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Criteria for “Charitable” Exemption to Real Property Tax for Provider of Housing for the Elderly Explained

In finding there were questions of fact about whether petitioner, a provider of housing for the elderly, qualified for the “charitable” property tax exemption pursuant to Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 420-a, the Third Department explained the relevant criteria:

The “critical factor” in determining whether a facility used for housing the elderly qualifies for an exemption by virtue of being “charitable” is whether the facility subsidizes rent or charges less than fair market rental rates … . Consideration is given to whether the facility retains the ability to terminate a resident’s lease for nonpayment, whether residents are charged for supplemental services and the number of residents who are dependent on government benefits … . Simply providing housing for elderly low-income individuals does not constitute a charitable purpose … . Matter of The Church Aid of the Prot Episcopal Church in the Town of Saratoga Springs Inc v Town of Malta Assessor, 2015 NY Slip Op 01689, 3rd Dept 2-26-15

 

Question of Fact Re: the “Hostility” Element of a Prescriptive Easement

In finding that the prescriptive easement cause of action should not have been dismissed, the Third Department explained the proof requirements:

A party claiming a prescriptive easement must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the use of the easement was open, notorious, hostile and continuous for a period of 10 years … . Although the element of hostility is presumed upon a showing of the other elements, where “the relationship between the parties is one of neighborly cooperation and accommodation,” no such presumption arises and, rather, permission will be inferred … . “Generally, the question of implied permission is one for the factfinder to resolve” … .

Here, the evidence submitted on the summary judgment motions indicates that a neighborly relationship existed between plaintiff, individually, the Trust’s tenants and defendants’ predecessors in title. However, inasmuch as there is no evidence of express permission granted to use defendants’ property, and the relevant parties are not “related by blood or part of a select group of friends,” summary judgment dismissing the claim for a prescriptive easement on the ground that plaintiff was unable to establish hostility was not warranted … . Gulati v O’Leary, 2015 NY Slip Op 01693, 3rd Dept 2-26-15

 

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Charitable Trust’s Challenge to Tax Foreclosure Time-Barred—Four-Month Statute of Limitations Applies to Action for Declaratory Judgment—RPTL, not the EPTL, Controls

The Third Department determined the action challenging the tax foreclosure on parcels of land owned by a charitable trust set up to hold land for Native Americans must be dismissed as time-barred.  The court further determined that County Court had subject matter jurisdiction because the matter was subject to the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL), not the Estates Powers and Trust Law (EPTL), and there was, therefore, no requirement that the Attorney General be notified of the tax foreclosure proceedings:

Under RPTL article 7, a property owner claiming to be aggrieved by an assessment of real property on the basis that the assessment is excessive, unequal or unlawful, or that the property is misclassified, may file a petition challenging the assessment, but “such a proceeding shall be commenced within thirty days after the final completion and filing of the assessment roll containing such assessment” (RPTL 702 [2]; see RPTL 704 [1]; 706 [1]). Where a party is alleging that the assessment is void — either through a challenge to the methodology of assessment or the jurisdiction of the taxing authority to assess particular property — the party may instead bring a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 or a declaratory judgment action … . Both of those options are governed by a four-month statute of limitations … . The Court of Appeals has expressly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that, because the property is allegedly mandatorily exempt from taxes, the assessment is illegal and void and may be challenged at any time … . Plaintiffs concede that they had notice of the Town’s determination regarding the taxable status of the parcels, and filed a grievance to administratively challenge the tax bills when the property was first listed as not tax exempt, but they failed to appeal when the Town denied the grievance. Plaintiffs did not file any further grievances, actions or proceedings until they commenced this action more than a year after the final foreclosure proceeding was concluded. Accordingly, while an action for declaratory judgment was a proper method, the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs’ challenges to their tax assessments … . Turtle Is Trust v County of Clinton, 2015 NY Slip Op 01698, 3rd Dept 2-26-15

 

Extraordinary Circumstances Justified Award of Primary Physical Custody to Nonparent–Criteria Described

In affirming Family Court’s award of primary physical custody to the grandmother, the Third Department explained the “extraordinary circumstances” criteria for awarding primary physical custody to a nonparent:

Family Court’s finding of extraordinary circumstances is supported by the record. It is clear and settled that a “parent has a claim of custody of his or her child, superior to that of all others, in the absence of surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over an extended period of time or other extraordinary circumstances” … . “It is the nonparent’s burden to establish extraordinary circumstances and, when that burden is met, custody is determined based upon the child’s best interests” … . The pertinent factors to be considered in determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist “include the length of time the child has lived with the nonparent, the quality of that relationship and the length of time the biological parent allowed such custody to continue without trying to assume the primary parental role” … , an analysis that considers “the cumulative effect of all issues present in a given case” … . Matter of Curless v McLarney, 2015 NY Slip Op 01680, 3rd Dept 2-26-15

 

Family Court Did Not Inform Respondent of His Rights and Did Not Conduct an Adequate Colloquy—PINS Adjudication Reversed

The Third Department reversed respondent’s adjudication as a PINS because Family Court did not advise respondent of his rights and the colloquy prior to Family Court’s acceptance of the consent finding was inadequate:

Family Court erred by failing to advise respondent of his rights. Pursuant to statute, at the initial appearance and at the commencement of any hearing concerning a PINS petition, Family Court must advise the respondent and his or her parent of the respondent’s rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel of his or her choosing or an assigned attorney (see Family Ct Act § 741 [a]…). Here, the court did not mention these rights at the first appearance on the PINS petition, at which time the court accepted respondent’s consent to a PINS finding, nor at the dispositional hearing. The court’s failure to advise respondent of these rights constitutes reversible error … . Additionally, the court’s colloquy prior to accepting that consent finding was inadequate; respondent merely answered “[y]es” when asked if he had a basic understanding of the proceeding and if he consented to a PINS finding, without any further discussion. To ensure that a PINS admission is knowingly and intelligently entered into, in a proper colloquy “[t]he respondent should at least state and admit the precise act, or acts, which constitutes the admission, and should be made aware on the record of the consequences, the dispositional alternatives, and the waiver of specific rights,” as well as give an assurance of the lack of coercion and that he or she consulted with counsel (Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 741 at 98…). Due to the inadequate colloquy and lack of advisement of rights, reversal is required, respondent’s adjudication as a PINS is vacated and the matter is returned to the preadmission stage. Matter of Aaron UU …, 2015 NY Slip Op 01505, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Bare Allegation in an Attorney Affidavit that, Upon Information and Belief, the Deputies Lacked Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant, Not Enough to Justify a Hearing on a Suppression Motion

In finding defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied without a hearing, the Third Department explained what is required to warrant a hearing:

“A motion seeking suppression of evidence ‘must state the ground or grounds of the motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact . . . supporting such grounds'” … . A hearing in this regard is neither “automatic [n]or generally available [simply] for the asking” … and, except in circumstances not present here (see CPL 710.60 [3] [b]; 710.20 [3], [6]), the trial court “may summarily deny the motion if the papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression or if the factual allegations do not as a matter of law support any alleged ground” … . Here, in support of her suppression motion, defendant tendered the affidavit of her attorney, who merely asserted — upon information and belief — that the deputies in question lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. This “bare allegation of a lack of probable cause, without any factual support, was insufficient to require a hearing” … . People v Briskin, 2015 NY Slip Op 01493, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Appellant Entitled to a Hearing on His Motion to Vacate His Conviction—Questions of Fact Whether Witness Testimony Was Induced by Threats and/or Promises Not Disclosed to the Defense at Trial

The Third Department determined appellant, who had been convicted of second degree murder, was entitled to a hearing re: a potential Brady violation.  Appellant was an inmate at the time of the incident and the witnesses to the incident were other inmates Appellant, in a motion to vacate the conviction, presented affidavits from witnesses to the incident who averred they were threatened or offered promises by prison personnel in exchange for their testimony.  The court noted there was a question of fact whether the prosecution could be held responsible for the actions of prison personnel (relevant information may have been outside the control of the prosecution):

…[D]efendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion. Due process requires that the People disclose to the defendant any evidence in their possession that is “material to guilt or punishment” … . The People must disclose evidence relating to a witness’s credibility, including “the ‘existence of an agreement between the prosecution and a witness, made to induce the testimony of the witness'” … . “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material” … . When a specific request has been made for the evidence that was withheld, “the materiality element is established provided there exists a ‘reasonable possibility’ that it would have changed the result of the proceedings” … . People v Lewis, 2015 NY Slip Op 01492, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Delivery Driver Was an Independent Contractor, Not an Employee

The Third Department reversed the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and determined claimant was not an employee and therefore was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.  Claimant worked as a delivery person for a business (ADS) that transports lost luggage from airports to the owners of the luggage:

Whether an employee-employer relationship exists “is a factual question to be resolved by the Board and we will not disturb its determination when it is supported by substantial evidence in the record” … . “‘While no single factor is determinative, control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results are pertinent considerations, with the latter being more important'” … . Upon reviewing the record here, we find that the requisite control is lacking.

Claimant paid all of the expenses associated with his delivery work, including the lease of his vehicle, fuel, tolls, insurance, maintenance and his cell phone. For his services, claimant negotiated his own rate of pay and was paid a portion of the commission paid to ADS … . No training was provided by ADS, nor did it impose any conditions on the way that claimant performed his work. Claimant spoke to the customer directly to determine delivery times and was ultimately responsible for lost or damaged luggage. Moreover, under the parties’ agreement, which designated him an independent contractor, claimant was permitted to hire other individuals to perform work, did not work a fixed schedule, had the right to accept or reject assignments and was free to work for any other company … . Matter of Jennings…, 2015 NY Slip Op 01503, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Motor-Route Newspaper Carriers Were Employees, Not Independent Contractors

The Third Department determined motor-route newspaper carriers were employee, despited “independent contractor” characterization in the distribution agreement:

“Whether an employer- employee relationship exists is a factual determination for the Board, and its decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … . “While no single factor is determinative, control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results are pertinent considerations, with the latter being more important” … .

Recently, in Matter of Armison [Gannett Co., Inc.— Commissioner of Labor] (122 AD3d 1101 [2014]), this Court upheld a finding of an employer-employee relationship between Gannett and certain newspaper delivery persons. Here, as we did in Armison, we find that the requisite level of control was present to support the Board’s finding of an employer-employee relationship. Claimant was required to make deliveries within set time frames and according to other conditions. Claimant was also required to be a licensed driver with a registered and insured vehicle, and was obligated to provide Gannett with a copy of her driver’s license and proof of liability insurance. Additionally, under the terms of the distribution agreement, all substitutes were required to be licensed and insured. Claimant was provided a route set by Gannett and, if claimant was not available to deliver her route, she was responsible for finding a substitute. In the event that deliveries were not made by claimant, Gannett would use an employee to make the delivery and charge claimant a fee. Further, Gannett controlled other aspects of claimant’s work, including prohibiting placing foreign materials on or in the publications. Claimant was also provided access to accident insurance from Gannett’s policy. In light of the foregoing, and despite the existence of other evidence in the record suggestive of an independent contractor relationship — including the distribution agreement expressly designating claimant as an independent contractor — we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant was an employee … . Matter of Hunter…, 2015 NY Slip Op 01509, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Maltreatment Finding Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

The Third Department determined substantial evidence did not support the Office of Children and Family Services finding of maltreatment.  Petitioner spanked the child for eating soap while petitioner was bathing the child.  Petitioner explained what had happened to the child’s day-care provider, who then reported the incident to the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment:

“‘At an administrative hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence'” … . Specifically, “‘[t]o establish that maltreatment occurred, the agency must show that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care'” … . In our consideration of the underlying determination, “our focus is whether the determination is rational and supported by substantial evidence” … . * * *

A parent is “entitled to use reasonable physical force to promote discipline” … , however, the application of such force may not “exceed[] the threshold of reasonableness” … . Although a single instance of excessive corporal punishment can suffice for a finding of maltreatment …, here, the record lacks substantial evidence demonstrating that petitioner’s conduct “impaired or was in imminent danger of impairing [the child’s] physical, mental or emotional condition” … . Matter of Maurizio XX v New Y\ork State Off of Children and Family Services, 2015 NY Slip Op 01512, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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