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Empire Zone Status Can Be Revoked; No Vested or Actionable Right

The petitioner, the owner of a shopping mall, was certified as an empire zone business enterprise in 2002, and was thereby afforded certain tax benefits.  In 2009 the Empire Zone Designation Board revoked petitioner’s certification.  On appeal from an Article 78 proceeding, the Third Department affirmed the lower court’s determination that the respondents were not estopped from revoking the empire zone status because tax legislation is not a governmental promise:

Because “tax legislation is not a governmental promise,  [taxpayers  have]  no  vested  or  actionable right . . . to the benefit of a tax statute or regulation” … .   A claim of estoppel may only be asserted against a government agency in the rarest of situations and may not be invoked to prevent an agency from discharging its statutory duties … .  After the Legislature amended the Empire Zones Act, the Board discharged its statutory duty to review appeals of the … decisions to decertify empire zone business enterprises (see General Municipal Law §  959  [w]). Under these circumstances, where petitioner did not have  a vested right to continue receiving tax credits and  the Board  was  fulfilling its duty under the law, the court properly held that estoppel may not be invoked.  Matter of Greece Town Mall, LP v New York State, et al, 515207, Third Dept 4-25-13

 

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Slander Per Se Complaint Not Based Upon “Serious Crime” (Trespass) ​

In affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging slander per se based upon the accusation defendant had committed trespass, the Third Department explained:

A statement will fall into one of the four categories of slander per se when  it is so noxious and injurious by nature that the law presumes that pecuniary damages will result and, thus, special damages need not be alleged ….  As relevant here, “slander per se” includes “statements . . . charging [a] plaintiff with a serious crime,” but “the law distinguishes between  serious and  relatively minor offenses, and  only statements regarding the former are actionable without proof of damage” … .  * * *

In any event, even construing the complaint liberally and according plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, it does not set forth the allegedly defamatory statement with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirement of CPLR  3016… .  Martin v Hayes, 515024, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13

 

 

Sentences for Underlying Felony and Bail Jumping Must Be Consecutive Absent Mitigating Factors that Bear Directly on the Manner the Crime Was Committed

In finding the sentencing court used the wrong “mitigating” factors to determine whether the sentence for bail jumping could run concurrently with the sentence for the underlying felony, the Third Department wrote:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2-c) restricts a court’s sentencing discretion when a person who is convicted of bail jumping in the second  degree  also is convicted of the underlying felony in connection with which he or she had been released on bail. Specifically, if indeterminate sentences are imposed upon both the bail jumping charge and the underlying felony, the bail jumping sentence must run consecutively to the other sentence unless the court “finds mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed” (Penal Law § 70.25 [2-c]…).  Here, County Court sought to justify concurrent sentences based upon “the severe penalties, fines, restrictions and state prison sentence [defendant was] earning by [his] antisocial behavior of drinking and driving and failing to come to court, and because [he had pleaded] guilty . . . and waived appeal in another county.” However, these factors have no bearing upon the manner in which the crime was committed … and, therefore, do not support imposing concurrent sentences in this case.  People v Harrison, 105176, 3rd Dept 4-18-22

 

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Inmate Should Not Have Been Required to Document His Native American Ancestry In Order to Practice His Religion

In annulling a determination by the Central Office Review Committee (CORC) that the petitioner (an inmate) must document his Native American ancestry before he will be allowed to practice his religion, the Third Department wrote:

It has been recognized that correction officials may impose restrictions on the religious practices of inmates provided that such restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests … .Respondents candidly concede, and we agree, that CORC failed to articulate or otherwise identify any legitimate penological interest reasonably served by the documentation requirement. Consequently, we conclude that the determinations at issue are arbitrary, capricious and  without a rational basis… .  Matter of Santiago, 514317, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

 

 

Reasons for Refusal of Temporary Job Not Sufficient; Claimant Disqualified

The Third Department upheld the disqualification of an unemployment-insurance claimant who refused a temporary job offer because the pay was lower than at his previous temporary job and a 20-mile commute was required:

“A claimant who  refuses to accept a job for which  he  or she is reasonably suited by  training and  experience will be  disqualified from receiving unemployment  insurance benefits” ….   Here, the record confirms that claimant was  qualified for the job offered to him  and  the position paid the prevailing wage ….   As for claimant’s rejection of the job offer due  to its location, “dissatisfaction with the length of one’s commute does not constitute good cause for rejecting an otherwise  suitable  offer of  employment”  … Notably, claimant admitted receiving the unemployment  insurance handbook explaining his obligations regarding reasonable commuting  distances under these circumstances.  Matter of Neuman, 509590, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

 

Claimant, Who Had Been Diagnosed With Job-Related Stress, Did Not Have Good Cause to Resign

After a doctor diagnosed claimant with job-related stress and authorized a month’s leave from work, claimant resigned from his job.  The Third Department affirmed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s finding claimant was not eligible for unemployment insurance on the ground he left his employment without good cause:

It is well settled that general dissatisfaction with a job or the inability to get along with a supervisor does not constitute good cause for leaving one’s employment … .   Here, claimant expressed extreme displeasure with his work environment as well as the demeanor of his supervisor, which undoubtedly contributed to the stress he was experiencing. While his physician provided him with a note setting forth medical reasons justifying a  leave of  absence,  claimant  did  not receive medical advice to quit his job … .   Moreover, although claimant  cited safety concerns  as another  reason  for his leaving, his supervisor testified that he  accepted  claimant’s suggestions concerning  the  operation  of the  machinery  and  did  not  have  him engage in potentially dangerous work practices. Matter of Bielak v Commissioner of Labor, 514536, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

Claimant’s Failure to Give Timely Written Notice of Injury Excused

In finding claimant’s failure to give timely written notice of her injury to her employer was excused, the Third Department wrote:

While claimant did not give timely written notice of her injury, her failure to do so may be excused “on the ground that notice could not be given, the employer or its agent had knowledge of the accident, or the employer was not prejudiced” (…see Workers’ Compensation Law § 18). Claimant testified that she verbally informed  the bus  dispatcher of the accident shortly after it occurred, and the employer’s employee benefits supervisor confirmed that the dispatcher would be an appropriate individual to whom  to report an accident if claimant’s  supervisor  was  unavailable. Claimant  also  testified that she orally notified her supervisor of the accident – perhaps the following day … .  Matter of Rankin v Half Hollow Hills Central School District, et al, 514956, Third Dept 4-18-13

 

Failure to Record Testimony Relied Upon by Hearing Officer Required Annulment

The failure to record testimony which was relied upon by the hearing officer in a disciplinary determination required annulment.  Matter of Tolliver v Fischer, 514866, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

Failure to Make Sufficient Effort to Transport Injured Inmate to His Hearing Required Annulment

In annulling a disciplinary determination, the Third Department ruled the inmate’s statement to the escort officer that he had injured his foot and could not put on a shoe (to walk to the disciplinary hearing) did not constitute a refusal to attend the hearing:

“[A]n inmate has a fundamental right to be present at his or her disciplinary hearing, unless he or she waives such right or refuses to attend”  …. Here, instead of “transporting petitioner to the hearing by  wheelchair, stretcher or other appropriate conveyance  or arranging to have medical personnel examine petitioner or otherwise developing a record on the issue of petitioner’s physical ability to walk” … – or even exploring the possibility of allowing petitioner to leave his SHU cell with only one shoe – the Hearing Officer summarily accepted the  escort  officer’s characterization of  petitioner’s conduct  as a blatant refusal to attend the hearing … .Under these circumstances, the record does not support the finding that petitioner “willfully refused”… .  Matter of Brooks v James, 514707, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

Failure to Make Sufficient Effort to Have Inmate’s Witness Testify Required a New Hearing

The Third Department ordered a new disciplinary hearing where insufficient efforts were made to procure the testimony of a witness requested by the inmate:

When  petitioner requested that a fellow inmate  testify at the  disciplinary  hearing,  the Hearing  Officer merely  noted  that the witness had informed petitioner’s employee assistant that he refused  to  testify. Such a notation by the Hearing Officer, without any attempt to determine the reason for the witness’s refusal, is not a sufficient basis upon which to deny petitioner’s right to call the witness … Matter of Dickerson v Fischer, 514685, 3rd Dept, 4-18-13

 

 

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