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THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action on the complaint should have been stayed, not dismissed, based upon the agreement to arbitrate. The Third Department further held that the complaint, augmented by affidavits, stated causes of action and should not have been dismissed:

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Supreme Court improperly dismissed the action against [defendant], rather than staying the action. Initially, there is no dispute on this record that plaintiff and [defendant], in the settlement agreement, consented to arbitrate any and all disputes regarding, among other things, the subject property. However, under established law, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate is not a defense to an action” and, thus, “may not be the basis for a motion to dismiss” … . [Defendant’s] cross motion to dismiss based upon CPLR 3211 (a) (1), premised upon the agreement to arbitrate, does not entitle him to dismissal of this action… . Rather, where, as here, there is a valid arbitration clause in an agreement and the party sued … moves to compel arbitration, the court should stay the judicial action rather than dismiss it (see CPLR 7503 [a]…). By statute, the order granting [defendant’s] motion to compel arbitration “operate[s] to stay [the] pending or subsequent action” (CPLR 7503 [a]). …

We further find that Supreme Court improperly dismissed the complaint against the remaining defendants … . Importantly, on the remaining defendants’ pre-answer cross motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, the court was bound to “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiff[] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . The court was also authorized to “consider affidavits submitted by plaintiff[] to remedy any defects in the complaint” … . Piller v Tribeca Dev. Group LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 09209, Third Dept 12-28-17

ARBITRATION (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 7503  (THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE COMPLAINT, THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, RATHER, THE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED (THIRD DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION WHETHER ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE... COURT WAS REQUIRED TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF HIS...