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241 (6) Cause of Action Improperly Dismissed—Plaintiff Tripped on Piece of Metal Protruding from Stair

The Third Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law 241 (6) claim against the general contractor (Glenman).  Plaintiff tripped and fell down a stairwell when his shoe was punctured by a piece of metal protruding from a stair:

Supreme Court improvidently dismissed plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim against Glenman. Notably, “Labor Law § 241 (6), by its very terms, imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to persons employed in, or lawfully frequenting, all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed” … . “To establish a claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), [a] plaintiff must allege that [the] defendant[] violated a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of Labor that sets forth a specific standard of conduct” … . “[O]nce it has been alleged that a concrete specification of [such a rule or regulation] has been violated, it is for the jury to determine whether the negligence of some party to, or participant in, the construction project caused plaintiff’s injury” … .

Here, plaintiff relies upon 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1), which provides:”(e) Tripping and other hazards.(1) Passageways. All passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping. Sharp projections which could cut or puncture any person shall be removed or covered.” This regulation appropriately “mandat[es] compliance with concrete specifications” as required to state a claim under Labor Law § 241 (6) … .  Marshall v Glenman Indus & Commercial Contr Corp, 20-14 NY Slip Op 02987, 3rd Dept 5-1-14

 

Substantive Issue Raised by Petitioner Had Not Been Addressed in a Prior Proceeding Which Had Been Dismissed—Current Proceeding Therefore Not Barred by Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel

The Third Department determined a former teacher’s challenge to the recall of another former teacher was not barred by collateral estoppel.  The challenge was based upon the claim that the petitioner had greater seniority than the recalled teacher.  A prior challenge by petitioner to the recall of a different teacher had been dismissed, but the seniority issue had not been addressed in that prior proceeding:

In order for collateral estoppel to apply, there must be an identity of a decisive issue between the present and prior proceedings which was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and the party who will be estopped must have been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding … . “Whether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” … . Here, while petitioner raises an identical issue in this proceeding, namely, whether she is entitled to more seniority credit than the Board gave her, that issue has never been decided. Rather, the earlier proceeding was dismissed as time-barred. Because the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to more seniority has not been decided, it is not barred by collateral estoppel … . Matter of Bubel v Board of Educ of the Saugerties Cent Sch Dist, 2014 NY Slip Op 02999, 3rd Dept 5-1-14

 

Question of Fact Whether Defendants Assumed a Duty of Reasonable Care When Escorting Elderly Plaintiff to His Car at Night

The Third Department determined a question of fact had been raised about whether defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care when escorting the elderly plaintiff to his car at night.  Plaintiff tripped and fell while being escorted by a hospital security guard after plaintiff had been treated at the hospital.  Plaintiff asked for the escort:

Plaintiffs did …raise a factual issue as to whether defendants assumed a duty of reasonable care regarding the escort provided. Under the assumed duty theory, “the question is whether defendant[s’] conduct placed plaintiff in a more vulnerable position than plaintiff would have been in had defendant[s] done nothing” … . While there was conflicting proof, on this cross motion by defendants for summary judgment we “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and accord that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the record proof” … . Plaintiff characterized the lighting conditions when he was ready to leave the emergency room as “pitch black,” prompting him to ask for assistance. The security guard who was summoned had previously escorted people from the emergency room to off-premises parking and thus was familiar with conditions in the area. Plaintiff kept a hand on his wife’s shoulder as they walked assisting his stability. Although the security guard had a flashlight, he did not turn it on and did not walk next to plaintiffs. Plaintiff recalled that, just before he fell, he stated to the security guard that he could barely see because of the darkness, but the guard made a gesture ostensibly indicating that it was safe to proceed and, as plaintiff did so, he immediately stepped into the crack or depression and fell. Accepting such proof and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury could conclude that plaintiff would have proceeded more cautiously had he not relied on an individual familiar with the area who apparently gestured for him to continue despite the poor visibility … . Giglio v Saratoga Care Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 02994, 3rd Dept 5-1-14

 

Defendant’s Statement Was Made In Response to the Functional Equivalent of a Question Designed to Elicit an Incriminatory Response and Should Have Been Suppressed

The Third Department determined a statement made by the defendant after he had been arrested and was being transported to the police station was not “spontaneous” (as County Court found) and should have been suppressed. At the arrest scene one of defendant’s “associates” indicated defendant might have drugs in his anal cavity.  In the police car, an officer said to the defendant that he hoped defendant did not have any more drugs on him and the defendant said he probably did.  During a subsequent search drugs were found in defendant’s anal cavity. Although defendant’s statement indicating he probably had more drugs on him should have been suppressed because it was made in response to a police statement designed to elicit an incriminating response, the drugs themselves were not subject to suppression.  The Third Department determined the search which turned up the drugs was not triggered by the statement:

The admissibility of a statement made by a defendant in custody depends on whether it was “the product of ‘express questioning or its functional equivalent'” … . The operative question is whether, in context, “the officer should have known that his statement was ‘reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from the suspect'” … . In our view, County Court erred in concluding that the inculpatory statement was admissible because it was simply a spontaneous response to a declaration by [the officer]. For a statement to be spontaneous, it must be self-generated without “inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescense, no matter how subtly employed” … . Coming on the heels of [the officer’s] explanation that defendant would be searched as part of the booking process, and having been informed by the passenger that defendant may have hidden additional drugs on his person, we find [the officer’s] statement to be the functional equivalent of a question intended to elicit an incriminating response … . Since defendant was in custody and had not been given Miranda warnings, the statement should have been suppressed as involuntary. People v George, 2015 NY Slip Op 03574, 3rd Dept 4-30-15

 

Hearing Officer’s Failure to Determine Why Three Witnesses Called by the Petitioner Purportedly Refused to Testify Required Annulment and Expungement of the Disciplinary Determination

The Third Department annulled the disciplinary determination, finding that the hearing officer deprived the petitioner of his right to call witnesses by failing to investigate the witnesses’ purported refusal to testify:

Although petitioner requested that his employee assistant interview three inmate witnesses who worked in the library, the record reflects no effort by the employee assistant to interview the potential witnesses or to report the results of those efforts to petitioner. When this issue was raised at the hearing and petitioner inquired about those witnesses, the Hearing Officer adjourned the hearing in order for the employee assistant to ascertain the witnesses’ willingness to testify. Thereafter, the Hearing Officer denied the requested witnesses based upon the employee assistant’s report that all three witnesses refused to testify. No inquiry was made by the Hearing Officer as to the reasons for those witnesses’ refusal, no witness refusal forms were provided, and petitioner’s employee assistant was not called to testify regarding the circumstances as to why the witnesses refused to testify. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer deprived petitioner of his right to call witnesses and the matter must be expunged.. . Matter of Gross v Prack, 2015 NY Slip Op 03595, 3rd Dept 4-30-15

 

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Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications Can Not Be Considered in the Criminal History Categories of a Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI)—However the Adjudications Can Be Considered When Deciding Whether to Depart from the Recommended Risk Level

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rose, indicated its prior rulings should not be followed and determined that juvenile delinquency adjudications may not be considered under risk factors 8 and 9 (criminal history) for the purpose of assessing points in the risk assessment instrument (RAI). However the adjudications may be considered in determining whether to depart from the recommended risk level:

Relying on People v Campbell (98 AD3d 5 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 853 [2012]), defendant contended that Family Ct Act § 381.2 (1) precluded the use of the juvenile delinquency adjudication and, without the 30 points for criminal history, defendant would be presumptively classified as a risk level I sex offender. County Court, citing our previous decisions in People v Pride (37 AD3d 957 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 812 [2007]) and People v Dort (18 AD3d 23 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 885 [2005]), denied defendant’s challenge to the 30-point assessment and classified defendant as a risk level II sex offender. Defendant appeals.

We reverse. We agree with the holding of People v Campbell (supra) that the Board “exceeded its authority by adopting that portion of the [Sex Offender Registration Act] Guidelines which includes juvenile delinquency adjudications in its definition of crimes for the purpose of determining a sex offender’s criminal history” (id. at 12; see Family Ct Act § 380.1 [1]…). Contrary to the People’s argument, the fact that the points at issue in Campbell were assessed under risk factor 8 of the RAI does not require a different conclusion because both risk factor 8 and risk factor 9 fall within the criminal history category of the RAI. To the extent that our prior decisions suggest that juvenile delinquency adjudications may be considered crimes for purposes of the RAI, we note that the conflict between the Guidelines and the Family Ct Act was not raised in those cases and they should no longer be followed. Our ruling is limited, however, to precluding the use of juvenile delinquency adjudications to assess points for criminal history under the RAI, and we do not hold that the facts underlying a juvenile delinquency adjudication may not be considered when determining whether to depart from the recommended risk level … . People v Shaffer, 2015 NY Slip Op 03586, 3rd Dept 4-30-15

 

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Precise Dates of Abuse Need Not Be Proven in a Family Court Act Article 10 Proceeding/Exclusion of Respondent from Proceedings During Child’s Testimony Was Proper

The Third Department affirmed the child abuse/severe abuse/neglect findings against respondent and noted that the precise dates of the abuse need not be proven in a Family Court Act Article 10 proceeding.  The Third Department further determined that the exclusion of the respondent during one of the children’s (Aleria’s) testimony, while allowing the respondent’s attorney to be present, was a proper exercise of discretion:

…[E]vidence of the exact dates that the abuse and/or neglect occurred is not required in order for petitioner to sustain its applicable burdens of proof in Family Ct Act article 10 proceedings (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i], [ii]). Rather, a child’s ability to recall details — including, among other things, dates and times — goes to the credibility and weight given to the child’s disclosures. In this regard, “Family Court’s findings are entitled to great deference especially where the critical evidence is testimonial, in light of the court’s ability to assess the witnesses’ credibility, and should generally not be disturbed absent a conclusion that they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record” … . The record before us contains corroborated allegations of horrendous, repeated acts of sexual and physical abuse perpetrated by respondent against his children and stepdaughter and, thus, we see no reason to depart from Family Court’s finding that the allegations of severe abuse, abuse, neglect and derivative abuse and neglect were sufficiently proven.

Nor do we find that Family Court abused its discretion when it excluded respondent from the courtroom during Aleria’s testimony. Although respondent is entitled to due process, he does not have an absolute right to be present at all stages of this civil proceeding … . “As such, in the context of a Family Ct Act article 10 proceeding, this Court has concluded that, ‘[i]n balancing the due process right of the accused with the mental and emotional well-being of the child, a court may . . . exclude the respondent during the child’s testimony but allow his [or her] attorney to be present and question the child'” … . Accordingly, after having properly balanced respondent’s interests with the impact of his presence in the courtroom on Aleria’s emotional state and well-being, Family Court’s decision to permit her to testify outside of respondent’s presence was an appropriate exercise of discretion. Matter of Aleria KK. (Ralph MM.), 2015 NY Slip Op 03590, 3rd Dept 4-30-15

 

Limousine Driver Properly Found to Be an Employee

The Third Department determined claimant was an employee of SUK, a limousine service, and therefore was entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.  The court noted that the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) need not distinguish every arguably similar case it has previously decided:

“An employer-employee relationship exists when the evidence shows that the employer exercises control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results,” with control over the latter being more important … .

Here, the record establishes that SUK assigned jobs to claimant and fielded complaints from its customers. Additionally, SUK imposed numerous restrictions upon claimant, including prohibiting him from working with its competitors, imposing detailed rules as to acceptable work dress and behavior and requiring him to drive a specific type of car. SUK also set the rate collected from the passengers and handled all voucher billing. … …[T]he Board need not “explicitly distinguish in its written decisions each and every arguably similar case that it previously has decided” and, hence, was not required to address the distinguishable cases relied upon by SUK … . Matter of June-Il Kim (Suk Inc.–Commissioner of Labor)\, 2015 NY Slip Op 03438, 3rd Dept 4-23-15

 

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board Has Jurisdiction Over Employment Within Federal Enclaves (Here Navy Ships at Sea)

The Third Department determined that the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (Board) had jurisdiction over employment within so-called federal enclaves.  Here claimant was employed by a company which sold cars to Navy personnel stationed on ships at sea.  The company, Priority Assist, argued the Board did not have jurisdiction over the employment at issue.  The court relied on a US Supreme Court case which indicated the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States could be modified by statute, and the federal statute which state employment on federal propery was not exempt from state unemployment compensation law:

Priority Assist initially asserts that claimant and others similarly situated performed work in federal enclaves — i.e., lands purchased by the federal government, with state consent, “for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings” — and that the Board accordingly lacked jurisdiction to hold it liable for unemployment insurance contributions (US Const, art I, § 8, cl 17). Even assuming that United States Navy vessels that have never been part of a state constitute federal enclaves, “exclusive jurisdiction over [such an] area . . . remains with the United States, except as modified by statute” (Howard v Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville, 344 US 624, 627 [1953] [emphasis added]). Inasmuch as federal law provides that “[n]o person shall be relieved from compliance with a [s]tate unemployment compensation law on the ground that services were performed on land or premises owned, held, or possessed by the United States,” the Board retained jurisdiction here (26 USC § 3305 [d]). Matter of Pickton (Priority Assist Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 03437, 3rd Dept 4-23-15

 

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Premises Clause Prevails Over Habendum Clause in a Deed/Failure to Expressly Label Parties and Include the Parties’ Addresses Does Not Invalidate a Deed

The Third Department determined that where there is a conflict between the premises clause and the habendum clause in a deed, the premises clause prevails.  Here the premises clause clearly indicated the creation of a life estate with the remainder interest going to decedent’s only children.  The habendum clause indicated the decedent conveyed the property to “[defendant] and assigns forever.”  The court also noted that the failure to label the parties and include the parties’ addresses in a deed does not invalidate the deed, although it may preclude recording of the deed:

…[T]he rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed … . Here, the premises clause provides that the remainder interest in the property is conveyed to plaintiffs, and nothing in the deed other than the habendum clause suggests that decedent had a contrary intent. …

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, Real Property Law § 258 did not require the deed to expressly label plaintiffs as parties or to include their addresses. The statute does not mandate the use of the deed formats that it sets forth, but instead provides that “this section does not prevent or invalidate the use of other forms” (Real Property Law § 258). Although the failure to include a party’s address may prevent a deed from being recorded, it does not operate to invalidate the underlying conveyance … . Basile v Rose, 2015 NY Slip Op 03213, 3rd Dept 4-16-15

 

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