape Shield Law (see CPL 60.42). With more time, he also could have called the examining physician or retained his own medical expert to review the records. Learning of the existence of potential witnesses such as the victim’s brother and the mother’s landlord a mere four days before trial provided defendant no opportunity to locate and interview these witnesses and possibly incorporate their testimony into his defense. Moreover, as County Court noted, defendant, under these circumstances, was under no obligation to seek an adjournment of the trial. People v Sherwood, 2022 NY Slip Op 02455, Third Dept 4-14-22

Practice Point: Although the Brady material was not provided until four days before trial pursuant to a defense subpoena, reversal was not required because the defense had a meaningful opportunity to use the material in the cross-examination of the People’s witnesses. The dissenter disagreed.

 

CLAIMANT DELIVERY DRIVER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF NEL, A BUSINESS LOGISTICS COMPANY WHICH ASSIGNED CLAIMANT TO DELIVER AUTO PARTS FOR ITS CLIENT, ANY-PART AUTO STORES (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined claimant was not an employee of NEL, a business logistics company, and NEL was, therefore, not liable for unemployment insurance contributions on remuneration paid to claimant and others similarly situated. Claimant was a delivery driver who was assigned by NEL to deliver auto parts for Any-Part Auto Stores:

The record reflects that, after NEL initially referred claimant to Any-Part, NEL did not retain any supervisory authority over him. NEL did not provide any training, set delivery goals for claimant, conduct performance reviews or evaluations, require any proof of delivery or require any contact from claimant on a day-to-day basis. Any-Part assigned the deliveries to claimant and handled any complaints. Claimant used his own vehicle, NEL did not reimburse him for any expenses and claimant was not restricted from working for others. Under the parties’ written agreement, claimant could refuse an assignment, but, once he accepted an assignment, he was required to complete it. Per the agreement, claimant was permitted to hire other individuals to perform the work if claimant could not, and claimant was responsible for ensuring that those individuals comply with state and federal regulations, including licensing and insurance requirements. … . Matter of Pasini (Northeast Logistics, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2022 NY Slip Op 02464, Third Dept 4-14-22

 

THERE WAS NO INDICATION ON THE FORM AND NO REGULATION REQUIRING CLAIMANT TO SUBMIT A SEPARATE RB-89 FORM FOR EACH CLAIM; THE BOARD THEREFORE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO REVIEW THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW JUDGE’S (WCLJ’S) DECISION ON THAT GROUND (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing the Workers’ Compensation Board and remitting the matter, determined it was an abuse of discretion to deny claimant’s application on the ground that a separate copy of the RB-89 form was not submitted for each claim:

We note … that the requirement that a party submit a copy of the RB-89 form when referencing multiple claims, or that failing to provide a copy for each claim could result in review being denied on one of the claims, is not included on the form, in the instructions to the form or in the Board’s regulations. Although the Board may certainly adopt the formatting requirement that applicants provide a copy of their RB-89 form for each claim referenced therein, we find, under the circumstances presented here, that the Board’s denial of claimant’s application for review of the WCLJ’s decision on the 2017 claim for failing to provide the Board with an additional copy of their RB-89 form was an abuse of the Board’s discretion … . Matter of Olszewski v PAL Envtl. Safety Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 02469, Third Dept 4-14-22

 

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION PETITIONER-INMATE WAS GUILTY OF “CREATING A DISTURBANCE” (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, annulling the disciplinary determination, held the evidence did not demonstrate petitioner-inmate was guilty of “creating a disturbance:”

Pursuant to the relevant regulations, an incarcerated individual “shall not engage in conduct which disturbs the order of any part of the facility” (7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [5] [iv]). Such disruptive conduct includes, as relevant here, “loud talking in a mess hall, program area or corridor” (7 NYCRR 270.0 [B] [5] [iv]). The misbehavior report, which was the sole evidence relied upon by the Hearing Officer, provided, in relevant part, that petitioner was observed “arguing” with another incarcerated individual “in the dorm hallway . . ., which drew the attention of the [incarcerated individuals] nearby.” The misbehavior report does not reflect that petitioner was screaming … or otherwise speaking in a loud or boisterous manner … , nor does it establish that petitioner’s behavior triggered an affirmative response on the part of the incarcerated individuals observing the alleged argument … . Similarly, petitioner was found not guilty of fighting, and there were no other established disciplinary infractions that would give rise to a reasonable inference that his conduct was disruptive … . In short, as the misbehavior report fails to identify the manner in which petitioner’s conduct disturbed the order of the facility, we cannot say that respondent’s determination is supported by substantial evidence … . Matter of Hogan v Thompson, 2022 NY Slip Op 02470, Third Dept 4-14-22

 

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