You are here: / Third Department

Tag Archive for: Third Department

COMPUTER DESKTOP ENGINEER NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF JOB PLACEMENT SERVICE.

The Third Department determined claimant, a computer desktop engineer, was not an employee of Logic, an information-technology job-placement service:

Even assuming, without deciding, that claimant’s IT position was a professional one, as the Board concluded, we similarly find that the record lacks substantial evidence that Logic exercised “overall control . . . over important aspects of the services performed other than results or means” … . The unrefuted testimony of claimant and Logic’s principal is that, aside from recruiting claimant and paying him, Logic had little knowledge of the services that he provided to OSP or his job duties, had no control over his assignments or work performance and did not evaluate or supervise his work. Matter of Desravines (Logic Corp.–Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 00361, 3rd Dept 1-19-17

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (COMPUTER DESKTOP ENGINEER NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF JOB PLACEMENT SERVICE)

INABILITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT.

The Third Department determined claimant could not use his inability to meet the requirements of his employment agreement as good cause for leaving his employment. Claimant agreed to provide his own vehicle for work. After an accident he no longer had access to a vehicle. The loss of his vehicle was deemed not to constitute good cause:

The Board determined that the employment agreement, wherein claimant agreed to provide his own vehicle, was not controlling. On the record before us, we disagree with the Board’s conclusion that claimant left his employment with good cause. Although claimant’s testimony constituted substantial evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the loss of the use of the vehicle, it was error to find that this constituted substantial evidence that his separation from his employment was for good cause. We note that claimant admitted that he shared responsibility for the accident with the other driver and that he had entered into a written employment agreement whereby he agreed to provide his own vehicle and keep it in good operational condition. Further, and importantly, he also agreed that if the vehicle became disabled, he would replace it expeditiously. It is well established that “once the terms of employment have been agreed upon, such terms cannot thereafter be invoked as valid grounds for quitting” … . Inasmuch as claimant was aware of the terms of his employment and accepted same, we conclude that he could not later invoke his inability to meet the requirements of his employment, regardless of the circumstances or fault surrounding the loss of the use of his vehicle, as good cause for leaving his employment … . Matter of Brown (Express Delivery LLC–Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 00359, 3rd Dept 1-19-17

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (INABILITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT)/EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, INABILITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS NOT GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT)

, , ,

TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD.

The Third Department, in a decision too detailed to be fairly summarized here, determined a town board of assessment review (BAR) is a quasi-judicial body and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Third Department further determined that causes of actions for civil rights violations (42 USC 1983) against two town assessors individually (stemming from allegedly discriminatory property tax assessments) can go forward:

Consistent with the provisions of RPTL 523, the Town was required to have a board of assessment review (see RPTL 523 [1] [a]), and its individual members, in turn, were required to attend mandated training (see RPTL 523 [1] [d]; [2]). Here, in accordance with its appointed duties, the BAR had a statutory obligation to “fix the place or places for the hearing of complaints in relation to assessments” (RPTL 525 [1]) and, on the date required by law, to “meet to hear complaints in relation to assessments” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]). Upon convening for the required hearing, the BAR could “administer oaths, take testimony and hear proofs in regard to any complaint and the assessment to which it relates” and, further, could “require the person whose real property is assessed, or his or her agent or representative, or any other person, to appear before [it] and be examined concerning such complaint, and to produce any papers relating to such assessment” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]). “Minutes of the examination of every person [so] examined” were required to “be taken and filed in the office of the . . . town clerk” (RPTL 525 [2] [a]), and the BAR thereafter was required to “determine the final assessed valuation or taxable assessed valuation . . . of the real property of each complainant” (RPTL 525 [3] [a]), “prepare and verify a statement showing the changes determined to be made by them in the assessments” and notify each complainant of its determination and the time within which to seek judicial review thereof (RPTL 525 [4]). In light of these statutory mandates, it is apparent that the BAR’s determinations constitute decisions of a quasi-judicial nature and, hence, the BAR (and its individual members) are entitled to absolute immunity … . * * *

… [S]uffice it to say that [defendants town assessors’] proof … fell short of establishing that the assessors valued plaintiff’s property in a nondiscriminatory fashion and, therefore, defendants failed to demonstrate their entitlement to summary judgment [on the violation of civil rights causes of action]. Corvetti v Town of Lake Pleasant, 2017 NY Slip Op 00227, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/MUNICIPAL LAW (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/IMMUNITY (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/CIVIL RIGHTS (42 USC 1983) (TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)/42 USC 1983 (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, TOWN BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY IMMUNE FROM SUIT, 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST TOWN ASSESSORS INDIVIDUALLY CAN GO FORWARD)

, , , ,

CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO INTENTIONAL (AS OPPOSED TO NEGLIGENT) CONDUCT.

The Third Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action against defendant accountants (Fuller) stemming from a workers’ compensation trust found to be more than $8 million in debt. The 2nd Department also found Supreme Court properly applied the six year statute of limitations to the allegedly intentional acts by the defendant accountants (designed to conceal the debt). The defendant accountants unsuccessfully argued the three-year (negligence/malpractice) statute of limitations should apply. Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the 2nd Department explained:

Although the duty owed by an accountant is generally not fiduciary in nature … , a fiduciary relationship exists where the accountant is “under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of [the client] upon matters within the scope of the relation” … . This inquiry is “necessarily fact-specific” … , and the dispositive factor is whether there is “confidence on one side and resulting superiority and influence on the other” … . Plaintiff alleged that Fuller held itself out to have the requisite skill and expertise to maintain the trust’s financial records, provide auditing services and — importantly — provide advice to the trust regarding the trust’s financial status. According to plaintiff, Fuller breached its fiduciary duty by knowingly and consistently concealing the trust’s true financial condition and failing to properly advise the trust regarding its solvency, causing over $8 million in damages. Accepting these allegations as true and giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference … , we find that plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is sufficiently stated to survive Fuller’s motion to dismiss … .  New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Fuller & LaFiura, CPAs, P.C., 2017 NY Slip Op 00225, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/FRAUD (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS, CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/ACCOUNTANTS (CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST ACCOUNTANTS STEMMING FROM A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $8 MILLION IN DEBT SURVIVED MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO INTENTIONAL ACTS BY ACCOUNTANTS)

HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS).

The Third Department determined defendant insurer (homeowners policies) had a duty to defend plaintiff in an action brought by one Prindle, who was shot by plaintiff. The shooting could have been unintentional and therefore covered under the policy:

An insurance company’s duty to defend “is exceedingly broad and an insurer will be called upon to provide a defense whenever the allegations of the complaint suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage” … . If the complaint’s allegations bring the claim “even potentially within the embrace of the policy, the insurer must defend its insured no matter how groundless, false or baseless the suit may be” … . …

Here, Prindle’s complaint alleged that plaintiff “assault[ed] [Prindle] . . . by shooting [Prindle] in the abdomen” and that “as a result of the assault,” Prindle sustained personal injuries. While Prindle’s complaint also alleged that plaintiff was arrested and criminally charged with assault, there was no further specification as to this criminal charge raised against plaintiff … . Inasmuch as an assault may derive from an individual’s recklessness or criminal negligence (see Penal Law § 120.00 [2], [3]), a reasonable possibility exists that plaintiff’s actions were not intentional, as defendant argues … . …

Because the shooting can be reasonably interpreted as having stemmed from plaintiff’s unintentional conduct, we conclude that defendant’s duty to defend was triggered under the insurance policy … . Guzy v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 00233, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/DUTY TO DEFEND (INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/ASSAULT (INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/SHOOTING (ASSAULT, INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))

, ,

IN A LAWSUIT BY EMPLOYERS AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT, THE EMPLOYERS WERE DEEMED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS AND THE TRUST, MANY OF THE EMPLOYERS’ NONCONTRACTUAL CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DERIVATIVE (PERTAINING TO THE TRUST) RATHER THAN DIRECT.

In a case related to State of N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Wang, 2017 NY Slip Op 00057, 3rd Dept 1-5-17, referenced immediately above, the Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Garry (much too complex to summarize here), determined, inter alia, (1) the employer plaintiffs could sue as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the workers’ compensation trust and its administrators, and (2) many of the employers’ noncontractual claims were properly dismissed as derivative, i.e., pertaining to the trust, rather than direct:

This Court recently held that an employer member of a group self-insured trust successfully alleges third-party beneficiary status by asserting “(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between [the trust and its administrators], (2) that the contract was intended for [the employer member’s] benefit, and (3) that the benefit to [the employer member] is sufficiently immediate to indicate the assumption by [the trust and its administrators] of a duty to compensate it if the benefit is lost” … . * * *

Supreme Court dismissed many of [the noncontractual] causes of action upon determining that they belonged in the first instance to the trust rather than to the employer members and were thus derivative rather than direct. The distinction between derivative and direct claims is grounded upon the principle that a stockholder does not have an individual cause of action that derives from harm done to the corporation, but may bring a direct claim when “the wrongdoer has breached a duty owed directly to the shareholder which is independent of any duty owing to the corporation” … . In determining whether a claim is direct or derivative, a court must “look to the nature of the wrong and to whom the relief should go” and should consider “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)” … . Accredited Aides Plus, Inc. v Program Risk Mgt., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00058, 3rd Dept 1-5-17

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW  (IN A LAWSUIT BY EMPLOYERS AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT, THE EMPLOYERS WERE DEEMED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS AND THE TRUST, MANY OF THE EMPLOYERS’ NONCONTRACTUAL CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DERIVATIVE (PERTAINING TO THE TRUST) RATHER THAN DIRECT)/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, IN A LAWSUIT BY EMPLOYERS AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT, THE EMPLOYERS WERE DEEMED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS AND THE TRUST, MANY OF THE EMPLOYERS’ NONCONTRACTUAL CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DERIVATIVE (PERTAINING TO THE TRUST) RATHER THAN DIRECT)/CONTRACT LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, IN A LAWSUIT BY EMPLOYERS AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT, THE EMPLOYERS WERE DEEMED THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATORS AND THE TRUST, MANY OF THE EMPLOYERS’ NONCONTRACTUAL CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED AS DERIVATIVE (PERTAINING TO THE TRUST) RATHER THAN DIRECT)

, ,

MANY (BUT NOT ALL) CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Egan, determined that certain causes of action can go forward in a lawsuit by the Workers’ Compensation Board against administrators and trustees of the Health Care Providers Self-Insurance Trust. The trust, which was to provide workers’ compensation coverage for the trust’s members, was found to be $188 million in debt. The opinion is fact-specific and much too detailed to be summarized here. Breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, gross negligence, alter ego liability, among other theories, were alleged. Many causes of action were deemed time-barred. Some causes of action dismissed by Supreme Court were reinstated. State of N.Y. Workers’ Compensation Bd. v Wang, 2017 NY Slip Op 00057, 3rd Dept 1-5-17

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)/FIDUCIARY DUTY (TRUSTS AND ESTATES, MANY CAUSES OF ACTION ALLOWED TO GO FORWARD IN AN ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FOUND TO BE $188 MILLION IN DEBT)

HEARING OFFICER’S DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR A WITNESS AND FAILURE TO INQUIRE INTO INMATE WINTESSES’ REFUSAL TO TESTIFY REQUIRED A NEW HEARING.

The Third Department determined the hearing officer’s denial of petitioner’s request for a witness and failure to inquire into the reasons witnesses refused to testify required a new hearing:

… [T]he Hearing Officer improperly denied petitioner’s request to have a State Police investigator testify and failed to make a proper inquiry into the reasons that certain inmate witnesses refused to testify. Although the Hearing Officer denied the investigator’s testimony as irrelevant because he was not present at the time of the attack and his investigation was separate from the one conducted by correction officials, petitioner maintained that the investigator obtained statements during the course of his investigation that materially contradicted the evidence relied upon by correction officials. Inasmuch as such testimony would have been potentially helpful to petitioner’s defense, the Hearing Officer erred in denying it. However, given that the Hearing Officer articulated a good-faith reason for such denial, this was at most a regulatory violation entitling petitioner to a new hearing and not expungement … .

As for the inmate witnesses’ refusal to testify, the Hearing Officer relied upon the notations contained in the employee assistant form indicating that they were interviewed as potential witnesses, but did not agree to testify. The Hearing Officer, however, did not make any inquiry into the reasons for their refusal or obtain written refusal forms from them. Although this constituted a denial of petitioner’s right to call witnesses, it too was only a regulatory violation inasmuch as the employee assistant had ascertained whether the inmate witnesses would be willing to testify and the Hearing Officer’s reliance on the employee assistant form constitutes a good-faith basis for denying petitioner’s request … . Matter of Mosley v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 00061, 3rd Dept 1-5-17

 

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (HEARING OFFICER’S DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR A WITNESS AND FAILURE TO INQUIRE INTO INMATE WINTESSES’ REFUSAL TO TESTIFY REQUIRED A NEW HEARING)

SECURITY OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYEES OF PLACEMENT SERVICE.

The Third Department, reversing the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, determined claimant security officer was not an employee of TMR, which was essentially a placement service which posted security jobs on a secure website:

TMR posted security-related jobs on a secure website for its clients, who dictated the hours to be worked, as well as the scope of services that were needed. The security officers, after browsing through these postings, would request to work on any particular job, which TMR ultimately awarded on a “first come, first serve” basis. The security officers were free to select a job that they wanted and were not prohibited from seeking jobs from TMR’s competitors. TMR did not provide the security officers with training or equipment nor did TMR pay the security officers a set hourly rate. Furthermore, once TMR placed the security officer with a client, TMR did not enter into a contract with the security officer. While a security officer could be in the middle of a continuing job for a client, he or she was nonetheless free to leave at any point and work elsewhere. In addition, if an issue arose with the security officer’s performance, the client dealt with the security officer directly, and TMR would be notified if it needed to provide a substitute security officer. Matter of TMR Sec. Consultants, Inc. (Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 08922, 3rd Dept 12-29-16

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (SECURITY OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYEES OF PLACEMENT SERVICE)/SECURITY OFFICERS (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, SECURITY OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYEES OF PLACEMENT SERVICE)

COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HUSBAND CREDIT FOR HIGHER CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE LOWER FINAL CHILD SUPPORT AWARD UPON DIVORCE.

The Third Department, in this divorce action, determined that Supreme Court’s attempt to give the husband credit for the difference between the higher child support payments imposed prior to the divorce and the lower payments ordered in the final child support award was error:

… [T]he temporary support payments already made by the husband pursuant to the pendente lite order exceeded the retroactive support obligation set forth by Supreme Court. Absent any statutory authority for recoupment of overpayments of child support and given the “‘strong public policy against restitution or recoupment of [such] overpayments'” … , we conclude that Supreme Court erred in crediting the husband for the temporary child support payments that he made in excess of what he was required to pay under the final child support award … . Sprole v Sprole, 2016 NY Slip Op 08911, 3rd Dept 12-29-16

FAMILY LAW (CHILD SUPPORT, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HUSBAND CREDIT FOR HIGHER CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE LOWER FINAL CHILD SUPPORT AWARD UPON DIVORCE)/CHILD SUPPORT (CHILD SUPPORT, COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HUSBAND CREDIT FOR HIGHER CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS MADE BEFORE THE LOWER FINAL CHILD SUPPORT AWARD UPON DIVORCE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy