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Local Law Purporting to Limit Term of County District Attorney Preempted by New York Constitution and State Law

The Second Department determined that the local law which limited the term of the county district attorney to 12 years was preempted by the New York Constitution and state law, thereby allowing the sitting district attorney (who had served for 12 years) to run for another term.  The court reasoned:

…[T]he County’s attempt to place a term limit on the office of District Attorney is impermissible. Since the office of District Attorney is not a local office falling within the ambit of NY Const, article IX, § 2(c)(1) or Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 (1)(ii)(a), the County had no authority to place restrictions on the District Attorney’s terms of office. Further, even if the District Attorney is a local office falling within NY Const, article IX, § 2(c)(1) and Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a), the New York Constitution and state law, together, so expansively and comprehensively regulate the office, that a county government’s ability to place restrictions on a District Attorney’s terms of office has been preempted. *  *  *

Pursuant to the maxim of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240…). Here, in light of the fact that the New York Constitution and state law speak to the duration and term of office of the District Attorney, there is an irrefutable inference that the imposition of any limit on the duration of that office was intended to be omitted or excluded (see McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240…). Indeed, regarding County Court judges, the New York Constitution provides for a 10-year term (see NY Const, art VI, § 10[b]) and a maximum duration to age 70 (see NY Const, art VI, § 25[b]). That the Constitution imposed a durational limit on County Court judges, but not on District Attorneys, who are also “constitutional officers,” indicates that the omission was intentional and that it was intended that there be no durational limit on District Attorneys. Matter of Hoerger v Spota, 2013 NY slip Op 05661, 2nd Dept 8-16-13

 

Failure to Comply with Service Method in Order to Show Cause Required Dismissal

In a proceeding under the Election Law to invalidate a petition designating a candidate, the Second Department determined dismissal was appropriate based upon the failure to comply the service method prescribed in an order to show cause:

“The method of service provided for in an order to show cause is jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly complied with” … . Service within the statutory period by means other than those authorized by the order to show cause does not bring a respondent within the court’s jurisdiction … . Here, the subject order to show cause provided that service thereof and of “the papers upon which it [was] granted” upon the candidate Ivy Reeves was to be effectuated by (1) “sending the same by overnight, next-day delivery by UPS, FEDEX or the U.S. Postal Service on or before the 22nd day of July, 2013”; “or” (2) “by personal delivery of the same to [Ivy Reeves] on or before July 23, 2013, no later than 7:00 p.m.” It is undisputed that the petitioners did not attempt to personally deliver the papers to Reeves, and that copies of both the order to show cause and petition to invalidate were not delivered to Reeves’s address until July 24, 2013. The petitioners submitted evidence that, at 9:30 p.m. on July 22, 2013, they deposited a prepaid United States Postal Service “Priority Mail Express” envelope containing these documents in a mail slot located inside a publicly accessible vestibule of a post office, after the post office itself had closed. The record established that an envelope deposited at that time would not have been collected, scanned, and prepared for delivery by postal employees until 7:00 a.m. on the following day. Matter of Rotanelli v Board of Elections of Westchester County, 2013 NY Slip Op 05657, 2nd Dept 8-15-13

 

Filing Petition Four Hours Late Was Fatal Defect

The Second Department determined that the filing of a petition for an opportunity to ballot more than four hours after the deadline was a fatal defect:

Election Law § 1-106 provides that papers shall be filed with the relevant board of elections between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Moreover, the “failure to file any petition or certificate relating to the designation or nomination of a candidate for party position or public office . . . within the time prescribed by the provisions of this chapter shall be a fatal defect” (Election Law § 1-106[2]). “[T]he case law interpreting Election Law § 1-106(2) and its predecessor, Election Law former § 143(12) (as amended by L 1969, ch 529, § 1), makes it clear that such time limitations are mandatory in nature, and the judiciary is oreclose[ed] . . . from fashioning exceptions, however reasonable they might be made to appear’”… .  Matter of Rhoades v Westchester County Bd of Elections, 2013 NY Slip Op 05656, 2nd Dept 8-15-13

 

Failure to Provide Cover Sheet Fatal to Designating Petition

In reversing Supreme Court and granting the petition to invalidate a designating petition and removing the candidate from the ballot, the Second Department determined that the failure provide a cover sheet for the petition in accordance with the Election Law and regulations was fatal to the petition:

We are mindful that the provisions of Election Law § 6-134 “shall be liberally construed, not inconsistent with substantial compliance thereto and the prevention of fraud” (Election Law § 6-134[10]; see 9 NYCRR 6215.6[a]) in order to avoid the disenfranchisement of voters. However, although certain “[c]over sheet deficiencies may be corrected by the filing of an amended cover sheet” …, a candidate may not “amend” a cover sheet which was never filed in the first place, as was the case here.

“The three-day cure provision for designating petitions (Election Law § 6-134[2]) is available for technical violations of the regulations” …. In the instant case, however, the candidate’s initial failure to file a cover sheet was not a mere technical defect subject to cure pursuant to Election Law § 6-134(2) … . To the contrary, the absence of a cover sheet, especially where, as here, the designating petition contained multiple volumes that were unbound, constituted a complete failure to comply with the requirements set forth in 9 NYCRR 6215.1, which may not be cured pursuant to Election Law § 6-134(2) and 9 NYCRR 6215.6 … . Such failure undermines procedural safeguards against both fraud and confusion … .  Matter of Armwood v McCloy, 2013 NY Slip Op 05654, 2nd Dept, 8-15-17

 

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Counsel Should Have Been Disqualified Based On Conflict of Interest—Criteria Explained

In reversing Supreme Court and determining that counsel representing the town must be disqualified for a conflict of interest, the Second Department explained the operative principles:

“The disqualification of an attorney is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the court” … . A party seeking disqualification of its adversary’s counsel based on counsel’s purported prior representation of that party must establish: “(1) the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship between the moving party and opposing counsel, (2) that the matters involved in both representations are substantially related, and (3) that the interests of the present client and former client are materially adverse” … . “A party’s entitlement to be represented in ongoing litigation by counsel of [its] own choosing is a valued right which should not be abridged absent a clear showing that disqualification is warranted” … . * * *

There is a rebuttable presumption that “where an attorney working in a law firm is disqualified from undertaking a subsequent representation opposing a former client, all the attorneys in that firm are likewise precluded from such representation” … . That presumption may be rebutted by proof that “any information acquired by the disqualified lawyer is unlikely to be significant or material in the [subject] litigation” … . Proof must also be presented that the law firm properly screened the disqualified lawyer from dissemination and receipt of information subject to the attorney-client privilege … .  Matter of Town of Oyster Bay v 55 Motor Ave Co LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 05636, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

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Employment Contract Deemed Hiring “At Will”—No Fixed Duration

The Second Department affirmed the dismissal of a breach of contract cause of action which alleged defendant breached an employment contract when the position which was the subject of the contract was withdrawn. In finding the agreement described a hiring “at will,” the court described the applicable principles as follows:

“New York adheres to the traditional common-law rule that absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party” … . In support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants submitted the … employment contract, setting forth the terms of the employment relationship. The … employment contract contained a merger clause reciting that the writing encompassed the entire agreement between the parties. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the …employment contract did not provide for a fixed or definite term of employment, as it expressly provided that [plaintiff] was to be employed “for an indefinite period of time.” Moreover, the …employment contract provided that either party could, without notice, terminate the employment relationship with immediate effect during the first two months after its execution, and thereafter with certain notice. Further, the plaintiffs themselves alleged in the complaint that, pursuant to the … employment contract, [plaintiff’s] employment was “to continue without any specific date for termination.” Thus, [plaintiff] was presumptively an at-will employee …. The plaintiffs failed to allege facts that would rebut the at-will presumption or limit [defendants’] right to freely terminate [plaintiff’s] employment.  Minovici v Belkin BV, 2013 NY Slip Op 05618, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

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Choice of Law Criteria Re: Insurance Contracts Explained

The Second Department, in reversing Supreme Court’s finding that New York, not New Jersey, law applied to a disclaimer of insurance coverage based on late notice, explained the relevant choice of law principles:

The first step in any case presenting a potential choice of law issue is to determine whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved”…. Here, there is a clear conflict inasmuch as New Jersey law requires insurers asserting a disclaimer based on late notice to show that they were prejudiced by the untimely notice…, while, with respect to an identical disclaimer made under an insurance policy that, like the one in dispute here…, New York law does not ….

In contract cases, the court then applies a “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” analysis in order to determine which State has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties … . The court considers significant contacts such as the place of contracting, the place of negotiation and performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile or place of business of the contracting parties … .”In the context of liability insurance contracts, the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties’ will generally be the jurisdiction which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk . . . unless with respect to the particular issue, some other [jurisdiction] has a more significant relationship’ “…. Where the covered risks are spread over multiple states, “the state of the insured’s domicile should be regarded as a proxy for the principal location of the insured risk” … . Jimenez v Monadnock Constr Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 05616, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

Validating Petition Not Sufficiently Particularized

In determining a proceeding to validate a petition designating a candidate for county executive should have been dismissed, the Second Department wrote:

“A validating petition must specify the individual determinations of a board of elections that the candidate claims were erroneous, including the signatures that the candidate claims were improperly invalidated” … . Here, the validating petition was not sufficiently particularized to give notice of which determinations were claimed to be erroneous or which signatures … were improperly invalidated … . Matter of Lacorte v Cytryn, 2013 NY slip Op 05632, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

Mistake in Name of Party Did Not Warrant Striking Candidate’s Name from Ballot

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court’s striking of a candidate’s name from the ballot.  Supreme Court determined the identification of the party as the “Working Family Party” rather than the “Working Families Party” was fatal because the “Working Family Party” is not a registered or recognized political party. The Second Department wrote:

Although it is undisputed that the designating petition contained an error in the naming of the political party …, a petition should not be invalidated where “there is no proof of any intention on the part of the candidate or of those who have solicited signatures on his [or her] behalf to mislead or confuse, and no evidence that the inaccuracy did or would lead or tend to lead to misidentification or confusion on the part of those invited to sign the petition” … . Here, there has been no showing of any intention to mislead or confuse, and no showing that the inaccuracy in the designating petition did or would lead or tend to lead to misidentification or confusion on the part of those invited to sign the petition. Inasmuch as no such showing was made, the designating petition was improperly invalidated… . Matter of  Cohn v Suffolk County Bd of Elections, 2013 NY Slip Op 05625, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

Failure to Include Restitution in Plea Negotiations Precluded Imposing Restitution at Sentencing

The Second Department vacated defendant’s sentence because, although restitution was not part of the plea promise, restitution was imposed at sentencing:

At the sentencing proceeding, the defendant did not have a sufficient opportunity to object to the imposition of restitution. The court made a brief reference to “RJOs,” apparently referring to restitution judgment orders. After pronouncing the sentence, the court stated: “With respect to any and all surcharges, given the fact there’s significant restitution judgment order obligations here, I’m going to waive the surcharges.” Under these circumstances, the defendant’s contention will be addressed on the merits … .

Although a court is free to reserve the right to order restitution as part of a plea bargain, the plea minutes in this case do not indicate that the pleas of guilty were negotiated with terms that included restitution … . At sentencing, the defendant should have been “given an opportunity either to withdraw his plea[s] or to accept the enhanced sentence[s] that included both restitution and a prison sentence” …, or for the court to impose the sentences agreed upon at the plea proceedings. People v Pettress, 2013 NY Slip Op 05645, 2nd Dept 8-14-13

 

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