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Photo Array Unduly Suggestive—Proof Burdens Explained

The Third Department determined a photo array was unduly suggestive because the nature of defendant’s picture was significantly different from the other photos:

Initially, a pretrial identification that is unduly suggestive violates due process and is therefore inadmissible against the defendant … . In this regard, a photo array is unduly suggestive if it “depicts a unique characteristic which draws the viewer’s attention so as to indicate that the police have selected a particular individual” … . “While the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification procedure, it is the defendant who bears the ultimate burden of proving that the procedure was unduly suggestive” … . Where suggestiveness is shown, it is the People’s burden to demonstrate the existence of an independent source by clear and convincing evidence … .

Finding that the People met their initial burden to establish that the police conduct was reasonable and their procedure was not unduly suggestive, we turn to defendant’s ultimate burden. … The array depicts six individuals of equivalent age and ethnicity who are reasonably similar in appearance. However, we nonetheless find the array to be unduly suggestive to the extent that defendant’s photo draws the viewer’s immediate attention. Specifically, while the other five photos depict individuals from the shoulders up with the upper portion of their photos consisting of nothing more than a blank, gray background, defendant is shown from the chest up with the top of his head reaching to the very top of the photo. Thus, defendant’s face occupies the space that, in all of the other photos, is bare. In our view, this difference cannot be deemed minor and impermissibly “create[d] a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification” … . Thus, County Court improperly held that the photo array was not unduly suggestive. People v Smith, 2014 NY Slip Op 08268, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

Criteria for Termination of Parental Rights on the Ground of Mental Illness Explained

In affirming the termination of petitioner’s parental rights upon the ground of mental illness, the Third Department explained the criteria:

To terminate parental rights upon the ground of mental illness, the petitioning agency must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is — and for the foreseeable future will continue to be — unable to provide proper and adequate care for his or her [child] by reason of that parent’s mental illness. Such a showing, in turn, must include testimony from appropriate medical witnesses particularizing how the parent’s mental illness affects his or her present and future ability to care for the [child]” … . Matter of Kaitlyn X …, 2014 NY Slip Op 08272, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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The Third Dept Upheld the Statutory Amendment Cutting Off Reimbursement of Medicaid Overburden Expenses Incurred Prior to 2006—However the Court Imposed a Six-Month Grace Period Before the Amendment Kicks In [The Fourth Dept Dealt with the Same Question in a Decision Dated 11-14-14—Although the Fourth Dept Also Upheld the Amendment, It Did Not Impose a Grace Period and Did Not Use the Same Reasoning]

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, determined that a 2012 amendment to the Social Services Law (section 61) eliminated the requirement that counties be reimbursed by the state for certain medicaid expenses (so-called “Overburden expenses”) incurred prior to 2006, when the medicaid “Cap Statute” was enacted.  The 4th Department dealt with the same issues in Matter of County of Niagara v Shah, 2014 NY Slip Op 07781, 4th Dept 11-14-14.  Although the two courts came to similar, but not identical, conclusions, it is interesting to see the substantial differences in reasoning and result.  Unlike the 4th Department, the Third Department imposed a six-month grace period, starting from the date of the decision, before the prohibition against reimbursement for pre-2006 expenses kicks in. The Third Department dealt with several issues, including:  (1) whether a political subdivision of a state can make a due process claim against the state (the court deemed the issue waived); (2) the amendment of the statute essentially imposed a statute of limitations and therefore did not extinguish a vested right to reimbursement; (3) the amendment is not unconstitutional because the new statute of limitations does not retroactively affect any substantive rights; (4) the special facts exception did not apply; (5) petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring payment of the pre-2006 expenses (because of the grace period):

Social Services Law § 368-a and the 2012 amendment can be read together and “interpreted to achieve legislative objectives that are not inherently inconsistent with each other” … . This Court has already held that, under Social Services Law § 368-a (1) (h), petitioner’s right to reimbursement of overburden expenditures accrued when petitioner made payment to the state for those expenses for which no local share was owed, i.e., prior to January 1, 2006 … . The 2012 amendment did not specifically repeal any part of Social Services Law § 368-a or affect the counties’ inherent right to reimbursement. Rather, the amendment simply imposed a statute of limitations for the payment of claims for such reimbursement. A statute of limitations does not impair an underlying substantive right, but may deprive a litigant of any remedy … . In April 2012, the Legislature could have reasonably decided that, to promote finality of claims and effectuate accurate budgeting, reimbursements from more than six years earlier could be barred. Although petitioner contends that DOH was required by statute to reimburse all counties for overburden expenditures incurred prior to 2006, and that DOH did not comply with its statutory obligations, “[a] statute of limitations may apply even when conduct inconsistent with a statute or the state constitution is alleged” … . Matter of County of St. Lawrence v Shah, 2014 NY Slip Op 08278, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

Homeowner Not Liable for Construction-Related Death—Criteria for Homeowner’s Exemption and Supervisory Control by Homeowner Described in Some Depth

The Third Department determined the homeowner was not liable to plaintiff’s decedent (under Labor Law 200, 240, 241 (6) or common law negligence) based on the homeowners’ exemption and absence of supervision (by the homeowner) of plaintiff’s decedent’s work.  The homeowner had provided architectural plans to a contractor for an addition to the home.  Plaintiff’s decedent was digging a trench for the basement and was buried and killed when the walls of the trench collapsed.  The court explained the applicable law in unusual detail:

Although Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 “impose nondelegable duties upon contractors, owners and their agents to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in various construction-related activities” …, the Legislature carved out an exception for “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (Labor Law §§ 240 [1]; 241 [6]…). “In this context, the phrase direct or control is to be strictly construed and, in ascertaining whether a particular homeowner’s actions amount to direction or control of a project, the relevant inquiry is the degree to which the homeowner supervised the method and manner of the actual work being performed by the [injured] party” … . That is, “the owner must significantly participate in the project before he or she will be deemed to have crossed the line from being a legitimately concerned homeowner to a de facto supervisor” who is not entitled to the exemption … . * * *

…[U]nder established case law, “neither providing site plans, obtaining a building permit, hiring contractors, purchasing materials, offering suggestions/input, inspecting the site, retaining general supervisory authority, performing certain work, nor physical presence at the site, operates to deprive a homeowner of the statutory exemption — so long as the homeowner did not exercise direction or control over the injury-producing work” … . …

We reach a similar conclusion with respect to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 claim, which codifies the common-law duty of owners and general contractors “to maintain a safe construction site” … . As a precondition to the imposition of liability upon defendant as a homeowner, “it must be shown that [defendant] exercised supervisory control over [decedent’s] work and had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe manner in which the work was being performed” … . “When an alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from [a] contractor’s methods and the owner exercises no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner under the common law or under Labor Law § 200” … . Even “[t]he retention of general supervisory control, presence at a work site, or authority to enforce safety standards is insufficient to establish the control necessary to impose liability” … . Peck v Szwarcberg, 2014 NY Slip Op 08290, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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Declaratory Judgment Action Was Actually Seeking to Open a Default Judgment in a Tax Foreclosure Proceeding—30-Day Statute of Limitations in the Tax Law Applied

The Third Department determined that a proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment was actually seeking to open a default judgment in a tax foreclosure proceeding, subject to a 30-day statute of limitations.  The action was dismissed as untimely:

A tax debtor’s motion to reopen a default judgment of tax foreclosure ‘may not be brought more than one month after entry of the judgment'” … . Although the complaint seeks a judgment declaring that the foreclosure is a nullity and does not expressly seek an order vacating the default judgment, it is apparent that the relief that plaintiff now seeks is analogous to that which is demanded in an application to reopen a judgment entered on default and it is, therefore, subject to the timing requirements of RPTL 1131. As the action was commenced more than one month after the default judgment of foreclosure was entered and plaintiff has not demonstrated “either a reasonable excuse for his default or a meritorious defense,” dismissal of the complaint was warranted … . Goodfriend v Village of Jeffersonville, 2014 NY Slip Op 08279, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

Motion to Intervene Should Have Been Granted—Criteria Explained

The Third Department determined that the church elders’ motion to intervene should have been granted.  The church at issue had been funded by the man after whom the church was named more than one hundred years ago. The petitioner sought to have the restrictions on the fund removed so that it could be used to support any local Presbyterian church, rather than just the church founded with the fund. The elders of the church founded with the fund sought to intervene:

“Intervention is liberally allowed by courts, permitting persons to intervene in actions where they have a bona fide interest in an issue involved in that action” … . “Whether intervention is sought as a matter of right under CPLR 1012 (a), or as a matter of discretion under CPLR 1013, is of little practical significance since a timely motion for leave to intervene should be granted, in either event, where the intervenor has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings” … .

Here, decedent was a wealthy philanthropist who funded the construction of a church building, and he provided trust funds that have benefitted that church for over 100 years. The congregation provided some proof reflecting that decedent may have intended assistance to the church bearing his name to have precedence over any particular denominational affiliation. Although it is premature to determine whether the congregation will prevail, nonetheless the congregation will be impacted by this proceeding and should be afforded the opportunity to present its position. Matter of Jermain, 2014 NY Slip Op 08274, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

Failure to Provide Meaningful Employee Assistance in Preparing for the Hearing Was a Constitutional, Not Merely Regulatory, Violation Requiring Expungement—Criteria Discussed in Some Depth

The Third Department determined the failure to provide the inmate with meaningful assistance leading up to his hearing required the annulment of the determination.  The court further determination that the failure was of constitutional, not merely regulatory, dimensions requiring expungement.  The issues were discussed in unusual depth:

…[P]etitioner was not provided meaningful employee assistance and that he was prejudiced thereby. Departmental regulations require that an inmate who is confined pending a superintendent’s hearing is to be provided an assistant (see 7 NYCRR 251-4.1 [d]; 254.4). The assistant’s role is to, among other things, “interview witnesses and to report the results of his [or her] efforts to the inmate” (7 NYCRR 251-4.2). The record reflects that petitioner’s girlfriend and the other individual involved provided signed written statements to correction officials and State Police investigators implicating petitioner. Although petitioner requested that his assistant interview the two women to ascertain whether their statements were truthful and voluntary and provided his assistant with a list of questions to ask them, the record reveals that no interview took place and the Hearing Officer made no attempt to remedy the deficiency when petitioner raised the issue at the disciplinary hearing. Thus, the determination must be annulled.

Petitioner further asserts that the determination should be expunged, while respondent argues that the matter should be remitted for a new hearing because this was a regulatory, not constitutional, violation. Notably, the “right to assistance is a right of constitutional dimension” … and the failure to provide assistance is a violation of 7 NYCRR 251-4.2. In this regard, our precedent is not entirely consistent, nor have we clearly articulated the appropriate factors relevant to whether expungement, rather than remittal, is warranted when a petitioner has been denied meaningful employee assistance … . We have, however, held that constitutional violations related to a Hearing Officer’s failure to investigate a witness’s refusal to testify or the outright denial of the right to call a witness results in expungement …, while regulatory violations of such right do not … .

In the case before us, petitioner’s employee assistant took no steps whatsoever to interview the requested witnesses and ask the questions posed by petitioner, and this failure clearly prejudiced petitioner by impeding his ability to assert a defense to the charges. In our view, where, as here, the denial of meaningful employee assistance is absolute and without reasonable explanation, and the Hearing Officer does not attempt to remedy the deficiencies, such denial is comparable to those instances in which we have found a constitutional violation relative to the outright denial of a witness or the failure to ascertain the basis of a witness’s refusal to testify. Thus, under these circumstances, we find the denial of meaningful employee assistance to be a constitutional violation requiring expungement of all references to the matter from petitioner’s record. Matter of Rivera v Prack, 2014 NY Slip Op 08297, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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If the Action Challenging Governmental Action Could Have Been Brought in an Article 78 Proceeding, No Matter How the Action Is Labelled, the Four-Month Statute of Limitations Applies

The collection of assessments by the defendant from hydroelectric power plants was deemed illegal in a federal lawsuit brought by a hydroelectric power plant.  Plaintiff, a different hydroelectric power plant, thereafter sought return of the assessments it had paid for six years (between 2002 and 2008) in an action for unjust enrichment.  The Third Department determined that action could have been brought as an Article 78 proceeding challenging the assessments as they were imposed.  Therefore the four-month Article 78 statute of limitations applied, rendering the action untimely:

…Supreme Court erred in applying a six-year statute of limitations because, even though plaintiffs have now labeled their cause of action as one for unjust enrichment, they could have raised their claim for refunds in a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging each annual assessment, for which the applicable statute of limitations is four months (see CPLR 217 [1]).

“Where, as here, governmental activity is being challenged, the immediate inquiry is whether the challenge could have been advanced in a CPLR article 78 proceeding” … . Thus, whether plaintiffs’ “claims are subject to the four-month statute of limitations period under CPLR article 78 . . . turns on whether the parties’ rights could have been resolved in an article 78 proceeding” … . Indeed, the analysis does not depend upon how plaintiffs label their claims but, rather, we “must look to the underlying claim and the nature of the relief sought and determine whether such claim could have been properly made in another form” … . The purpose of this rule, which results in the imposition of a short statute of limitations to governmental action, is to ensure “that the operation of government [will] not be trammeled by stale litigation and stale determinations” … . Northern Elec Power Co LP v Hudson River-Black Riv Regulating District, 2014 NY Slip Op 08280, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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Retroactive Application of New Regulations Affecting the Revocation of Driver’s Licenses for Alcohol- and Drug-Related Convictions or Incidents Okay—No Vested Right Re: License to Drive

The Third Department determined the new regulations concerning the effect of alcohol- or drug-related convictions or incidents can be applied retroactively because they do not affect a vested right:

“Retroactive statutes are those which impair vested rights or alter past transactions or considerations” … . Here, however, petitioner’s driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions and revocation by respondent under her discretionary powers (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 510 [c]; 1192 [2]…). Thus, respondent remained free to apply her most recent regulations when exercising her discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny petitioner’s application for relicensing. This is especially so in light of the rational, seven-month moratorium placed on all similarly-situated applicants for relicensing — i.e., persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions (see NY Reg, Mar. 13, 2013 at 46…). Furthermore, inasmuch as the revised regulations operated only to nominally change the effect of petitioner’s past acts on his future eligibility to obtain a driver’s license and was not imposed as punishment but, rather, to promote public safety, respondent’s application of 15 NYCRR 136.5 (b) (2) was proper under these circumstances (see … State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 [6]). Matter of Scism v Fiala, 2014 NY Slip Op 08283, 3rd Dept 11-26-14

 

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Complaint Based Upon Injury Caused by a Horse Which Had Gotten Loose After Defendant Rode the Horse to a Tavern Could Be Amended to Plead Negligence of the Horse’s Owner as Well as Strict Liability/Vicious Propensities in the Alternative

The Third Department determined plaintiff should be allowed to amend the complaint to include a negligence cause of action against the owner of a horse (Whiskey) which injured plaintiff.  The two theories, negligence and strict liability, can be pled in the alternative. The defendant rode the horse to a tavern.  While the defendant was in the tavern, the horse broke loose.  Plaintiff helped get control of the horse and was injured when he was holding the reigns.  The Third Department noted the 2013 Court of Appeals decision (Hastings) which held that a lawsuit based upon injury caused by a cow which had escaped the farm could be based upon the negligence of the owner in allowing the cow to escape, and not upon strict liability for the vicious propensities of the cow.  Here, both the negligence of the owner and vicious propensity/strict liability issues are raised by the facts:

Defendant apparently disputes plaintiff’s claim that Whiskey’s conduct constituted a vicious propensity–as opposed to normal equine behavior–upon which strict liability can be based. If defendant were successful in establishing the absence of a vicious propensity, this would lead to the very outcome of which the Court of Appeals disapproved in Hastings — defendant would be immunized for Whiskey’s behavior despite having been allegedly negligent in allowing the horse to roam from where it was being kept [FN3]. Inasmuch as we cannot predict how a jury will decide the question of whether Whiskey’s actions constituted a vicious propensity, we discern no reason why the two theories could not be pleaded in the alternative. Thus, if Whiskey’s actions were determined to constitute a vicious propensity, plaintiff would be limited to pursuing a claim based on strict liability … . If, however, a jury determined that Whiskey’s conduct did not constitute a vicious propensity, the jury could then decide whether defendant is liable based upon his alleged negligence in allowing the horse to stray from where it was kept… . Carey v Burton P Schwab, 2014 NY Slip Op 08096, 3rd Dept 11-20-14

 

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