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SEVEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly found that the seven-year delay between defendant’s arrest and indictment did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The court explained the relevant law:

A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed both by the United States Constitution … . Moreover, an unjustified delay in prosecution will deprive a defendant of the State constitutional right to due process … . However, “a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant” … . Where there has been extended delay, the People have the burden to establish good cause … .

In determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Court of Appeals has articulated five factors to be considered: (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any impairment of the defendant’s defense … . These factors apply as well to the due process guarantee … . “In this State, we have never drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards’ when dealing with delays in prosecution” … . People v Allen, 2015 NY Slip Op 08850, 2nd Dept 12-2-15

CRIMINAL LAW (SPEEDY TRIAL, SEVEN YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT)/SPEEDY TRIAL (SEVEN YEARS BETWEEN ARREST AND INDICTMENT)

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NOTICE TO ADMIT IMPROPERLY SOUGHT CONCESSIONS THAT WENT TO HEART OF THE CON... 17-YEAR DELAY ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED, SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT NOT VIOLATED.