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NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the superior court information (SCI) charging burglary did not need to specify the crime to be committed during the robbery. The court further found that it was error to impose restitution for a burglary which was not charged in SCI:

Defendant further asserts that the SCI is jurisdictionally defective because it did not identify the underlying crime that he intended to commit during the burglary. We are not persuaded. “A charging instrument that incorporates by reference the statutory provisions applicable to the crime charged has been held to allege the material elements of the crime sufficiently to survive a jurisdictional challenge”… . Here, the SCI specifically referenced Penal Law § 140.20, which defines burglary in the third degree. Significantly, the statute does not specify that the underlying crime must be identified (see Penal Law § 140.20), nor has this been held to be a requirement… . Consequently, we find that the SCI validly charged defendant with two counts of burglary in the third degree, to which he pleaded guilty. …

As for the restitution award, the People concede that County Court erroneously included the amount of $31,000 as compensation to the owner of the Halfmoon restaurant when there was no accusatory instrument filed charging defendant with any crimes related thereto. We must agree. “Penal Law § 60.27 permits a trial court to require restitution arising from ‘the offense for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense'” … . People v Suits, 2018 NY Slip Op 01098, Third Dept 2-15-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/BURGLARY (SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION (SCI) (BURGLARY, NO NEED TO SPECIFY CRIME TO BE COMMITTED DURING A CHARGED BURGLARY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT INFORMATION, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))/RESTITUTION (BURGLARY, RESTITUTION FOR AN UNCHARGED BURGLARY IMPROPERLY ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

ALTHOUGH DECEDENT, A NEW YORK RESIDENT, WORKED FOR A PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY, NEW YORK HAD JURISDICTION OVER AN INJURY THAT OCCURRED OUTSIDE NEW YORK (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined New York could exercise jurisdiction over an injury that occurred outside New York. Decedent was a New York resident working for a Pennsylvania company:

The Board has jurisdiction over a claim for an injury occurring outside of New York where there are “sufficient significant contacts” between the employment and New York … . A variety of factors must be taken into account in the fact-finding required to assess jurisdiction, “including where the employee resides, where the employee was hired, the location of the employee’s employment and the employer’s offices, whether the employee was expected to return to New York after completing out-of-state work for the employer and the extent to which the employer conducted business in New York” … . The Board’s determination as to the existence of jurisdiction will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence … .

At the hearing, decedent testified that, while he was living in New York, he was hired by the employer during a phone call and that he thereafter went to Pennsylvania for a four-day orientation before he began driving for the employer. He further explained that he continued to live in New York and that, during the two-year period prior to his accident, he had made 17 deliveries to locations in New York, which was significantly more deliveries than he had made to Pennsylvania. Decedent also described his “home base” as being in New York and testified that the employer would contact him at his home in New York about jobs. After decedent was injured, the employer assisted in securing medical care for him in New York and selecting a doctor for him there. Decedent acknowledged that the dispatcher from whom he received calls was located in Pennsylvania. Decedent further explained that, after he was injured, the employer helped secure him light-duty work in New York for which the employer paid him, and the record contains a letter to decedent explaining that the employer had sought assistance in securing him such a position and that it was “an extension of [his] employment” with the employer. Matter of Galster v Keen Transp., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 01105, Second Dept 2-14-18

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (JURISDICTION, INJURY OUTSIDE NEW YORK, NEW YORK HAD JURISDICTION OVER AN INJURY THAT OCCURRED OUTSIDE NEW YORK (THIRD DEPT))/JURISDICTION (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, INJURY OUTSIDE NEW YORK, NEW YORK HAD JURISDICTION OVER AN INJURY THAT OCCURRED OUTSIDE NEW YORK (THIRD DEPT))

BACK AND NECK INJURIES PROPERLY RULED AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RESULTING FROM REPETITIVE LIFTING AND CARRYING (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant demonstrated his back and neck injuries constituted an occupational disease related to his lifting and mix heavy containers of compound and applying the compound to walls and ceilings:

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“In order for an occupational disease to be established, the claimant must establish a recognizable link between his or her condition and a distinctive feature of his or her employment”… . Claimant testified that his job required lifting and carrying containers of plastering compound weighing roughly 50 pounds and using the compound to hang sheetrock for eight hours a day, five or six days a week, for over 30 years. Samuel Kim, a neurosurgeon, opined that claimant suffered from chronic neck and back pain and degenerative disc disease in his cervical and lumbar spine and that the condition was consistent with a history of repetitive movement, and Yong Kim, claimant’s treating physician, attributed claimant’s back pain to “repetitive use at work.” In light of the foregoing, and given that no contrary medical opinions were presented, the Board’s determination that claimant suffered from an occupational disease resulting from repetitive stress is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed … . Matter of Garcia v MCI Interiors, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00873, Third Dept 2-8-18

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, BACK AND NECK INJURIES PROPERLY RULED AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RESULTING FROM REPETITIVE LIFTING AND CARRYING (THIRD DEPT))/OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, BACK AND NECK INJURIES PROPERLY RULED AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE RESULTING FROM REPETITIVE LIFTING AND CARRYING (THIRD DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ALLEGED CONTINUING BREACHES OF CONTRACT, AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD, NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION AND AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR THE DURATION OF THE DEBT-RIDDEN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST, WHICH WAS TERMINATED 25 DAYS BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined the causes of action for breach of contract, aiding and abetting fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty should not have been dismissed as time barred. The underlying suit is based on the allegation that defendant insurance broker was on the board of a Workers’ Compensation trust, which plaintiff had joined, and which was $82 million in debt. The Third Department held that the six-year statute of limitations applied to all the (above-described) causes of action and the complaint alleged continuing breaches throughout the period of membership in the trust, which terminated 25 days before the expiration of the statute of limitations (i.e., the six-year period before the suit was brought extended back to March 24, 2008, and the trust was terminated on April 17, 2008):

… [T]he amended complaint alleges continuing contractual obligations on the part of defendant and specifies that the various acts and omissions constituting the breaches occurred “[t]hroughout the entire course of [p]laintiff’s membership in the [t]rust.” Deeming these allegations as true and according them every favorable inference, as we must … , we conclude that defendant failed to make the requisite prima facie showing that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is time-barred in its entirety … . …

[P]laintiff’s causes of action for negligent misrepresentation and aiding and abetting fraud are timely insofar as they allege conduct occurring [during the 25 day window]. …

… [W]e disagree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that the entirety of plaintiff’s aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Because plaintiff does not seek equitable relief, a six-year statute of limitations period applies to a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action if “an allegation of fraud is essential to” such claim … . While a claim of fraud generally requires an affirmative misrepresentation, “fraud may also result from a fiduciary’s failure to disclose material facts when the fiduciary had a duty to disclose and acted with the intent to deceive” … . Krog Corp. v Vanner Group, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 00876, Third Dept 2-8-18

 

ALTHOUGH THE EMPLOYER HAD CAUSE TO FIRE CLAIMANT FOR TARDINESS AND ABSENCES, CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS DID NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined that, although the employer had cause to fire the claimant for tardiness and absences, substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding her tardiness and absences did disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits. Although claimant had been informed that her tardiness and absences were not acceptable, she was never informed that she could be fired as a result. Claimant was not fired until after she put in a claim for workers’ compensation benefits after an injury at work:

… “[W]hether a claimant’s actions rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct is a factual issue for the Board to resolve, and not every mistake, exercise of poor judgment or discharge for cause will rise to the level of misconduct”… . The Board’s determination in this regard will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence … .

The record reveals that, although claimant’s tardiness and attendance problems began in December 2014, she was not served with any notices of discipline until May 4, 2015, just after her work-related injury. Claimant’s immediate supervisor testified that she instructed claimant on the proper procedure for entering her work hours into the computer system and told her that she had to be at work between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In fact, claimant received emails in December 2014 and March 2015 reminding her of these requirements. She was not, however, advised that adverse employment consequences would result if she did not follow the proper protocol. Likewise, the notices of discipline did not set forth the disciplinary measures that would be taken if claimant continued to engaged in the objectionable behavior. Furthermore, claimant’s termination occurred shortly after she was placed on suspension without affording her an opportunity to correct her behavior … . Under the circumstances presented, although the employer had cause to discharge claimant, she did not exhibit a willful and wanton disregard of the employer’s interest rising to the level of disqualifying misconduct … . Matter of Jelic (Ama Research Labs. Inc.–Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 00588, Third Dept 2-1-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (ALTHOUGH THE EMPLOYER HAD CAUSE TO FIRE CLAIMANT FOR TARDINESS AND ABSENCES, CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS DID NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/DISQUALIFYING MISCONDUCT (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, ALTHOUGH THE EMPLOYER HAD CAUSE TO FIRE CLAIMANT FOR TARDINESS AND ABSENCES, CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS DID NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/TARDINESS (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, ALTHOUGH THE EMPLOYER HAD CAUSE TO FIRE CLAIMANT FOR TARDINESS AND ABSENCES, CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS DID NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/ABSENCES (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, ALTHOUGH THE EMPLOYER HAD CAUSE TO FIRE CLAIMANT FOR TARDINESS AND ABSENCES, CLAIMANT’S ACTIONS DID NOT DISQUALIFY HER FROM RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))

CLAIMANT ENROLLED IN A BARBER TRAINING PROGRAM AFTER HIS REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS HAD RUN OUT, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined claimant was not entitled to additional unemployment benefits in connection with his enrolling in a barber training program. Claimant did not enroll in the program until after his regular unemployment benefits had been exhausted:

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Labor Law § 599 provides an avenue whereby a claimant who participates in an approved training program may be eligible for additional unemployment insurance benefits after his or her regular benefits are exhausted” … . However, in order to receive benefits under this statute, the claimant “must have been accepted into an approved program, or demonstrated an application for such a program, while still receiving regular unemployment benefits” … . Here, it is undisputed that claimant’s regular unemployment benefits were exhausted more than a month before he filed his application for additional benefits under Labor Law § 599. In view of this, and in the absence of any legal authority excusing the delay, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. Matter of Simpson (Commissioner of Labor), 2018 NY Slip Op 00594, Third Dept 2-1-18

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (CLAIMANT ENROLLED IN A BARBER TRAINING PROGRAM AFTER HIS REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS HAD RUN OUT, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/TRAINING PROGRAMS (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, CLAIMANT ENROLLED IN A BARBER TRAINING PROGRAM AFTER HIS REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS HAD RUN OUT, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))/LABOR LAW 599 (UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, CLAIMANT ENROLLED IN A BARBER TRAINING PROGRAM AFTER HIS REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS HAD RUN OUT, HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS (THIRD DEPT))

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S SHOULDER INJURY WAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, AS OPPOSED TO AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s shoulder injury was an occupational disease, as opposed to an accidental injury. Claimant alleged his torn rotator cuff was caused by unloading a wheelbarrow, which he did as part of his job filling potholes:​

The employer contends that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s establishment of the claim as an occupational disease. Rather, it maintains that the shoulder injury should be classified as an accidental injury and, as such, the claim is untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 18. An occupational disease is statutorily defined as “a disease resulting from the nature of the employment and contracted therein” … . Significantly, in order to establish an occupational disease, a claimant must demonstrate a “recognizable link” between his or her affliction and a “distinctive feature” of his or her employment … . * * *

Even accepting, as did the Board, that claimant injured his shoulder unloading the wheelbarrow, we agree with the employer that the injury should be classified as accidental and not as an occupational disease. The proof failed to demonstrate that claimant’s shoulder injury was attributable to repetitive movements associated with moving heavy wheelbarrow loads of asphalt or performing other manual duties during his short period of employment as a laborer with the highway department. To the contrary, claimant testified that the onset of shoulder pain occurred during a definitive event at work when he was emptying a wheelbarrow filled with asphalt. Consequently, we find that there is a lack of substantial evidence evincing a recognizable link between claimant’s shoulder injury and a distinctive feature of his job as is necessary to establish his claim for an occupational disease … . Matter of Yonkosky v Town of Hamburg, 2018 NY Slip Op 00586, Third Dept 2-1-18

 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE VERSUS ACCIDENTAL INJURY, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S SHOULDER INJURY WAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, AS OPPOSED TO AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY (THIRD DEPT))/OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,  SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S SHOULDER INJURY WAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, AS OPPOSED TO AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY (THIRD DEPT))/ACCIDENTAL INJURY (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD’S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT’S SHOULDER INJURY WAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, AS OPPOSED TO AN ACCIDENTAL INJURY (THIRD DEPT))

HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHY AN INMATE WITNESS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO TESTIFY LATER REFUSED, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined petitioner was entitled to a new hearing because the hearing officer did not make an adequate inquiry into the reasons an inmate witness who had previously agreed to testify later refused:

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Generally, we have held that, in situations where an inmate witness who had previously agreed to testify but later refuses without giving a reason, “it is incumbent upon the Hearing Officer to conduct a personal inquiry unless a genuine reason for the refusal is apparent from the record and the Hearing Officer makes a sufficient inquiry into the facts surrounding the refusal to ascertain its authenticity” … . While the personal inquiry by a hearing officer may be limited in situations where, as here, the requested witness is housed in a different correctional facility, the record does not reflect that the Hearing Officer made any attempt to personally interview the witness to confirm the reason for the refusal, to obtain a written refusal form from the witness containing such a reason or to call the correction officer who interviewed the witness to testify at the hearing. In our view, petitioner’s regulatory right to call this witness was not adequately protected and that part of the determination finding petitioner guilty of assault, refusing to obey a direct order and possessing a weapon, as charged in the first misbehavior report, must be annulled and remitted for a new hearing on these charges … . Matter of Radcliffe v Annucci, 2018 NY Slip Op 00505, Third Department 1-25-18

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (INMATES) (HEARING OFFICER DID NOT MAKE AN ADEQUATE INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHY AN INMATE WITNESS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO TESTIFY LATER REFUSED, NEW HEARING ORDERED (THIRD DEPT))

FINDING THAT PETITIONER POSSESSED A WEAPON FOUND IN A CUBE SHARED WITH OTHER INMATES NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, DETERMINATION ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the finding that petitioner possessed a weapon which was found in a cube shared with other inmates was not supported by substantial evidence:

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Petitioner denied any knowledge of the weapon, and the record reflects that he shared the cube with other inmates. The cube was separated by a divider into two living areas, with petitioner and another inmate sharing one side and at least one other inmate housed on the other side. The correction officer who authorized the search, and was present when the weapon was found, testified that the weapon was discovered under the center of the divider. According to the officer, all the inmates housed in the cube had access to that area because the divider was movable and it could be easily lifted. The correction officer who discovered the weapon testified that it was located closer to the side of the divider where petitioner and another inmate were housed and that it would have been more difficult for inmates housed on the other side of the divider to place the weapon there. There is no evidence in the record to support a finding that petitioner possessed the weapon and, in our view, the evidence presented does not eliminate either the inmates housed on the other side of the divider or the inmate who shared petitioner’s side from being responsible for possessing it. Further, under the circumstances presented here, “we do not believe that a reasonable inference can be made that petitioner possessed this contraband simply because he had access to the area where the contraband was found and that it, to some extent, was under his control” … . Matter of Carter v Annucci, 2018 NY Slip Op 00501, Third Dept 1-25-18

DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS (FINDING THAT PETITIONER POSSESSED A WEAPON FOUND IN A CUBE SHARED WITH OTHER INMATES NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, DETERMINATION ANNULLED (THIRD DEPT))

CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mulvey, reversing Family Court, determined: (1) the presumption of legitimacy applies to a child born to a same-gender married couple after artificial insemination; (2) the presumption was not rebutted; (3) ordering a paternity test was not in the best interests of the child; and (4) the doctrine of equitable estoppel required the dismissal of the paternity petition. The mother inseminated herself with sperm with the consent of the donor. The parties had agreed the sperm donor waived any claims of paternity and any right to custody or visitation. The facts that the written agreement was destroyed and did not comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law 73 (formalities required for artificial insemination) did not preclude proof of legitimacy by other means. The opinion is comprehensive and too detailed to fairly summarize here:

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While a workable rubric has not yet been developed to afford children the same protection regardless of the gender composition of their parents’ marriage, and the Legislature has not addressed this dilemma, we believe that it must be true that a child born to a same-gender married couple is presumed to be their child and, further, that the presumption of parentage is not defeated solely with proof of the biological fact that, at present, a child cannot be the product of same-gender parents … . If we were to conclude otherwise, children born to same-gender couples would be denied the benefit of this presumption without a compelling justification. * * *

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… [I]nvocation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is warranted here “to protect the status interests of [the] child,” who was born to married parents and thereafter lived with them in a family unit … . While the child, now over three years old, was an infant when the paternity proceeding was commenced, we nonetheless find that petitioner’s representations in donating sperm combined with his delay in asserting parental rights compel against ordering a test. While young, the child’s “image of her family” — consisting of two mothers — would be devastated by an outsider, who merely donated sperm, belatedly asserting parental rights … . Matter of Christopher YY. v Jessica ZZ., 2018 NY Slip Op 00495, Third Dept 1-25-18

FAMILY LAW (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/LEGITIMACY, PRESUMPTION OF (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/PATERNITY (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/SAME-GENDER MARRIAGE (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, (CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))/PARENTAL RIGHTS (ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, CHILD BORN TO SAME-GENDER MARRIED COUPLE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IS ENTITLED TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE SPERM DONOR’S PATERNITY PETITION (THIRD DEPT))

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