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Question of Fact Whether Out-of-Possession Landlord Created the Dangerous Condition Which Caused Gas Escaping from a Propane Tank to Ignite/Question of Fact Whether the Injured Employee’s Negligent Act (the Employee, Against the Direction of His Supervisor, Brought a Partially-Filled Propane Tank Inside the Building) Was Foreseeable

The Third Department determined a question of fact had been raised about the out-of-possession landlord’s liability for an accident which ignited gas from a propane tank.  The landlord had converted the building where the accident occurred for the operation of a propane tank refinishing business.  The business was continued by the tenant.  An expert concluded that there were several ignition sources within the building, installed by the landlord, which could have ignited the gas.  Therefore, there was a question of fact whether the out-of-possession landlord had created the dangerous condition.  In response to the argument that the negligence of injured employee (who brought a propane tank which still had gas in it into the building) was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the Third Department determined there was a question of fact about whether bringing such a partially filled tank inside the building (something employees were directed not to do) was foreseeable:

… [I]t is well established that, generally, “once possession has been transferred to a tenant, an out-of-possession landlord will not be held responsible for dangerous conditions existing upon leased premises” … . Exceptions to the general rule do exist, including situations where the landlord retains control over the leased premises, has agreed to repair or maintain the premises or “has affirmatively created the dangerous condition” … .

… [Landlord and tenant-employer] assert that the reckless conduct of [tenant’s] employees was the sole proximate cause of the explosion and that defendant cannot be held liable to plaintiffs merely because it allegedly furnished the condition that allowed for the accident. In order to sever the causal connection in this matter, it must be demonstrated that the employees’ actions were “extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from … defendant’s conduct” … . Certainly, the act of the [tenant’s] new employee of bringing a tank that was not marked as empty into the building –against the direct instructions of his supervisor–was negligent. Nonetheless, defendant and third-party defendant have failed to show that such conduct was unforeseeable, thereby “sever[ing] any causal link between [defendant’s] negligence and [decedent’s] injuries” … . Miller v Genoa AG Ctr Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 00586, 3rd Dept 1-22-15

 

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