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Plaintiff’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Did Not Preclude Lawsuit—Question of Fact Re: Applicability of Emergency Doctrine

In affirming the denial of summary judgment to the defendant driver who struck plaintiff when the defendant turned toward the shoulder to avoid an on-coming car, the Third Department noted that plaintiff’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy did not preclude the suit and there were questions of fact about the applicability of the emergency doctrine:

Initially, we reject defendants’ assertion that plaintiff lacks the capacity to sue by virtue of his failure to disclose his personal injury claim in his chapter 13 bankruptcy schedule of assets.  “While [c]hapter 7 and [c]hapter 11 debtors lose standing to maintain civil suits – which must be brought and/or maintained by their bankruptcy trustees – it is clear that [c]hapter 13 debtors like plaintiff are not subject to this restriction” … .   Accordingly, Supreme Court properly concluded that plaintiff’s omission in this regard was not fatal. …

“Under the emergency doctrine, a driver who confronts a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration may be relieved of liability if the actions taken in response are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” … .  The reasonableness of the driver’s conduct, as well as whether he or she could have done something to avoid the accident, typically present questions of fact for a jury to resolve … .  Thus, in order to be granted summary judgment in this regard, “a driver must establish as a matter of law that he or she did not contribute to the creation of the emergency situation, and that his or her reaction was reasonable under the circumstances such that he or she could not have done anything to avoid the collision” …Defendants failed to meet that burden here.  Collins v Suraci, 516138, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine Re: Shard of Wood Ingested by Plaintiff Allowed Case to Survive Summary Judgment

In reversing Supreme Court, the Third Department determined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently raised a question of fact about whether a shard of wood, which was swallowed by plaintiff, was negligently present in food prepared by defendant (Cipriani):

Res ipsa loquitur is neither a theory of liability nor a presumption of liability, but instead is simply a permitted inference – that the trier of fact may accept or reject – reflecting a “common-sense application of the probative value of circumstantial evidence” … .  Criteria for res ipsa loquitur to apply are that “(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff” … .  The parties dispute the exclusive control element and, to establish that element, plaintiffs were “not obligated to eliminate every alternative explanation for the event, but only to demonstrate that the likelihood of causes other than the defendant[s’] negligence is so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant[s’] door, rendering it more likely than not that the injury was caused by defendant[s’] negligence” … .

Here, the event occurred at a banquet hall operated by Cipriani.  Cipriani prepared and provided all of the food. Attendees were not permitted to bring food onto the premises. Individuals undisputedly under Cipriani’s control (pursuant to a contractual arrangement) acted as captains, servers and bartenders.  Cipriani thus exclusively prepared, provided and served the food.  Although the shard possibly could have been present when the ingredients for food were purchased from suppliers, it was not so small as to have been likely concealed and thus not visible upon careful preparation (cf. Restatement [Second] of Torts § 328D, Comment e, Illustration 2).  … There is sufficient proof under these circumstances to find ample control by defendants for purposes of res ipsa loquitur. Brumberg v Cipriani USA Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 06759, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

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New Medicaid Reimbursement Procedures Did Not Violate State Administrative Procedure Act

The Third Department affirmed Supreme Court and determined that a modified Medicaid reimbursement procedure for the school supportive health services program (SSHSP) did not violate the State Administrative Procedure Act because the new administrative directives (referred to as Q & A’s) were not new rules triggering the requirements of the Act:

The documentation and reimbursement eligibility requirements reflected in the challenged Q & As were not required to be promulgated as rules under the State Administrative Procedure Act.  For purposes of rule-making notice and filing requirements (see State Administrative Procedure Act § 202), a rule is defined as “the whole or part of each agency statement, regulation or code of general applicability that implements or applies law, or prescribes . . . the procedure or practice requirements of any agency, including the amendment, suspension or repeal thereof” (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [a]).  Expressly excluded from the definition are “rules concerning the internal management of the agency which do not directly and significantly affect the rights of or procedures or practices available to the public” (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [b] [i]), and “forms and instructions, interpretive statements and statements of general policy which in themselves have no legal effect but are merely explanatory” (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [b] [iv]).  The Court of Appeals has recognized “that there is no clear bright line between a ‘rule’ or ‘regulation’ and an interpretative policy” (Cubas v Martinez, 8 NY3d 611, 621 [2007]).  Courts have previously found administrative directives to be interpretive statements when they rely on and constitute reasonable interpretations of existing regulations or statutes, or merely address the type of documentation needed to establish whether a predetermined test of eligibility has been met … .  Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village Union Free School District, 516336, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

Revocation of Empire Zone Program Certifications Cannot Be Applied Retroactively

The Third Department noted that revocation of Empire Zone Program certifications cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to James Sq Assoc LP v Mullen, 21 NY3d 233 [2013].  Matter of Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC v NY Dept of Economic Development…, 514812, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

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In College Disciplinary Action, Victim Need Not Testify—Failure to Detail Factual Findings in Determination Violates Due Process

The Third Department, in a disciplinary action by SUNY Cortland, determined the alleged victim of harassment was not the complainant in the disciplinary proceeding and therefore the alleged victim need not testify in the proceeding.  The court, however, determined the school’s failure to set forth detailed factual findings in its disciplinary determination violated the student’s due process rights. The matter was sent back for those factual findings, after which the student could pursue administrative remedies:

We reject petitioner’s contention that the Hearing Panel failed to substantially adhere to its rules and regulations published in the Code … .  Although petitioner correctly notes that the Code requires the “complainant” to present his or her own case, the “complainant” is defined as “any person or persons who have filed disciplinary charges against a student.”  Here, the complainant was SUNY Cortland’s Director of Judicial Affairs.  Thus, petitioner’s contention that the Hearing Panel did not comply with the Code because the victim did not present the case is unavailing.  Furthermore, as the victim was not called as a witness by either side and nothing in the Code establishes that the victim is a party to a disciplinary proceeding, we find that the Hearing Panel substantially complied with its rule requiring it to afford petitioner the opportunity to question all parties.  …
We do agree, however, that petitioner was denied due process because the Hearing Panel failed to set forth detailed factual findings in its disciplinary determination.  In a disciplinary proceeding at a public institution of higher education, due process entitles a student accused of misconduct to “a statement detailing the factual findings and the evidence relied upon by the decision-maker in reaching the determination of guilt” … .   Recognized as one of the “‘rudimentary elements of fair play'” in this context …, “[s]uch a statement is necessary to permit the student to effectively challenge the determination in administrative appeals and in the courts and to ensure that the decision was based on evidence in the record”… . Matter of Boyd v SUNY Cortland, 514925, 3rd Dept 10-17-13

 

Accidental Disability Retirement Benefits (Police Officers)

The Third Department confirmed the comptroller’s determination that the injuries suffered by a police officer were not the result of “accidents” and therefore did not justify the award of accidental disability retirement benefits.  The officer slipped on a wet metal-encased curb while directing traffic and was subsequently injured again when a suspect he was chasing resisted arrest.  The Third Department wrote:

Initially, we note that petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to receive accidental disability retirement benefits, and the Comptroller’s determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence … .  In order to qualify as an accident, the precipitating event must be “a sudden, fortuitous mischance that is unexpected, out of the ordinary and injurious in impact” … .  Notably, an injury will not be considered accidental if it “‘results from an expected or foreseeable event arising during the performance of routine employment duties'” … . Matter of Rodriques v DiNapoli, 515935, 3rd Dept 10-3-13

 

Retroactive Transfer of Liability to Special Fund Proper

The Third Department affirmed the board’s determination that retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund to a time within seven years of the underlying injury was proper:

Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a, liability is transferred to the Special Fund “when an application to reopen a closed case is made more than seven years from the date of injury and more than three years after the last payment of compensation” (…see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1]).  Here, there is no dispute that these conditions have been met and the only issue before us is whether the Board properly transferred liability to the Special Fund retroactively to a period of time prior to the lapse of seven years following claimant’s injury.

While the retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund is limited to no longer than two years prior to the date of the application to reopen (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]…), there is no statutory requirement that there be a seven year lapse from the date of a claimant’s injury prior to the date of a retroactive transfer of liability (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a [1-a]).  Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s determination, that Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a does not preclude a retroactive transfer of liability to the Special Fund to a time period within seven years of the underlying injury, is not unreasonable, irrational or inconsistent with the purpose of the statute …, and the Board has set forth sufficient reasons for no longer following any prior decisions to the contrary. Canfora v Goldman Sachs…, 515529, 3rd Dept 10-3-13

 

Math Tutor Was an Independent Contractor, Not an Employee

The Third Department affirmed the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board finding that claimant, a math tutor, was an independent contractor, not an employee:

Although claimant maintains that he was erroneously considered an independent contractor in connection with earnings received from tutoring services through TestQuest, Inc. and that such funds should be utilized as covered employment to establish his claim, we cannot agree.  As noted earlier, TestQuest, Inc. tutors such as claimant were deemed by this Court to be independent contractors (Matter of Leazard [TestQuest, Inc.–Commissioner of Labor], 74 AD3d at 1415-1416), which decision is conclusive and binding upon all such persons employed by TestQuest, Inc. (see Labor Law § 620 [1] [b]).  As such, those earnings cannot qualify for inclusion as remuneration in the base periods… . Matter of Tkachyshyn…, 516210. 3rd Dept 9-26-13

 

Claimant Who Sold Educational Materials Was an Employee

The College Network (TCN) sells educational materials for personal study from home to obtain college credits through testing. Claimant was retained by TCN to promote and selling the materials. After claimant stopped working for TCN he filed a claim for unemployment insurance. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board upheld the decision that claimant was an employee entitled to unemployment insurance.  The Third Department affirmed:

It is well settled that “the existence of an employment relationship is a factual issue for the Board to decide and its determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … .  “The predominant consideration in making this inquiry is evidence of the alleged employer’s control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results, with the latter being more important” … .  Here, there is ample evidence that TCN exercised control over many aspects of the program advisors’ work.

Notably, TCN established the program advisors’ sales territory and provided them with sales leads as well as product knowledge training.  Although the program advisors could pursue these leads or develop their own, they were paid commissions based upon percentages set by TCN depending on the manner in which the sale was generated.  The program advisors were required to report to TCN the results of company-generated leads and were only allowed to use advertisements and promotional materials approved by TCN.  TCN provided program advisors with company email addresses and business cards, and reimbursed them for the expenses of attending some training.  Notably, at times, regional sales managers accompanied the program advisors on sales calls to ensure they were providing customers with accurate information. In addition, TCN maintained a corporate calendar by which it would schedule appointments for the program advisors depending upon their availability.  Significantly, the program advisors were expected to contact nine customers within a 90-day period, and TCN retained the right to terminate them if they were underperforming.  TCN also prohibited the program advisors from working for competitors for a two-year period.  Matter of Smith…, 515773, 3rd Dept 9-26-13

 

Tour Musicians Were Employees of Columbia Artists Management; Workers Who Loaded and Unloaded Equipment Were Not Employees

The Third Department determined that, for purposes of assessing unemployment insurance contributions, musicians on tour were employees of, not independent contractors for, Columbia Artists Management, but the workers who loaded and unloaded the equipment used by the musicians were independent contractors, not employees:

… [T]here are a number of factors that establish that Columbia retained control over important aspects of the musicians’ work.  Specifically, Columbia paid the musicians a flat fee per week for the duration of the tour as well as the costs of transportation, lodging and miscellaneous expenses, supplied them with sheet music on occasion and prohibited them from taking on engagements that conflicted with the tour.  Most significantly, under the written contracts, Columbia retained the right to ensure the artistic quality of the show by insisting that a performance be changed if it found it to be inappropriate. In addition to retaining broad overall control over the musicians’ performances, Columbia retained the right to dismiss any musician for drug or alcohol abuse.  In view of this, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between Columbia and the musicians … .

We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the loaders.  There is nothing in the record to indicate that Columbia exerted any type of control over either the means or the results of the work of these individuals.  All communications involved in retaining the loaders occurred through the union representative at the venue, who dictated the terms of payment as well as the number of loaders needed.  The Columbia representative present at the time the trucks were unloaded was there solely for the purpose of paying the loaders and provided no equipment or instruction to assist them in performing their work.  Matter of Columbia Artists Management LLC…, 515768, 3rd Dept 9-26-13

 

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