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53-MONTH PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS.

The Fourth Department determined a 53-month delay between the incident and indictment did not constitute a denial of due process. Defendant was charged with burglary, robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. He was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The court explained the analytical criteria re: speedy trial/due process and went through the facts in support of each of the criteria:

“A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Constitution … and by statute … . A defendant may also challenge, on due process grounds, preindictment delay …, and “the factors utilized to determine if a defendant’s rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or the due process right to prompt prosecution” … . The inquiry involves weighing the factors enunciated in Taranovich: “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay” (Taranovich, 37 NY2d at 445…). “Generally when there has been a protracted delay, certainly over a period of years, the burden is on the prosecution to establish good cause” … . People v Johnson, 2015 NY Slip Op 09449, 4th Dept 12-23-15

CRIMINAL LAW (53-MONTH PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS)/SPEEDY TRIAL (53-MONTH PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS)/PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY (53-MONTH DELAY DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS)

SEVEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly found that the seven-year delay between defendant’s arrest and indictment did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The court explained the relevant law:

A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed both by the United States Constitution … . Moreover, an unjustified delay in prosecution will deprive a defendant of the State constitutional right to due process … . However, “a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant” … . Where there has been extended delay, the People have the burden to establish good cause … .

In determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Court of Appeals has articulated five factors to be considered: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of the defendant’s defense … . These factors apply as well to the due process guarantee … . “In this State, we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution” … . People v Allen, 2015 NY Slip Op 08850, 2nd Dept 12-2-15

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, SEVEN YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT)/SPEEDY TRIAL (SEVEN YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT)

17-YEAR DELAY ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED, SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT NOT VIOLATED.

The Third Department determined a 17-year delay between the act a defendant’s indictment did not violate his right to a speedy trial. Several years of the delay were attributed to the ability to test DNA without destroying it (not available at the time of the offense, 1994). In addition, a witness came forward in 2011. The court explained the applicable law:

“In determining whether there is an undue delay, the trial court must consider ‘(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay'” … . Where, as here, the delay is extraordinary, “close scrutiny of the other factors, especially the question of why the delay occurred,” is required … .

The People introduced evidence indicating that DNA technology in 1994 would have required the destruction of the two samples of biological material that had been collected. Further evidence established that technology at the time that the samples were tested — in 2004 and 2011 — did not require such destruction. In addition to this physical evidence becoming probative, a witness came forward in May 2011 implicating defendant in the murder. Such evidence demonstrated a good faith basis for the delay in proceeding with the prosecution … .

Turning to the remaining factors, the charge of murder in the second degree is “inarguably a very serious offense” … . Further, defendant was never incarcerated during the 17-year delay … . In addition, defendant’s generic claim that witnesses may have moved and that their recall of events is no longer as strong as it once was is too speculative to carry significant weight in the analysis … . Although defendant faced a substantial delay, upon considering these factors, we find that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated … . People v Chaplin, 2015 NY Slip Op 08869, 2nd Dept 12-2-15

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, 17-YEAR DELAY)/SPEEDY TRIAL (17-YEAR DELAY)

Amendment of Decision and Order Dismissing Indictment Was Proper

The Second Department, over an extensive dissent, determined Supreme Court properly amended a decision and order which initially granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on “speedy trial” grounds. The amended decision and order, which was issued a day after the initial decision and order, denied the motion with respect to three counts:

A court possesses “inherent authority to rectify a prior error in dismissing an indictment” … , and “where there is a clearly erroneous dismissal of an indictment or count thereof, it is unreasonable to foreclose a court from reconsidering its previous determination” …, even in the absence of a formal motion for leave to reargue by the People … . Furthermore, under the facts of this case, there was no constitutional or statutory impediment to the court’s power to promptly modify its prior determination to dismiss the indictment and to thereby correct the previous error … .

Here, the Supreme Court recognized the error only one day after issuing the initial decision and order, well within the time period during which, for example, a motion for leave to reargue could have been made and before the People even had a reasonable opportunity to make such a motion. Moreover, while any present challenge to the court’s determination of the statutory speedy trial issue in the amended decision and order was forfeited by the defendant’s knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty …, we note, in any event, that the error in initially dismissing counts seven, eight, and nine based on an alleged statutory speedy trial violation was clearly apparent from the documents in the court file. Accordingly, the prompt issuance of the amended decision and order correcting the prior mistake in this case was not improper or jurisdictionally defective. People v Francis, 2015 NY Slip Op 07679, 2nd Dept 10-21-15

 

People Could Not Show Good Cause for the Nearly Five-Year Pre-Indictment Delay—Indictment Dismissed

The Third Department, over a dissent, determined, in a child pornography case, the nearly five-year delay between when defendant’s computer was seized and defendant questioned (2009) and the indictment (2013) required dismissal of the indictment. The case was not complex and no additional information beyond that gathered in 2009 was needed to indict. The People therefore did not demonstrate good cause for the extensive delay:

The parties agree that there has been a protracted preindictment delay that places the burden on the People to establish good cause for that delay … . The People state in their brief that there are no issues of fact regarding the issue before this Court and the record on appeal provides an adequate basis to determine whether the protracted delay was justified.

In determining whether there is an undue delay, the trial court must consider “(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay” … . Here, although defendant was not incarcerated during the period of delay and the nature of the charges are serious, the extent of the delay was clearly extensive. The People attribute the delay to the fact that the matter was initially referred to the office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York for prosecution, and point to vague references of personnel changes within that office, as well as that office’s decision, at some point, not to prosecute.

This was not a complex legal matter and the record establishes that no further evidence was needed in order to charge defendant beyond that gathered in the 2009 … .  People v Montague, 2015 NY Slip Op 05721, 3rd Dept 7-2-15

 

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Even Though the People Indicated They Were Not Ready for Trial After Filing a Certificate of Readiness, the Presumption the Statement of Readiness Was Accurate and Truthful When Made Was Not Rebutted/How to Interpret a Plurality Opinion by the Court of Appeals Explained

The First Department determined the People’s off-calendar statement of readiness was not illusory and, therefore, the defendant’s speedy-trial motion was properly denied. The First Department explained how it interpreted the Court of Appeals decision in People v Sibbles, 22 NY3d 1174, which included two three-judge concurrences, one by Judge Lippman and one by Judge Graffeo:

The three judge concurrence by Chief Judge Lippman “would hold that, if challenged, the People must demonstrate that some exceptional fact or circumstance arose after their declaration of readiness so as to render them presently not ready for trial” at the next court appearance after filing the certificate (22 NY3d at 1178). Chief Judge Lippman found that the People’s desire to strengthen their case did not satisfy this requirement.

The three judge concurrence by Judge Graffeo “would decide th[e] case on a narrower basis” (22 NY3d at 1179). While recognizing established precedent that the requirement of actual readiness under CPL 30.30 “will be met unless there is proof that the readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People’s position'”(id. at 1180, quoting People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 799 [1998]) and that “there is a presumption that a statement of readiness is truthful and accurate” (22 NY3d at 1180), Judge Graffeo found the statement of readiness “illusory” because “[t]he People initially declared that they were ready for trial on February 22 but within days sought copies of the injured officer’s medical records,” admitted at the next calendar call that they “were not in fact ready to proceed because they were continuing their investigation” and that they “needed to examine the medical records to decide if they would pursue introduction of the records into evidence at trial”, and then “gave no explanation for the change in circumstances between the initial statement of readiness and the[ir] subsequent admission that the[y] … were not ready to proceed without the medical records” (22 NY3d at 1181).

Following analogous precedent pertaining to plurality opinions by the United States Supreme Court, we apply the narrower approach of Judge Graffeo, which leaves intact well- settled law that a post-certificate assertion that the People are not ready does not, by itself, vitiate the previously filed certificate of readiness … . * * *

[Here], unlike, Sibblies, there is no “proof that the readiness statement did not accurately reflect the People’s position,” so as to render the prior statement of readiness illusory (Sibblies, 22 NY3d at 1180 …). Rather, defense counsel merely speculated that the certificate of readiness was illusory because the People announced that they were not ready at the next court appearance after it was filed, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the certificate of readiness was accurate and truthful … . People v Brown, 2015 NY Slip Op 02042, 1st Dept 3-17-15

 

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Failure to Move to Withdraw Plea, and Thereby Preserve the Issue for Appeal, Did Not Prohibit Appeal Here—Defendant Was Wrongly Informed by the Court and Counsel that the Denial of His Speedy Trial Motion Would Be Appealable After the Plea

The Third Department reversed Supreme Court and vacated defendant's guilty plea because defendant was wrongly informed by the court and counsel that his statutory speedy trial issue would survive the guilty plea (for appeal).  Under the circumstances, the court determined the failure to preserve the error by moving to withdraw the plea did not prohibit the appeal:

The People concede that an essential term of the plea bargain was the parties' understanding that defendant would retain the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Defendant was thereafter sentenced … . Defendant now appeals, arguing that his plea was involuntarily entered because his counsel and County Court erroneously informed him that a statutory CPL 30.30 claim would survive a plea of guilty.

Initially, we consider whether defendant was required to preserve this claim by appropriate postallocution motion (see CPL 220.60 [3]; 440.10). While a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea is generally not preserved for appellate review unless it was first raised in the trial court …, the Court of Appeals has recognized that “where a defendant has no practical ability to object to an error in a plea allocution which is clear from the face of the record, preservation is not required” … . Here a CPL 440.10 motion was unavailable because the error is clear from the face of the record; similarly a CPL 220.60 (3) motion was practically unavailable because “'defendant [could] hardly be expected to move to withdraw his plea on a ground of which he ha[d] no knowledge'” … . Inasmuch as defendant–due to the inaccurate advice of his counsel and the trial court–did not know during the plea and sentencing proceedings that his statutory speedy trial claim would be forfeited as a direct consequence of his plea …, preservation was not required … . Moreover, under these circumstances, we agree with defendant that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary and, accordingly, we reverse and vacate the plea … . People v Williams, 2014 NY Slip Op 09067, 3rd Dept 12-31-14


Delay In Seeking DNA Sample Contributed to Violation of Speedy Trial Statute—Indictment Dismissed

The Second Department dismissed the indictment because the unexcused delay in seeking a DNA sample resulted in the violation of the speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30):

The defendant moved pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Contrary to the People’s contention, because the People failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the DNA sample from the defendant, the 161-day period between June 5, 2009, and November 13, 2009, was not excludable on the ground that their need to obtain the DNA test results constituted excusable, exceptional circumstances (see CPL 30.30[4][g]…). Adding this period of time to the periods of delay correctly conceded by the People, the People exceeded the six-month period in which they were required to be ready for trial (see CPL 30.30[1][a]). Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 granted, and the indictment dismissed. People v Clarke, 2014 NY Slip Op 07680, 2nd Dept 11-12-14

 

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Speedy Trial Clock Starts On the Day the People’s Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Appeals Is Denied, Notwithstanding Adjournments Granted in the Lower Court

The Court of Appeals determined that the speedy trial clock started running when the People's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied.  The time attributable to the lower court's adjournment while the application to the Court of Appeals was pending should not have been excluded from the speedy trial calculation:

The parties do not dispute that under CPL 30.30 (5) (a) a new criminal action commenced when a Judge of this Court denied the People leave to appeal from the Appellate Term's order. The People point to the fact that, under the Criminal Procedure Law, “[i]n computing the time within which the people must be ready for trial . . . a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: . . . appeals; . . . and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court” must be excluded (CPL 30.30 [4] [a] [emphasis added]).

The People contend therefore that the period from May 10, 2010 to August 23, 2010 is excludable, relying on People v Vukel (263 AD2d 416 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 830 [1999]), which held that when a trial court orders an adjournment for control purposes because of the pendency of a defendant's application for leave to appeal to this Court, the entire period of the adjournment is excludable under CPL 30.30 (4) (a), as time resulting from the appeal. In Vukel, the Appellate Division rejected the argument that the People have “an obligation to advance the case to an earlier date upon receiving the certificate denying leave” (id. at 417).

The mere lapse of time, following the date on which the order occasioning a retrial becomes final, does not in itself constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (a). Otherwise, the People would be permitted to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment in the trial court, no matter how lengthy, even after a Judge of our Court has denied leave to appeal, without consequence under CPL 30.30. Such a rule would be inconsistent with “the dominant legislative intent informing CPL 30.30, namely, to discourage prosecutorial inaction” … . To the extent Vukel holds otherwise, it should not be followed. People v Wells, 2014 NY Slip Op 07012, CtApp 10-16-14

 

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Conditioning Plea Offer Upon Withdrawal of a Constitutional Speedy Trial Motion Is an Inherently Coercive Mode of Proceedings Error

The Third Department determined that the People’s conditioning of a plea bargain on the defendant’s withdrawal of his constitutional speedy trial motion was a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal:

…[T]he Court of Appeals has recently cited to People v Blakley (34 NY2d at 315) as an example of the “mode of proceedings” exception to the preservation rule (People v Hanley, 20 NY3d 601, 604, 605 n 2 [2013]). In that case, the Court held that conditioning a plea on a waiver of a constitutional speedy trial claim is “inherently coercive” (People v Blakley, 34 NY2d at 313). The narrow mode of proceedings exception speaks to fundamental flaws that implicate “rights of a constitutional dimension that go to the very heart of the process” … . Where, as in Blakley, the People condition a plea offer on the defendant’s waiver of his or her constitutional speedy trial claim, the integrity of the judicial process has been undermined … .

Here, the People expressly conditioned the plea offer on defendant’s withdrawal of his constitutional speedy trial motion, while the hearing on this issue was still pending. To make matters worse, the offer was set to expire as soon as the hearing resumed … . This is the type of prosecutorial bartering expressly prohibited as “inherently coercive” in People v Blakley (34 NY2d at 313). A trial court has a core obligation to recognize and prevent such an unfair tactic, but here the court simply reiterated the impermissible condition of the plea and waiver … . People v Wright, 2014 NY Slip Op 04976, 3rd Dept 7-3-14

 

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