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COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM; FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION.

The Second Department determined the county was not entitled to summary judgment on governmental immunity grounds and an independent contractor for the county was not entitled to summary judgment because of the contractual relationship. Plaintiffs alleged the county and the contractor were negligent in dredging a pond resulting in flood damage. The county could be liable in ordinary negligence for maintenance of the drainage system (as opposed to design) and the subcontractor could be liable for launching an instrument of harm:

Although a governmental entity may be entitled to immunity from liability arising out of claims that it negligently designed a sewerage or storm drainage system … , the immunity does not extend to claims that it negligently maintained the system … . Here, even assuming the subject project fell within the ambit of a governmental function, the plaintiffs contend that the County was negligent, inter alia, in its maintenance of the pond and oversight of the dredging operations. * * *

Generally, an independent contractor owes no tort duty of care to third parties … . However, there are “three situations in which a party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care—and thus be potentially liable in tort—to third persons … where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launches a force or instrument of harm … . Nachamie v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00657, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/NEGLIGENCE (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/IMMUNITY (COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)/CONTRACT LAW (INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM, FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION)

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LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE.

The Second Department determined the county’s written notice required precluded suit in this “slip and fall on ice” action:

Here, the County established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting the affidavit of a County employee, which indicated that she had conducted a search of the relevant records covering a five-year period prior to the date of the accident, and found no written notice of any dangerous or defective conditions at the accident site … .

… Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the County could require prior written notice of the icy condition because the landing on the exterior steps of the building where the accident occurred provided the public with a general right of passage, and thus served the same functional purpose as a sidewalk, which is one of the locations specifically enumerated in General Municipal Law § 50-e(4) … . Walker v County of Nassau, 2017 NY Slip Op 00683, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/SLIP AND FALL (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)/NEGLIGENCE (LACK OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF AN ICY CONDITION PRECLUDED SUIT IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE)

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ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly dismissed a police officer’s article 78 proceeding seeking reimbursement of the cost of defending a civil rights lawsuit. During the civil rights suit, the officer admitted doing nothing when he learned the plaintiff could not have committed the crime for which he was arrested. The officer argued the applicable provision of the General Municipal Law was ambiguous and, read correctly, required the county to indemnify him. Although the Second Department found that the provision was in fact ambiguous and had not been interpreted correctly by the Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification Board, the Board had correctly held the statute did not allow indemnification of the officer:

The statute vests the [Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification] Board with the discretion to determine the issues of proper discharge of duties and scope of employment, limited only by judicial review of whether a denial of defense and indemnification is arbitrary and capricious … . Here, the Board’s determination that the petitioner was not acting within the scope of his employment was arbitrary and capricious … . However, its determination that the petitioner’s failure to notify anyone that an incarcerated arrestee could not possibly have committed the robbery for which he was charged was not “committed while in the proper discharge of his duties” was supported by the facts and was not arbitrary and capricious (General Municipal Law § 50-l…). A court “may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the determination, but must ascertain only whether there is a rational basis for the decision or whether it is arbitrary and capricious” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 2017 NY Slip Op 00649, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/POLICE OFFICERS (ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)/CIVIL RIGHTS (POLICE OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW WAS WRONG, THE RULING WAS CORRECT, THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHO LEARNED THE SUSPECT COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME, BUT SAID NOTHING, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR COSTS OF DEFENDING THE RELATED CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT)

DOG INJURED PLAINTIFF BY RUNNING AND JUMPING UP ON HER IN PLAY, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DOG DID NOT HAVE A PROPENSITY TO JUMP IN PLAY EXCEPT ON COMMAND.

The Second Department determined the complaint in this dog-injury case was properly dismissed. It was alleged the dog ran at plaintiff at full speed, jumped up on its hind legs, struck plaintiff in the chest and knocked her to the ground:

To recover in strict liability in tort for damages caused by a dog, the plaintiff must establish that the dog had vicious propensities and that the owner knew or should have known of the dog’s vicious propensities ;;; . “Vicious propensities include the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of the persons and property of others in a given situation” … . Indeed, “[a] known tendency to attack others, even in playfulness, as in the case of the overly friendly large dog with a propensity for enthusiastic jumping up on visitors, will be enough to make the defendant liable for damages resulting from such an act” … .

The defendants’ submissions, including the deposition testimony of the defendants and the plaintiffs, as well as the defendants’ affidavits, demonstrated that prior to the subject incident, the dog was not aggressive, and did not growl or spontaneously jump on people in the fashion described by the injured plaintiff. The defendants did not restrain the dog to keep it away from guests in their home. Accordingly, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … .

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. While the plaintiffs note that the defendants “trained” their dog to jump up on them on command, the deposition testimony of the defendants made clear that the dog only did so when prompted and only on immediate family members. They specifically testified that their dog had never jumped on an individual outside the immediate family. Such a jump on command is very different from the type of jump described by the injured plaintiff. Gammon v Curley, 2017 NY Slip Op 00630, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

 

ANIMAL LAW (DOG INJURED PLAINTIFF BY RUNNING AND JUMPING UP ON HER IN PLAY, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DOG DID NOT HAVE A PROPENSITY TO JUMP IN PLAY EXCEPT ON COMMAND)/DOGS (DOG INJURED PLAINTIFF BY RUNNING AND JUMPING UP ON HER IN PLAY, COMPLAINT PROPERLY DISMISSED, DEFENDANTS DEMONSTRATED THE DOG DID NOT HAVE A PROPENSITY TO JUMP IN PLAY EXCEPT ON COMMAND)

DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The Second Department determined the masonry contractor, Citnalta, did not exercise sufficient control over plaintiff’s work to be liable under Labor Law 200. Plaintiff, who worked for a subcontractor, was injured when a masonry saw jammed”

Here, Citnalta established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the subject accident was caused by the means and methods of the plaintiff’s work, that the plaintiff’s work was directed and controlled by his employer, and that it had no authority to exercise supervisory control over his work … . The plaintiff’s evidence of Citnalta’s general supervision of the project and overall compliance with safety standards was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition … . Further, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, he failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his injuries arose from a dangerous or defective premises condition … . Messina v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00640, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTIVE LAW (DEFENDANT DID NOT EXERCISE SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK TO BE LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)

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COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING PAYMENT OF INADEQUATE WAGES AND RETALIATION FOR BRINGING SUIT PRECLUDED BY EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED WRONGFUL ACTS.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurer (FIC) was not obligated to defend plaintiff in a suit alleging the payment of inadequate wages in violation of the Faire Labor Standards Act and retaliation for bringing suit. The policy excluded coverage for employment-related wrongful acts. “Employment-related” was not defined:

In context, the plain and ordinary meaning of the “employment-related Wrongful Act” exclusion unambiguously encompasses claims regarding violations of wage laws and retaliation for complaints about violations of wage laws. The payment of wages has such an established connection to the “act of employing” or “the state of being employed” that a contrary conclusion would be unreasonable. Put otherwise, no reasonable average insured giving the relevant terms their “plain and ordinary meaning” would conclude that complaints regarding violations of law as to payment of wages were not “employment-related” … . In short, it is clear from the language of the exclusion that … the policy did not insure against the clearly “employment-related” claims raised in the underlying action. Hansard v Federal Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 00633, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

INSURANCE LAW (COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING PAYMENT OF INADEQUATE WAGES AND RETALIATION FOR BRINGING SUIT PRECLUDED BY EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED WRONGFUL ACTS)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING PAYMENT OF INADEQUATE WAGES AND RETALIATION FOR BRINGING SUIT PRECLUDED BY EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED WRONGFUL ACTS)/EXCLUSIONS (INSURANCE LAW, COVERAGE FOR CLAIMS ALLEGING PAYMENT OF INADEQUATE WAGES AND RETALIATION FOR BRINGING SUIT PRECLUDED BY EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED WRONGFUL ACTS)

MOTHER’S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING.

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother’s modification of custody petition should not have been denied without a hearing:

Here, the mother established her entitlement to a hearing on the basis of changed circumstances. Specifically, the mother made a sufficient evidentiary showing in support of her allegations that the father sexually abused the oldest child and that, as a result of the ensuing litigation, the mother’s relationship with the father had deteriorated to the point that they could no longer communicate, and the oldest child was no longer visiting with the father … . Moreover, the “narrow exception” to the general requirement that a hearing be held is inapplicable in this case … . The dismissal of the article 10 [alleging sexual abuse of the oldest child by father] proceeding pursuant to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was not a dismissal on the merits and it did not resolve the allegations of sexual abuse … . Indeed, no evidentiary hearing was held in the article 10 proceeding, and the Family Court never made any findings of fact in that proceeding regarding the allegations of sexual abuse. In sum, the court should not have dismissed the mother’s modification petition without a hearing … . Matter of Chess v Lichtman, 2017 NY Slip Op 00644, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

FAMILY LAW (MOTHER’S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING)/CUSTODY (MOTHER’S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING)

MOTION FOR DNA TESTING OF CERTAIN TRIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion for DNA testing of some, but not all, of the evidence admitted at his trial:

Here, the defendant established that if forensic DNA testing had been conducted on two blood samples, a bloody sweater, and fingernail scrapings of the decedent, if any, recovered by the police from the crime scene, and if the results of such testing had been admitted at trial, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to him … . However, with respect to the defendant’s request for forensic DNA testing of hair and fibers, the defendant failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to him had DNA testing results of those items been admitted into evidence … .

In opposition to the motion, the People failed to come forward with evidence demonstrating the existence or nonexistence of the materials sought, and whether such materials are available for testing. “[T]he defendant does not bear the burden of showing that the specified DNA evidence exists and is available in suitable quantities to make testing feasible. To the contrary, it is the People, as the gatekeeper of the evidence, who must show what evidence exists and whether the evidence is available for testing” … . “[A] conclusory assertion that the evidence no longer exists is legally insufficient” … . People v Robinson, 2017 NY Slip Op 00665, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (MOTION FOR DNA TESTING OF CERTAIN TRIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MOTION FOR DNA TESTING OF CERTAIN TRIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED)/DNA (CRMINAL LAW, MOTION FOR DNA TESTING OF CERTAIN TRIAL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED)

NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION JURY INSTRUCTION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Second Department determined defendant was entitled to a new trial on the criminal possession of a weapon counts.  The People requested a jury instruction for constructive possession and the instruction was given. The evidence at trial did not provide a basis for the instruction:

After the gunpoint robbery of the supermarket, committed by a single perpetrator, the defendant was arrested when he was found hiding in an attic of a nearby house. Shortly thereafter, police officers recovered a gun from the attic. The People sought to prove at trial, among other things, that the defendant was the individual who committed the robbery with the gun recovered from the attic. In the bill of particulars and throughout the trial, the People’s theory on the counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was that the defendant possessed the subject gun in the supermarket. Even at the charge conference, at which the People requested a charge of constructive possession, the People maintained that the basis of those counts was the defendant’s possession of the gun in the supermarket. Since there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant constructively possessed the gun in the supermarket, that charge should not have been given … . People v Golden, 2017 NY Slip Op 00661, 2nd Dept 2-1-17

CRIMINAL LAW (NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION JURY INSTRUCTION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION JURY INSTRUCTION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION JURY INSTRUCTION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION, NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION JURY INSTRUCTION, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED.

The Second Department determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case was properly denied. Plaintiff was injured when a concrete step broke and gave way.  Defendants did not demonstrate when the area in question was last inspected and did not demonstrate the defect at issue was latent:

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of establishing that it did not create the alleged dangerous or defective condition or have either actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . A defendant has constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident that it could have been discovered and corrected … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, a defendant is required to offer some evidence as to when the accident site was last cleaned or inspected prior to the plaintiff’s fall” … . “When a defect is latent and would not be discoverable upon a reasonable inspection, constructive notice may not be imputed” … .

Here, in the absence of any evidence as to when the defendants last inspected the subject staircase before the accident, or that the condition of the step was a latent defect that could not have been discovered upon a reasonable inspection, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition of the subject step … . Gairy v 3900 Harper Ave., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 00458, 2nd Dept 1-25-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/SLIP AND FALL (DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)/NOTICE (SLIP AND FALL, EFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE STEP WAS LAST INSPECTED AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ANY DEFECT WAS LATENT, SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED)

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