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Challenge to Superior Court Information Does Not Survive Guilty Plea

The Third Department noted that a challenge to the factual sufficiency of a superior court information must be preserved by objection and does not survive a guilty plea (after indictment).  People v Martinez, 104837, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

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Relationship Between Defendant’s Act and Fatal Car Accident Too Attenuated to Support Criminally Negligent Homicide

The Third Department determined that the relationship between the defendant’s act and a fatal car accident was too attenuated to support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide.  The defendant, a passenger, jerked the steering wheel, apparently in an attempt to intimidate or strike a car that was along side of the car defendant was in.  The car defendant was in struck a guard rail and caused the blockage of one lane of traffic.  The one car accident caused traffic to back up.  30 minutes later the fatal accident occurred.  The Third Department wrote:

“[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen'”… .   A connection between the conduct and the death that is obscure or “merely probable” will not suffice ….  On the other hand, we note that the mere lapse of time will not  necessarily serve to break the chain of causation … .  Nor  does  a  defendant’s conduct  need  to be  the  sole cause  of death  in order  for criminal responsibility to attach ….  * * *

Here, the People failed to present evidence directly linking defendant’s act to the victims’ deaths …. Although the accident reconstructionist called as a witness by the People provided an opinion as to the sequence of the five-car collision, he could not estimate the speed of the vehicles involved, he did not attempt to reconstruct the initial accident and he offered no opinion to support the conclusion that the third and fatal accident was  a foreseeable result of the initial accident … . People v Ballenger, 104664, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

 

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Defense Counsel’s Assessment of the Merits of Defendant’s Pro Se Motion Rendered Her Position Adverse to Defendant’s

The defendant made a pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.  In response to the sentencing court’s question, the defendant’s attorney told the court that she saw no legal basis for the motion. The Third Department determined defense counsel acted appropriately in not supporting the pro se motion, but the sentencing court should not have questioned defense counsel about the merits of the motion and should have assigned new counsel to the defendant once it was clear counsel’s position was adverse to defendant’s:

Under  established principles, defense counsel has no  duty to support a pro se motion that he or she has determined to be without merit, and failing to support such a motion “does not constitute a position adverse to the client” ….   Here, after properly informing County Court that she would not be making the motion on behalf of defendant, defense counsel responded to the court’s substantive inquiry that she found no  “legal basis” for his motion. Indeed, in denying defendant’s request for new counsel or for more time to make the motion, the court reiterated that defense counsel “in her knowledge and  understanding of this case [stated] that there’s no legal basis to withdraw your plea of guilty.”  “[O]nce counsel took a position adverse to . . . defendant, the court should not have proceeded  to determine the motion  without first assigning. . . defendant new counsel” … . People v McCray, 104161, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

Indictment Count Did Not State an Offense; Jurisdictional Defect Can Not Be Cured by Amendment

The Third Department determined one count of an indictment was jurisdictionally defective and the People’s attempt to cure the defect by amendment was prohibited by CPL 200.70, which does not allow amendment to fix the failure to state or charge an offense:

Here, count 3 of the indictment charged defendant with conspiracy in the second degree, a crime which requires an “intent that conduct constituting a class A  felony be  performed” (Penal Law § 105.15). While count 3 references the relevant statutory section for conspiracy in the second degree and expressly states that defendant acted “with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed,” it does not include any statutory reference to the class A  felony listed in count 1 of the indictment. * * *

While it is true that “[t]he incorporation [in an indictment] by  specific reference to the statute [defining the crime charged] operates without more to constitute allegations of all the elements of the crime required by explicit provision of the statute itself or by judicial gloss overlaid thereon” …, such reference may be negated, as it was here, by the inclusion of conduct that does not constitute the crime charged …. People v Boula, 104053, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

Includable/Excludable Time Under Speedy Trial Statute Explained​

The Third Department explained the principles and proof requirements with respect to excludable time under the speedy trial statute, including a detailed analysis of all the relevant types of excludable/includable time raised by the facts of the case:

Where, as here, a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months of incarceration, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b];…).   “Whether  the People  complied  with this obligation is ‘determined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People’s declaration of readiness, subtracting any  periods of delay that are excludable under  the terms  of the statute and  then  adding  to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People  and  are ineligible for an  exclusion'”… . People v Sydlar, 103777, 3rd Dept, 5-30-13

 

 

Deputy Sheriff Fired for Incompetence and Insubordination Was Entitled to Unemployment Benefits

In upholding the finding that a former sheriff’s deputy was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, even though he was terminated for incompetence and insubordination, the Third Department noted that collateral estoppel applied to the factual findings in the Civil Service proceeding, but the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board could make its own determination whether the facts supported denial of unemployment benefits:

Given that claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of misconduct at the Civil Service Law § 75 hearing, the Board properly accorded collateral estoppel effect to the factual findings of the Hearing Officer… .  It was, however, incumbent upon the Board to draw its own conclusion as to whether such factual findings amounted to misconduct disqualifying claimant from receiving unemployment insurance benefits….  Significantly, “[t]he  same conduct that leads to a claimant being discharged for cause may not necessarily rise to the level of misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes….  The Board’s decision in this regard will not  be  disturbed  if supported  by substantial evidence … . Matter of Guynup, 515235, 3rd Dept, 5-23-13

 

Matter Remitted; County Court Did Not Follow Procedure Mandated by Drug Law Reform Act

In remitting the matter, the Third Department explained County Court failed to follow the procedure mandated by the Drug Law Reform Act:

The record contains no written order denying defendant’s application for resentencing and setting forth County  Court’s “findings of fact and the reasons for such order” as is required under the Drug Law Reform Act (L 2004, ch 738, § 23). Absent the necessary written order, we are without jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal … .  People v Allen, 104967, 3rd Dept, 5-23-13​

 

Transfer to Another County for Probation Did Not Divest Sentencing Court of Jurisdiction Over Defendant’s Violation of His Intermittent Sentence​

In this case Columbia County Court sentenced defendant to intermittent imprisonment in the Columbia County jail and five years probation in Greene County where defendant resided.  After defendant failed to report to Columbia County Jail, County Court revoked the intermittent sentence and sentenced defendant to four months. Defendant contended Columbia County Court had relinquished jurisdiction by transferring the probation term to Greene County.  The Third Department disagreed:

Defendant’s reliance on CPL 410.80 – which provides for transfer of probation supervision by the sentencing court to the Probation Department in the jurisdiction (county) where  the defendant  resides at sentencing –  is misplaced … . Defendant was not charged  with violating probation but, rather, was  alleged to have violated his intermittent sentence of imprisonment.  The transfer in CPL  410.80 (2) of “all powers  and  duties” of the sentencing court over supervision of probationers to the receiving court does not, as defendant argues, divest the sentencing court of its express jurisdiction to modify  or revoke a sentence of intermittent imprisonment pursuant to Penal Law § 85.05 (1) (b) … . People v Dick, 104424, 3rd Dept, 5-23-13

 

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Children’s Hearsay Alleging Abuse by Father Was Not Corroborated; Change in Custody Should Not Have Been Granted

In reversing Family Court’s grant of the mother’s petition to modify a prior order of custody, the Third Department determined the children’s hearsay statements alleging abuse by the father was not corroborated, and therefore could not form the basis of a modification of custody:

Inasmuch as Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (vi) is applicable to custody proceedings based upon allegations of abuse, the children’s out-of-court statements are excepted from the hearsay rule, but must be corroborated …. *  *  * Because the  children’s out-of-court statements were not corroborated, Family Court’s finding of a change in circumstances lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record.  Matter of Zukowski v Zukowski, 514074, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

Hearing Officer’s Refusal to Call Witness Required Expungement of Relevant Charges

The Third Department determined the relevant charges must be expunged because the hearing officer refused to call a witness, a violation of the inmate’s constitutional right:

…[T]he Hearing Officer erroneously refused to call a correction officer who witnessed petitioner’s behavior while being escorted to his cell. Inasmuch  as petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to call a witness with regard to that incident, expungement of the related charges is required… .  Matter of Cahill v Prack, 515216, 3rd Dept, 5-16-13

 

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