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Delivery Driver Was an Independent Contractor, Not an Employee

The Third Department reversed the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and determined claimant was not an employee and therefore was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.  Claimant worked as a delivery person for a business (ADS) that transports lost luggage from airports to the owners of the luggage:

Whether an employee-employer relationship exists “is a factual question to be resolved by the Board and we will not disturb its determination when it is supported by substantial evidence in the record” … . “‘While no single factor is determinative, control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results are pertinent considerations, with the latter being more important'” … . Upon reviewing the record here, we find that the requisite control is lacking.

Claimant paid all of the expenses associated with his delivery work, including the lease of his vehicle, fuel, tolls, insurance, maintenance and his cell phone. For his services, claimant negotiated his own rate of pay and was paid a portion of the commission paid to ADS … . No training was provided by ADS, nor did it impose any conditions on the way that claimant performed his work. Claimant spoke to the customer directly to determine delivery times and was ultimately responsible for lost or damaged luggage. Moreover, under the parties’ agreement, which designated him an independent contractor, claimant was permitted to hire other individuals to perform work, did not work a fixed schedule, had the right to accept or reject assignments and was free to work for any other company … . Matter of Jennings…, 2015 NY Slip Op 01503, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Motor-Route Newspaper Carriers Were Employees, Not Independent Contractors

The Third Department determined motor-route newspaper carriers were employee, despited “independent contractor” characterization in the distribution agreement:

“Whether an employer- employee relationship exists is a factual determination for the Board, and its decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence” … . “While no single factor is determinative, control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results are pertinent considerations, with the latter being more important” … .

Recently, in Matter of Armison [Gannett Co., Inc.— Commissioner of Labor] (122 AD3d 1101 [2014]), this Court upheld a finding of an employer-employee relationship between Gannett and certain newspaper delivery persons. Here, as we did in Armison, we find that the requisite level of control was present to support the Board’s finding of an employer-employee relationship. Claimant was required to make deliveries within set time frames and according to other conditions. Claimant was also required to be a licensed driver with a registered and insured vehicle, and was obligated to provide Gannett with a copy of her driver’s license and proof of liability insurance. Additionally, under the terms of the distribution agreement, all substitutes were required to be licensed and insured. Claimant was provided a route set by Gannett and, if claimant was not available to deliver her route, she was responsible for finding a substitute. In the event that deliveries were not made by claimant, Gannett would use an employee to make the delivery and charge claimant a fee. Further, Gannett controlled other aspects of claimant’s work, including prohibiting placing foreign materials on or in the publications. Claimant was also provided access to accident insurance from Gannett’s policy. In light of the foregoing, and despite the existence of other evidence in the record suggestive of an independent contractor relationship — including the distribution agreement expressly designating claimant as an independent contractor — we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claimant was an employee … . Matter of Hunter…, 2015 NY Slip Op 01509, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

Insurance Agent Was an Employee, Not an Independent Contractor

The Third Department determined claimant, an insurance agent, was an employee of Aaron Casey Insurance, not an independent contractor, and, therefore, was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits:

Whether an employee-employer relationship exists “is a factual question to be resolved by the Board and we will not disturb its determination when it is supported by substantial evidence in the record” … . “While no single factor is determinative, control over the results produced or the means used to achieve those results are pertinent considerations, with the latter being more important” … .

… [C]laimant was required to work a minimum of 30 hours per week, per a schedule set by Aaron Casey Insurance, and needed permission to take time off. In addition to servicing customers outside the office, claimant was responsible for performing in-office work, including answering phones and servicing walk-in customers. Claimant was paid an hourly wage plus commissions and was reimbursed for the costs associated with obtaining his insurance license. Additionally, claimant was provided training and was required to report back regarding sales leads, his work was reviewed by Aaron Casey Insurance and he had a sales quota and faced termination if it was not met. In our view, the foregoing is more than sufficient to support the Board’s finding of an employment relationship, notwithstanding the existence of other proof that could support a contrary conclusion … . Matter of Fahrson…, 2015 NY Slip Op 01515, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Maltreatment Finding Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

The Third Department determined substantial evidence did not support the Office of Children and Family Services finding of maltreatment.  Petitioner spanked the child for eating soap while petitioner was bathing the child.  Petitioner explained what had happened to the child’s day-care provider, who then reported the incident to the Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment:

“‘At an administrative hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence'” … . Specifically, “‘[t]o establish that maltreatment occurred, the agency must show that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care'” … . In our consideration of the underlying determination, “our focus is whether the determination is rational and supported by substantial evidence” … . * * *

A parent is “entitled to use reasonable physical force to promote discipline” … , however, the application of such force may not “exceed[] the threshold of reasonableness” … . Although a single instance of excessive corporal punishment can suffice for a finding of maltreatment …, here, the record lacks substantial evidence demonstrating that petitioner’s conduct “impaired or was in imminent danger of impairing [the child’s] physical, mental or emotional condition” … . Matter of Maurizio XX v New Y\ork State Off of Children and Family Services, 2015 NY Slip Op 01512, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Relatively Low Degree of Corroboration Required to Admit Child’s Out-of-Court Statements Re: Abuse or Neglect

The Third Department, in a custody proceeding, explained the level of corroboration required to render a child’s out-of-court statements admissible:

Both the mother and the attorney for the children contend that the testimony of the father’s psychiatrist … concerning the older child’s out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. A child’s out-of-court statements are admissible in a custody dispute if the statements relate to abuse or neglect, provided that such statements are corroborated by other evidence … . “The degree of corroboration required is relatively low” … , and the hearing court “is accorded considerable discretion in determining whether there is sufficient corroboration” … . Heather B v Daniel B, 2015 NY Slip Op 01506, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Department of Environmental Conservation’s Finding that the Owners of Land on Either Side of a Creek Also Owned a Dam Across the Creek, and Therefore Were Responsible for Making the Dam Safe, Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence—Dam Had Been Conveyed to the City in Condemnation Proceeding

The Third Department determined that the Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) finding that the owners of parcels of land bordering a creek also owned the dam spanning the creek between the parcels, and therefore the landowners were responsible for the work necessary to make the dam safe, was not supported by substantial evidence. The Third Department concluded the land under the water where the dam was located had been transferred to the City of Hudson in a condemnation proceeding:

We recognize that a riparian owner’s right to the natural flow of water along its land is properly classified as real property, equally with the land … . As such, a party could acquire an interest in the water flow separate and distinct from the land under the water … . The controlling point here, however, is that the “real estate” acquired in the condemnation, in conjunction with the indenture and agreement, is as defined under the WSA [Water Supply Act]. The comprehensive statutory definition for “real estate” embraces both the water and the “lands under water.” Because the [DEC] considered only the “rights” that the City acquired by the condemnation and not the “property,” the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioners own the dam is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Berger v New York State Dept of Envtl Conservation, 2015 NY Slip Op 01496, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Municipal Action Re: a Mining Permit Not Ripe for Review

In finding that the issue was not ripe for review, the Third Department explained the relevant analytical criteria:

A municipal action is ripe for judicial review if it “impose[s] an obligation, den[ies] a right or fix[es] some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process” … . Such a determination requires a “pragmatic evaluation of whether the decision-maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury” … .

* * * … [A]ny harm to petitioner at this stage is merely speculative, may be ameliorated by further proceedings and is insufficient to warrant judicial review… . Matter of Troy Sand & Gravel Co Inc v Town of Nassau, 2015 NY Slip Op 01517, 3rd Dept 2-19-15

 

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Defendant’s Verbal Abuse of His Lawyer Did Not Constitute a Waiver of His Right to Counsel—Criteria for Valid Waiver Explained

The Third Department determined the defendant did not, by his disruptive behavior and his telling his lawyer she was fired, waive his right to counsel:

Defendant’s “conduct unambiguously indicate[d] a defiance of the processes of law and . . . disrupt[ed] the [hearing] after all parties [were] assembled and ready to proceed,” and he arguably thereby forfeited his right to be present at the hearing … . Nevertheless, he did not validly waive his right to counsel. “For such a waiver to be effective, the trial court must be satisfied that,” among other things, “it has been made competently, intelligently and voluntarily” … . Thus, the court must undertake a “searching inquiry . . . when a defendant [seeks to] waive[] the right to counsel in favor of self-representation[,] aimed at [e]nsuring that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel” … . Here, Supreme Court did not make any attempt to apprise defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se or the importance of counsel’s role, and there is no indication on the record before us that defendant “acted with full knowledge and appreciation of the panoply of constitutional protections that would be adversely affected by counsel’s inability to participate” … . Indeed, defendant stated that he did not wish to represent himself. Inasmuch as the court “did not make the requisite searching inquiry to [e]nsure that defendant was aware of the drawbacks of self-representation before allowing him to go down that path” … . People v Middlemiss, 2015 NY Slip Op 01208, 3rd Dept 2-11-15

 

Claimant Entitled to Partial Disability Benefits for a Back Injury Until the Relationship Between the Back Injury and Claimant’s Inability to Work Was Raised for the First Time at the Hearing—Claimant Had Stopped Working After an Unrelated Knee Injury

The Third Department determined the claimant was entitled to benefits re: his partial disability (for a back injury) up until the time the Special Fund raised, at the hearing, the requirement that claimant demonstrate his attachment to the labor market, i.e., the requirement that claimant demonstrate his inability to work was the result of the back injury.  Claimant had stopped working because of an unrelated injury to his knee and the Special Fund argued he was not entitled to any benefits for the back injury:

… [A]bsent a finding of involuntary retirement, claimants with a partial disability have “an obligation to demonstrate attachment to the labor market with evidence of a search for employment within medical restrictions” … . As the Special Fund concedes, however, the Board has previously held that awards should be continued until the carrier has raised the issue of labor market attachment, thereby allowing for development of the record on the issue … . The Special Fund does not challenge the principle set forth in the Board's prior decisions, but argues that they are distinguishable. We disagree. The award sought herein was for lost time prior to the date of the hearing, when the Special Fund raised the issue of attachment to the labor market for the first time. The award of benefits for that period was therefore entirely consistent with the Board's prior precedent. Matter of Scott v Rochester City Sch Dist, 2015 NY Slip Op 01219, 3rd Dept 2-11-15

 

Claimant Demonstrated His Partial Disability Prevented Him from Finding Work

The Third Department affirmed the Appeal Board's finding that claimant had demonstrated he was unable to find work due to his partial disability and was therefore entitled to benefits:

“Where a claimant has a permanent partial disability but there has been no finding of involuntary retirement, the claimant has an obligation to demonstrate attachment to the labor market with evidence of a search for employment within medical restrictions,” and the Board's determination in that regard will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence … . Here, the Board concluded that claimant credibly testified and provided corroborating documentary evidence that he actively participated in a job location service and engaged in an independent job search within his medical restrictions, thereby demonstrating attachment to the labor market … . The Board noted that, although jobs were available, when claimant advised prospective employers of his disability, he was told that no positions were available that would accommodate his medical restrictions … . Contrary to the employer's argument, the fact that claimant limited that search to jobs within the field that he had worked for nearly 50 years provides no basis to disturb the Board's decision … . Matter of Cole v Consolidated Edison Co of NY Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 01220, 3rd Dept 2-11-15

 

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