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WHEN THE PROPERTY OWNER DIED INTESTATE, THE DECEDENT’S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY PASSED OUTSIDE THE ESTATE TO THE DISTRIBUTEES AS TENANTS IN COMMON; THEREFORE, THE PARTITION ACTION BY ONE OF THE TENANTS IN COMMON SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISED ON THE GROUND AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE HAD BEEN APPOINTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the partition action by a party holding 50% ownership of real property formerly owned by decedent should not have been dismissed based on the appointment of an administrator for decedent’s estate. Decedent died intestate. His interest in the real property passed to the distributees upon his death and is therefore not part of the estate:

… [T]he decedent died intestate, possessed of the subject property, and leaving six distributees who became owners of the subject property as tenants in common at the time of the decedent’s death. In its complaint, LCD Holdings alleged that it had acquired a 50% interest in the subject property from deeds given by and through certain of those distributees, with the defendants—the decedent’s remaining distributees—holding the other 50% interest. Consequently, the subject property is not part of the administrable estate … . Under such circumstances, LCD Holding, as the alleged holder of a 50% interest in the subject property as a tenant in common with the defendants, had the right to maintain this action for the partition and sale of the subject property in the Supreme Court, Kings County (see RPAPL 901[1] … ). Accordingly, the court erred in, sua sponte, directing dismissal of the action without prejudice to the commencement of a proceeding for the same relief in the in Surrogate’s Court … . LCD Holding Corp. v Powell-Allen, 2022 NY Slip Op 01447, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: When a real-property owner dies intestate, the decedent’s interest in the property immediately passes outside the estate to the distributees as tenants in common. Here the partition action by one of the tenants in common should not have been dismissed when an administrator of the estate was appointed because the real property was not part of the administrable estate.

 

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THE BANK FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE “HOLDER (OF THE NOTE)” REQUIREMENTS OF THE UCC WERE MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff bank did not demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action:

… [T]here was no evidence that the plaintiff is the assignee of note, and triable issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time the action was commenced. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code (see UCC 3-104[2][d] …). A “holder” is “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession” (UCC 1-201[b][21][A] …). Where an instrument is endorsed in blank, it may be negotiated by delivery (see UCC 3-202[1]; 3-204[2] …). In the present case, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the note was properly endorsed in blank by an allonge “so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof” when it came into the possession of the plaintiff (UCC 3-202[2] …). …

The plaintiff’s reliance on the assignments of the mortgage is misplaced “because the mortgage is not the dispositive document of title as to the mortgage loan” … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Herod, 2022 NY Slip Op 01444, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: To establish standing, a bank has to prove it was the “holder” of the promissory note within the meaning of the UCC at the time the foreclosure action was commenced. Here there were questions of fact whether the note in the bank’s possession was endorsed in blank by an attached “allonge” as required by the UCC.

 

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THE COUNTY WHERE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT OWNED A SEASONAL SECOND HOME (WHERE DEFENDANT LIVED AFTER COVID REACHED NEW YORK CITY) WAS NOT THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lasalle, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county where plaintiff and defendant owned a seasonal second home, and where defendant moved when COVID reached New York City, was not the proper venue for the divorce action:

The parties to this divorce action primarily resided in New York County, while maintaining a seasonal second home in Suffolk County. In March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic first reached New York City, the defendant retreated to the Suffolk County residence along with her pregnant and immunocompromised daughter and began spending more time there in order to assist the daughter during the pregnancy and after the child’s birth. In August 2020, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief in Suffolk County, on the ground that the parties were residents of Suffolk County. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 510 and 511 for a change of venue, and the Supreme Court denied the motion.

This case presents the issue of whether sheltering in place in a seasonal home creates a sufficient degree of permanence to establish residency at that location. We hold that it does not under the circumstances of this case. Because the parties’ stays in Suffolk County were only seasonal and temporary, we hold that neither of them were residents of Suffolk County at the time of the commencement of the action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 510 and 511 to change the venue of the action from Suffolk County to New York County. Fisch v Davidson, 2022 NY Slip Op 01442, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: In this divorce action commenced in August 2020 (during the pandemic), the county were plaintiff and defendant owned a seasonal home, and where defendant moved when COVID reached New York City, was not the proper venue. New York County, where the couple primarily resided, was deemed the proper venue for the divorce proceedings.

 

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THE LOST NOTE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE BANK WAS INSUFFICIENT; THEREFORE THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ASSERT THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate standing to bring the action and Supreme Court should have granted defendant’s motion to amend the answer to assert lack of standing as a defense:

… [I]n support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted … a lost note affidavit of a representative of the plaintiff’s loan servicer, to which was annexed a copy of the consolidated note. However, the affidavit was insufficient to establish the facts preventing the production of the note … . …

… Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend her answer to assert the affirmative defense of lack of standing … . Leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted (see CPLR 3025[b]). In the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, a motion to amend should be granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit … .. “Mere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine” … …. [T]he defendant did not waive the affirmative defense of lack of standing (see RPAPL 1302-a). Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Kreitzer. 2022 NY Slip Op 01441, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: The bank was unable to demonstrate standing to bring the foreclosure action because the lost note affidavit was insufficient. Even a late motion to amend an answer should be granted if there is no prejudice to the plaintiff. Here the motion to add the lack of standing defense to the answer should have been granted.

 

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IN THIS POLICE-CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THE MUNICIPALITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE POLICE OFFICER’S SPECIFIC CONDUCT WAS EXEMPT FROM THE ORDINARY RULES OF THE ROAD PURSUANT TO VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1104, AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE OFFICER WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER THE ORDINARY RULES OF NEGLIGENCE; THE MUNICIPALITY’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant municipality did not demonstrate that the reckless disregard standard applied or that the police officer was not negligent in this police-car traffic accident case:

“[T]he reckless disregard standard of care in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) only applies when a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle involved in an emergency operation engages in the specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b)” … . Even where there is no dispute that the driver was involved in an emergency operation of an authorized vehicle, where the injury-causing conduct did not fall within any of the categories of privileged conduct set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), the plaintiff’s claim is governed by principles of ordinary negligence … .

Here, the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether [officer] Giandurco engaged in specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) and whether the reckless disregard standard of care was therefore applicable … . The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that under principles of ordinary negligence, Giandurco was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . Cooney v Port Chester Police Dept., 2022 NY Slip Op 01440, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: Even if a police car is engaged in an emergency operation at the time of a traffic accident, the police officer’s conduct is not automatically judged under the reckless disregard standard for emergency vehicles in Vehicle and Traffic Law 1104. The officer’s specific conduct must fall within one of the the categories of privileged conduct in the statute. Otherwise the ordinary rules of negligence apply. At the summary-judgment stage, a municipality must demonstrate either that the specific conduct was exempt from the ordinary rules of negligence, or that the specific conduct was not culpable under the ordinary rules of negligent. Here the municipality did not demonstrate either one.

 

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THE TENANT HARASSMENT CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; SUPREME COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR THAT CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying Supreme Court, determined the tenant harassment cause of action should not have been dismissed, noting that Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction for that cause of action:

… Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the third cause of action, which alleged harassment in violation of Local Law No. 7 (2008) of City of New York (Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-2005[d]). Contrary to the court’s determination, the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that cause of action. Furthermore, the court was vested with subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination on that cause of action … .Akter v Zara Realty Holding Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 01434, Second Dept 3-9-22

​Practice Point: Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a tenant harassment cause of action pursuant to the the NYC Administrative Code.

 

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DEFENDANTS WERE NOT SERVED WITH NOTICE OF THE FORECLOSURE SALE; THEIR MOTION TO VACATE THE FORECLOSURE SALE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants in this foreclosure action were entitled to service of the notice of the foreclosure sale. Because the defendants were not served with the notice, their motion to vacate the foreclosure sale should have been granted:

“Parties to an action involving the sale of real property pursuant to a judgment, who have appeared in the action and have not waived service, are entitled to have served upon them, pursuant to CPLR 2103, all papers in the action, including a notice of sale” … , a court is authorized to set aside a judicial sale within one year thereafter, for failure to comply with the requirement as to notice, but only if a substantial right of a party was prejudiced by the defect.

Here, the defendants established that they were prejudiced by the lack of notice of the sale inasmuch as they were deprived of the opportunity to protect their interest in the subject property … . 38-12 Astoria Blvd., LLC v Ramos, 2022 NY Slip Op 01433, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: Defendants who have appeared in a foreclosure action are entitled to notice of the foreclosure sale. Here defendants were not served with the notice of sale. Their motion to vacate the foreclosure sale should have been granted.

 

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CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY DO NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IS OPENLY REPUDIATED; CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION BASED UPON FRAUD ARE TIMELY SIX YEARS FROM THE CONVERSION OR TWO YEARS FROM DISCOVERY OF THE CONVERSION; THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF ACTION HERE, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined causes of action alleging defendant Filardo, plaintiff car dealership’s employee, used fraudulent schemes to steal funds from plaintiff over a period of years, should not have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, and/or on the ground the causes of action were not adequately pled:

The plaintiff asserted causes of action against Filardo for breach of fiduciary duty (first cause of action), breach of the duty of loyalty (second cause of action), faithless servant doctrine (third cause of action), conversion (fifth cause of action), fraudulent concealment by fiduciary (sixth cause of action), and promissory estoppel (ninth cause of action), and causes of action against both defendants for aiding and abetting fraud (fourth cause of action), civil conspiracy (seventh cause of action), fraud and deceit (eighth cause of action), unjust enrichment (tenth cause of action), money had and received (eleventh cause of action), and fraud by non-disclosure (twelfth cause of action). …

“The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty does not begin to run until the fiduciary has openly repudiated his or her obligation or the relationship has been otherwise terminated” … Here, the plaintiff alleged that its relationship with Filardo was not terminated until November 2017, and there is no allegation that Filardo openly repudiated his employment obligations prior to that time … .

… [W]hen the allegations of fraud are essential to a cause of action alleging conversion based upon actual fraud, the cause of action is governed by the limitations period for fraud set forth in CPLR 213(8). That statute provides that, in an action based upon fraud, “the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” … .Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo, 2022 NY Slip Op 01476, Second Dept 3-9-22

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty does not start running until the fiduciary openly repudiates the duty.

Practice Point: The statute of limitations for conversion based upon fraud is six years from the conversion or two years from discovery of the conversion.

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A RETAINER AGREEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANTS IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the legal malpractice action should not have been dismissed on the ground plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Plaintiff did not have to produce a retainer agreement:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in granting dismissal of the legal malpractice cause of action based upon the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence of an attorney-client relationship. An attorney-client relationship does not depend on the existence of a formal retainer agreement … , and the plaintiff had no obligation to demonstrate evidentiary facts to support the allegations contained in the complaint … . Furthermore, the complaint sufficiently alleges the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the … defendants … , as well as the other elements of legal malpractice, including damages, to support a legal malpractice cause of action … . Ripa v Petrosyants, 2022 NY Slip Op 01336, Second Dept 3-2-22

 

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PLAINTIFF, WHILE ATTENDING A BEACH-FRONT PARTY, SUFFERED SEVERE INJURY WHEN HE DOVE OFF A BULKHEAD INTO SHALLOW WATER; HIS ACTION AGAINST THE PROPERTY OWNER FOR FAILURE TO WARN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE PROPERTY OWNER’S INDEMNIFICATION ACTION AGAINST THE PERSON WHO RENTED THE AREA FOR THE PARTY WAS DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action against the owner of beach-front property where a party was being held should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff dove off a bulkhead into shallow water and suffered severe injury. Plaintiff alleged a negligent failure to warn against diving. Apparently the water was murky and the bulkhead extended 40 feet into a bay along a boat channel. In addition, the Second Department determined that the person who rented the area for the party (Hanson) did not agree, in the rental agreement, to indemnify the property owner for the owner’s alleged negligence:

The plaintiff testified that he believed the waters to be deep in the area in which he dove because the bulkhead was adjacent to a boating channel, it extended approximately 40 feet into the bay from the beach, and he had seen people swimming earlier in the day. … [I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff knew or should have known that he was diving into shallow waters, and thus, that his conduct constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident or an unforeseeable superseding event sufficient to absolve [the owner] of liability … . Moreover, [the owner] did not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level was the sole proximate cause, or a superseding cause, of the accident … . …

“When a party is under no legal duty to indemnify, a contract assuming that obligation must be strictly construed to avoid reading into it a duty which the parties did not intend to be assumed” … . “The promise should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” … . Particularly with agreements to indemnify, “[a]lthough the words might ‘seem to admit of a larger sense, . . . they should be restrained to the particular occasion and to the particular object which the parties had in view'” … .

Here, the indemnification provision on which [the owner] relies is contained in the agreement Hanson signed to rent the Community Center for a party. Hanson demonstrated … that a promise on his part to indemnify PPI for its alleged negligence in relation to its ownership and maintenance of the beach area and bulkhead cannot be “clearly implied from the language and purpose of [that] entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” … . Reilly v Patchogue Props., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 01334, Second Dept 3-2-22

 

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