You are here: / Second Department

Tag Archive for: Second Department

, ,

CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER.

In an action stemming from the withholding of payment to plaintiff subcontractor, the Second Department determined the breach of contract cause of action should not have been dismissed, but noted that a conversion action cannot be based upon a breach of contract, and an unjust enrichment cause of action cannot coexist with a breach of contract cause of action.  Supreme Court had dismissed the breach of contract cause of action, finding the defendant had a legal right to withhold payment under Labor Law 220 because complaints had been lodged for failure to pay the prevailing wage for this school construction project. But since the Comptroller had not yet ruled on the Labor Law 220 complaints, Supreme Court should not have based its dismissal on them by making its own finding:

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . While a court is “permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)” … , “where the motion is not converted to one for summary judgment, the criterion is whether the [third-party plaintiff] has a cause of action, not whether [it] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the [third-party plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it . . . dismissal should not eventuate'” … . A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may appropriately be granted “only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . * * *

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the third-party cause of action alleging breach of contract on the ground that the third-party defendants had a legal right to withhold payment pursuant to Labor Law §§ 220 and 220-b. Based upon the record before us, there is no indication that the Comptroller has rendered a final determination regarding the alleged Labor Law § 220 violation. As such, the court, in effect, determined the prevailing wage issue, which is within the exclusive province of the Comptroller, prior to a determination by the Comptroller … . Thus, the evidentiary material submitted by the third-party defendants, which demonstrated that payment to AGC under the subject contracts was withheld pending the Comptroller’s determination, failed to establish that any fact alleged in support of the third-party breach of contract cause of action was undisputedly not a fact, and failed to conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law to that cause of action. Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v Astoria Gen. Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08047, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)/DISMISS, MOTION TO (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)

,

CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED, DISCRETIONARY CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly stayed a civil matter after the defendant was indicted in a related criminal matter and indicated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent if the civil matter went forward:

A motion pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay a civil action pending resolution of a related criminal action is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court … . “Factors to consider include avoiding the risk of inconsistent adjudications, [duplication] of proof and potential waste of judicial resources. A compelling factor is a situation where a defendant will invoke his or her constitutional right against self incrimination” … . “Although the pendency of a criminal proceeding does not give rise to an absolute right under the United States or New York State Constitutions to a stay of a related civil proceeding . . . there is no question but that the court may exercise its discretion to stay proceedings in a civil action until a related criminal dispute is resolved” … .

Here, this action and the criminal proceeding against Samuel arise from the same facts. While a stay may cause inconvenience and delay to the plaintiffs, the failure to grant the stay would cause Samuel to “suffer the severe prejudice of being deprived of a defense” … . Moreover, a prior determination in the criminal proceeding could have collateral estoppel effect in this action, thereby simplifying the issues … . Mook v Homesafe Am., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08054, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED)/CRIMINAL LAW (CIVIL MATTER PROPERLY STAYED UNTIL RELATED CRIMINAL MATTER RESOLVED)

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the County’s motion to amend its answer to assert a statute of limitations defense, six years after the initial answer was served, should have been denied:

The County waived a defense based on the statute of limitations by not raising that defense in its answer … . Nevertheless, defenses waived under CPLR 3211(e) can be interposed in an answer amended by leave of the court pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) … . ” In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit'” … . ” A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court’s broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed'” … . ” In exercising its discretion, the court should consider how long the party seeking the amendment was aware of the facts upon which the motion was predicated [and] whether a reasonable excuse for the delay was offered'” … . ” [W]here the application for leave to amend is made long after the action has been certified for trial, judicial discretion in allowing such amendments should be discrete, circumspect, prudent and cautious'” … .

We agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the County’s motion for leave to amend its answer to assert the statute of limitations as a defense and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred … . The County’s motion was not made until approximately six years after service of its answer, after the parties had completed discovery, and after the note of issue had been filed. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs have suffered significant prejudice from the County’s delay in asserting the statute of limitations as a defense … . Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v County of Nassau, 2016 NY Slip Op 08038, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)/ANSWER, MOTION TO AMEND MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, MADE SIX YEARS AFTER INITIAL ANSWER WAS SERVED, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED)

, ,

STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED.

The Second Department determined the statement in a summons with notice alleging a mortgage was obtained by fraud was protected by judicial-proceedings privilege:

Generally, statements made at all stages of a judicial proceeding in communications among the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court are accorded an absolute privilege, as long as the statements may be considered in some way “pertinent” to the issue in the proceeding … . This privilege, or “immunity” … , applies to statements made in or out of court, on or off the record, and regardless of the motive with which they were made … .

The test of pertinency to the litigation is extremely liberal, so as to embrace anything that may possibly or plausibly be relevant or pertinent … . The purpose of the privilege is to allow the parties, witnesses, and attorneys in a litigation to communicate freely without fear of defamation litigation … . Weinstock v Sanders, 2016 NY Slip Op 07947, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

DEFAMATION (STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)/PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION, STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)/IMMUNITY (DEFAMATION, STATEMENT IN SUMMONS WITH NOTICE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED)

A SMOOTH SLIPPERY SURFACE, STANDING ALONE, WILL NOT SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to summary judgment in a slip and fall case. The court noted that a smooth surface which is slippery, standing alone, does not raise a question of fact:

The plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging that the defendants had negligently applied wax to the staircase, making it dangerously slippery. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court denied the motion. We reverse.

During the injured plaintiff’s deposition, the transcript of which was submitted in support of the defendants’ motion, he testified that he did not see any foreign substance, liquids, or other slippery substance on the steps, either before or after the subject accident. “[I]n the absence of evidence of a negligent application of floor wax or polish, the mere fact that a smooth floor may be slippery does not support a cause of action to recover damages for negligence” … . Here, in support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants submitted evidence sufficient to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the complaint as was based on the defendants’ alleged negligent application of wax or polish to the subject staircase … . Kapoor v Randlett, 2016 NY Slip Op 07927, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (A SMOOTH SLIPPERY SURFACE, STANDING ALONE, WILL NOT SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (A SMOOTH SLIPPERY SURFACE, STANDING ALONE, WILL NOT SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE IN A SLIP AND FALL CASE)

, , ,

ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED (NOT THE CASE HERE).

The Second Department, finding that a cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of contract does not exist, explained the elements of aiding and abetting fraud. The court further found that the arbitration clause was not invalidated by the allegations of fraud in the inducement:

There is no cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of contract … . To recover for aiding and abetting fraud, the plaintiff must plead “the existence of an underlying fraud, knowledge of the fraud by the aider and abettor, and substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the fraud” … . “Substantial assistance” requires an affirmative act on the defendant’s part … . “[T]he mere inaction of an alleged aider or abettor constitutes substantial assistance only if the defendant owes a fiduciary duty directly to the plaintiff” … . * * *

The plaintiffs contend that the arbitration agreement is invalid because it was fraudulently induced. However, a broad arbitration provision is separable from the substantive provisions of a contract such that the agreement to arbitrate is valid even if the substantive provisions of the contract were induced by fraud … . “The issue of fraud in the inducement affects the validity of the arbitration clause only when the fraud relates to the arbitration provision itself, or was part of a grand scheme that permeated the entire contract'” … . “To demonstrate that fraud permeated the entire contract, it must be established that the agreement was not the result of an arm’s length negotiation, or the arbitration clause was inserted into the contract to accomplish a fraudulent scheme” … . Markowits v Friedman, 2016 NY Slip Op 07932, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

FRAUD (ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)/CONTRACT LAW (ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD EXPLAINED, WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)/ARBITRATION (WHEN FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAN INVALIDATE AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE EXPLAINED)

QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS UNCONSCIONABLE.

The Second Department determined summary judgment should not have been granted enforcing the parties’ separation agreement. Defendant had raised a question of fact about whether the agreement was unconscionable:

Under the terms of the separation agreement, the defendant relinquished all of the property rights that he acquired during the marriage, including any interest that he may have had in the plaintiff’s partnership interest in a neurological practice and the parties’ four properties in Florida, as well as any spousal maintenance. Given the vast disparity in the parties’ earnings, the evidence that the defendant had no assets of value, and the defendant’s documented medical condition which inhibits his future earning capacity, the defendant’s submissions were sufficient to create an inference that the separation agreement was unconscionable … . In addition, the defendant’s evidence indicating that the plaintiff sold almost $1 million in securities in the months preceding his execution of the separation agreement, the value of which were not accounted for in the list of her bank and brokerage accounts therein, raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff concealed assets … . Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court should have exercised its equitable powers and directed further financial disclosure, to be followed by a hearing to test the validity of the separation agreement … . Gardella v Remizov, 2016 NY Slip Op 07924, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

FAMILY LAW (QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS UNCONSCIONABLE)/SEPARATION AGREEMENT (QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS UNCONSCIONABLE)/UNCONSCIONABILITY (FAMILY LAW, QUESTION OF FACT RAISED ABOUT WHETHER A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WAS UNCONSCIONABLE)

,

UNDER THE FACTS, ERROR TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S FACEBOOK COMMENT AND GANG AFFILIATION AS SANDOVAL EVIDENCE.

Although the errors were deemed harmless, the Second Department noted that allowing, as Sandoval evidence, a comment posted by defendant on Facebook and evidence of defendant’s gang affiliation was improper under the facts:

The Supreme Court erred, in its Sandoval ruling … , in permitting the People to elicit testimony from the defendant regarding a comment posted on his Facebook page, since the comment was not probative of the defendant’s credibility … . The Supreme Court further erred in permitting the People to elicit testimony from certain witnesses regarding the defendant’s alleged gang affiliation and involvement in a prior violent incident. Contrary to the People’s contention and the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the defendant did not introduce evidence that could properly be construed as character evidence and, thus, it was improper to permit the People to elicit evidence as to the defendant’s alleged prior bad acts on that basis … . In addition, the Supreme Court improperly modified its Sandoval ruling by permitting the prosecutor to question the defendant regarding his alleged gang affiliation and the prior violent incident, as the defendant did not “open the door” to the otherwise precluded evidence … . People v Borgella, 2016 NY Slip Op 07972, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

CRIMINAL LAW (UNDER THE FACTS, ERROR TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S FACEBOOK COMMENT AND GANG AFFILIATION)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, SANDOVAL, UNDER THE FACTS, ERROR TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S FACEBOOK COMMENT AND GANG AFFILIATION)/SANDOVAL (UNDER THE FACTS, ERROR TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT’S FACEBOOK COMMENT AND GANG AFFILIATION)

,

DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A CIVIL LAWSUIT WHICH ALLEGED THE OFFICER FABRICATED A WEAPONS CHARGE.

The Second Department determined prohibiting the cross-examination of a police officer about a federal lawsuit which alleged the officer fabricated a weapons charged was reversible error. Defendant was arrested by the officer and charged with possession of a weapon allegedly found by the officer in the seat of the car where defendant was sitting:

The Court of Appeals has held that law enforcement witnesses should be treated in the same manner as any other prosecution witness for purposes of cross-examination and that civil allegations of misconduct in a federal lawsuit filed against a law enforcement agent are favorable to a defendant as impeachment evidence insofar as such allegations bear on a law enforcement officer’s credibility as a witness … . Furthermore, there is no prohibition against cross-examining a witness, including a police officer, about bad acts that have never been formally proven at a trial … .

In cross-examining a law enforcement witness, the same standard for good faith basis and specific allegations relevant to credibility applies, as does the same broad latitude to preclude or limit cross-examination … . Counsel must first present a good faith basis for inquiring, namely the lawsuit relied upon. Second, specific allegations from the lawsuit that are relevant to the credibility of the law enforcement witness must be identified. Third, the trial judge must exercise discretion in assessing whether inquiry into such allegations would confuse or mislead the jury, or create a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the parties … . People v Enoe, 2016 NY Slip Op 07977, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A CIVIL LAWSUIT WHICH ALLEGED THE OFFICER FABRICATED A WEAPONS CHARGE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A CIVIL LAWSUIT WHICH ALLEGED THE OFFICER FABRICATED A WEAPONS CHARGE)/POLICE OFFICERS (CROSS-EXAMINATION, (DEFENDANT, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH POSSESSION OF A WEAPON, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A CIVIL LAWSUIT WHICH ALLEGED THE OFFICER FABRICATED A WEAPONS CHARGE)

SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ARTICLE 78/SUMMARY JUDGMENT ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE.

The Second Department reversed the dismissal of a petition because a question of fact had been raised about the adequacy of notice of a tax lien. The Second Department also reversed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment portion of this hybrid Article 78/declaratory judgment action because no motion had been made for summary determination of declaratory judgment request:

“In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those which seek to recover damages and declaratory relief, on the other hand. The Supreme Court may not employ the summary procedure applicable to a CPLR article 78 cause of action to dispose of causes of action to recover damages or seeking a declaratory judgment” … . “Thus, where no party makes a request for a summary determination of the causes of action which seek to recover damages or declaratory relief, it is error for the Supreme Court to summarily dispose of those causes of action” … . Here, since no party made such a motion, the Supreme Court should not have summarily disposed of the cause of action that sought declaratory relief, and the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings on that cause of action … . Matter of East W. Bank v L & L Assoc. Holding Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 07956, 2nd Dept 11-23-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE)/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE)/HYBRID ACTIONS (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE)/ARTICLE 78 (HYBRID ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PORTION OF THIS HYBRID ACTION BECAUSE NO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DETERMINATION OF THAT PORTION OF THE PROCEEDING HAD BEEN MADE)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy