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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK IN THE ON-COMING LANE WHILE ATTEMPTING A LEFT TURN IN AN INTERSECTION, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff was making a left turn when he was struck by defendant in the on-coming lane, there was a question of fact whether defendant should have seen plaintiff. Plaintiff was making the turn after a stopped driver in the on-coming law gestured to him:

… [A]lthough the defendant submitted evidence that the plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way when turning left in violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1141, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the defendant was free from fault … . While testifying, the defendant admitted that he saw nothing out of the ordinary prior to the collision, that he could not recall if he observed the plaintiff’s vehicle, and that he only realized that there was a collision from hearing the sound. However, the defendant also testified that he was only driving at approximately 25 miles per hour and was looking straight ahead on a sunny afternoon with no obstructions to his view … . Moreover, the defendant acknowledged that he did not know if his vehicle or the plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection first. Thus, the defendant’s evidentiary submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection as the defendant approached and whether the defendant should have observed the plaintiff’s vehicle making a left turn in time to take evasive action to avoid the accident … . Blake v Francis, 2022 NY Slip Op 02974, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Although plaintiff may have violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by making a left turn in the path of defendant’s car, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident. Here there was a question of fact whether defendant should have seen the plaintiff as he attempted the turn.

 

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A CONTRACTOR WHICH CREATES A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON A PUBLIC SIDEWALK MAY BE LIABLE FOR A SLIP AND FALL BY A MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant sidewalk-repair contractor’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should not have been granted. There was a question of fact whether the contractor who repaired the sidewalk created the hole which caused plaintiff to trip. A contractor may be liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in a dangerous condition on a public street or sidewalk:

“A contractor may be [held] liable for an affirmative act of negligence which results in the creation of a dangerous condition upon a public street or sidewalk” … . Here, Amato [the defendant contractor] failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

At his deposition, Victor Amato, Amato’s owner, testified that his company had replaced a portion of the sidewalk at the subject location.  … He acknowledged … that a two-by-four had been installed as a vertical “stake” to support a form that was used when the concrete was poured, and that he or one of his employees would have removed the stake after the concrete had set.

… [T]he plaintiff testified that she had not seen the hole because, from the direction she was walking, it was on the other side of an uneven, or sloped, portion of the sidewalk. Victor Amato admitted that this slope had been created deliberately (through a process known as “feathering”) because the new portion of the sidewalk was at a different height from the existing sidewalk. Pizzolorusso v Metro Mech., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 03018, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Contactors which create a dangerous condition on a public sidewalk or road may be liable to a member of the public who is injured by the dangerous condition. The theory is similar to the “launch an instrument of harm” theory of contractor liability under the Espinal case.

 

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION OF THE STAIRS ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL BECAUSE THEY OFFERED NO PROOF OF WHEN THE STAIRS WERE LAST INSPECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this stairway slip and fall case should not have been granted. To warrant summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, defendants must show when the stairway was last inspected, which they failed to do:

The defendants … failed to show … that they did not have constructive notice of the condition that the plaintiff alleged caused her to fall. “A defendant has constructive notice of a hazardous condition on property when the condition is visible and apparent, and has existed for a sufficient length of time to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to discover and remedy it” … . “To meet its initial burden on the issue of lack of constructive notice, the defendant must offer some evidence as to when the area in question was last . . . inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” … . Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion failed to demonstrate when the subject staircase was last inspected relative to the plaintiff’s accident … . Weiss v Bay Club, 2022 NY Slip Op 03026, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a slip and fall case, to warrant summary judgment the defendant must show it did not have constructive notice of the dangerous condition by demonstrating that the area of the fall was inspected close in time to the incident.

 

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THE BANK’S AFFIDAVIT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT LAY A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS RECORDS, INCLUDING PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the bank’s proof of compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 was deficient because the foundation for the admission of business records was not laid:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted … an affidavit of an employee of its current mortgage loan servicer, along with copies of the 90-day notice, which was generated by the plaintiff’s prior loan servicer, along with alleged proof of mailing, which was also generated by the prior loan servicer. The affiant averred … that the current mortgage loan servicer is responsible for maintaining the books and records pertaining to the subject mortgage, “including, but not limited to, the account ledgers, and prior servicer’s records.” However, the affiant did not aver to her familiarity with the prior loan servicer’s business practices and procedures, or that the prior loan servicer’s records were incorporated into the current loan servicer’s records. Thus, the plaintiff’s moving affidavit failed to satisfy the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518(a) … , and the prior loan servicer’s records, including the 90-day notice, were not admissible … . “Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that it complied with the notice provision of RPAPL 1304” … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Basta, 2022 NY Slip Op 02971, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, at the summary judgment stage, even if business records demonstrating the bank’s compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304 are submitted, they are not admissible unless a proper foundation (CPLR 4518(a)) is laid in the accompanying affidavit.

 

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THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; I.E., THE NOTICE MUST BE MAILED IN A SEPARATE ENVELOPE WITH NO OTHER MATERIALS, AND THE NOTICE MUST BE SENT SEPARATELY TO EACH BORROWER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff did not comply with the RPAPL 1304 requirements that the 90-day notice of foreclosure be mailed in a separate envelope and that the notice be sent separately to both borrowers:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to establish … that it strictly complied with RPAPL 1304, since additional material was sent in the same envelope as the 90-day notice required by RPAPL 1304 … , and a single notice was jointly addressed to both defendants … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v DiBenedetti, 2022 NY Slip Op 02983, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: RPAPL 1304, which must be strictly complied with by the bank in any foreclosure action, requires (1) that the 90-day notice of foreclosure be sent in a separate envelope which includes nothing else and (2) that the 90-day notice be sent separately to each borrower.

 

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TO CHALLENGE THE BANK’S STANDING TO FORECLOSE THE DEFENDANT MUST ASSERT THE LACK OF STANDING AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE; MERELY DENYING THE RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT ENOUGH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the bank in this foreclosure action was not required to affirmatively demonstrate standing, the defendant, to raise the issue, must assert lack of standing as an affirmative defense, and merely denying the relevant allegations in the complaint is not enough:

… [T]he plaintiff was not required to show its standing to maintain the action. “[W]here, as here, standing is not an essential element of the cause of action, under CPLR 3018(b) a defendant must affirmatively plead lack of standing as an affirmative defense in the answer in order to properly raise the issue in its responsive pleading” … . The mere denial of the allegation that the plaintiff was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage in the answer of Republic First Bank, without more, was insufficient to assert that the plaintiff lacks standing … . Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Jemal, 2022 NY Slip Op 02970, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Lack of standing in a foreclosure action must be raised as an affirmative defense. It is not enough to deny the relevant allegations in the foreclosure complaint.

 

EVEN CRIMINAL SLURS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE AS DEFAMATION IF THEY ARE PURE OPINION; HERE DEFENDANT’S TWEET ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF MAKING “THREATS” WAS NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined even communications which could be considered “criminal slurs” are not actionable as defamation if they are “pure opinion.” The defendant was a member of the NYC council representing Queens. When defendant opposed the construction of an Amazon corporate headquarters in Queens, plaintiff, a local restaurant owner, in text messages, indicated defendant’s career would be ended if defendant did not withdraw his opposition to the Amazon project: Defendant then put out a tweet accusing plaintiff of making “threats.” Plaintiff brought this defamation action based on that tweet.. Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and the Second Department reversed:

The defendant’s characterization of the plaintiff’s text as containing “several threats rolled into one” is not a statement which can be proved true or false but was, instead, an opinion … . Moreover, “there is simply no special rule of law making criminal slurs actionable regardless of whether they are asserted as opinion or fact” … . Instead, “accusations of criminality [can] be regarded as mere hypothesis and therefore not actionable if the facts on which they are based are fully and accurately set forth” … . Here, the defendant’s statement amounts to no more than “nonactionable opinion or rhetorical hyperbole” … . Bowen v Van Bramer, 2022 NY Slip Op 02975, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: A tweet accusing plaintiff of making “threats” against defendant city council member (representing Queens) was not actionable as defamation. Plaintiff, a restaurant owner, had texted defendant saying that people would work to end defendant’s political career if he didn’t retract his opposition to Amazon’s building a corporate headquarters in Queens. Defendant then posted plaintiff’s comments in a tweet and accused plaintiff of making “threats.” Plaintiff sued for defamation based on that tweet. In dismissing the complaint, the Second Department noted that even “criminal slurs” are not actionable where, as here, they are “pure opinion.”

 

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AT THE TIME DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE IN 2007, IT WAS NOT A REGISTRABLE OFFENSE UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT; THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY DENIED; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the crime for which defendant was convicted, at the time of its commission in 2007, was not a registrable offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Therefore defendant’s motion to seal the record should not have been summarily denied. The matter was remitted for a hearing:

… [A]t the time of the defendant’s conviction for attempted promoting prostitution in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 230.25), the definition of “sex offense” in Correction Law § 168-a(2) did not include convictions of an attempt to commit Penal Law § 230.25 … . Further, the defendant has never been required to register under SORA for this conviction. Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the defendant has not been not [sic] convicted of “an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to article six-C of the correction law” (CPL 160.59[1][a] …). Thus, the Supreme Court should not have determined that the defendant’s conviction falls into the category of excluded offenses … . Likewise, although CPL 160.59(3)(a) provides that the reviewing court must summarily deny the defendant’s application when, inter alia, “the defendant is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to article six-C of the correction law,” here, the defendant is not required to do so.

As the defendant’s motion was not subject to mandatory denial under CPL 160.59(3) and the district attorney opposed the defendant’s motion, a hearing on the defendant’s motion was required … . People v Miranda, 2022 NY Slip Op 03009, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: If an offense is now a registrable offense pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act, but was not a registrable offense when committed (here in 2007), a defendant’s motion to seal the record cannot be summarily denied. The motion may still be denied after a hearing, however.

 

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SEX OFFENDER CERTIFICATION IS NOT PART OF A SENTENCE AND THEREFORE IS NOT COVERED BY THE UNLAWFUL-SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT; THEREFORE THE UNPRESERVED ISSUE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; HOWEVER, UPON REMITTAL, THE ISSUE CAN BE (AND WAS) CONSIDERED AT THE APPELLATE DIVISION LEVEL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, upon remittal from the Court of Appeals, adhered to its prior decision finding defendant’s certification as a sex offender unlawful. The Court of Appeals ruled that sex-offender certification is not part of a sentence and therefore is not covered by an exception to the preservation requirement. But, because the Appellate Division, unlike the Court of Appeals, has “interest-of-justice” jurisdiction, the prior decision was upheld in the interest of justice by the Second Department, despite the lack of preservation:

In an opinion dated November 23, 2021, the Court of Appeals concluded that sex offender certification is not part of a defendant’s sentence, and thus, a contention regarding sex offender certification does not fall within the exception to the preservation rule for challenges to unlawful sentences … . However, the Court of Appeals noted that although it does not have interest-of-justice jurisdiction to review unpreserved issues, the “Appellate Division may have authority to take corrective action in the interest of justice based upon defendant’s unpreserved challenge to the legality of his certification as a sex offender” … . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remitted the matter to this Court for further proceedings … .

We now reach the defendant’s unpreserved contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15[3][c]; [6][a]). For the reasons stated in our prior opinion and order, the defendant’s certification as a sex offender was unlawful … .People v Buyund, 2022 NY Slip Op 03004, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: The Court of Appeals does not have interest-of-justice jurisdiction and therefore cannot consider appellate issues that are not preserved. The Appellate Division, however, can invoke interest-of-justice jurisdiction to consider unpreserved appellate issues.

 

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WHETHER DEFENDANT’S CONNECTICUT CONVICTION CAN SERVE AS A PREDICATE FOR SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS CANNOT BE DETERMINED WITHOUT THE CONNECTICUT ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT; THE UNPRESERVED ISSUE WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, ruled a hearing was required to determine whether defendant’s Connecticut conviction could serve as a predicate offense for second felony offender status. The issue was not preserved and was considered in the interest of justice:

Although the defendant did not preserve for appellate review the issue of whether he was properly sentenced as a second felony offender, we reach that issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. The defendant’s prior conviction in Connecticut was for larceny in the first degree under Connecticut General Statutes former § 53a-122(a). This statute defined grand larceny differently under several subdivisions, not all of which are felonies under New York law. To determine which subdivision applied to this defendant, the Supreme Court could have looked at the Connecticut accusatory instrument to determine the subdivision of the Connecticut statute under which the defendant was convicted … . However, the Connecticut accusatory instrument is not in the record.

Accordingly, in the interest of justice, we vacate the defendant’s adjudication as a second felony offender and the sentence imposed, and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for a second felony offender hearing and for resentencing thereafter. People v Robinson, 2022 NY Slip Op 03010, Second Dept 5-4-22

Practice Point: Here portions of the Connecticut larceny statute were equivalent to a New York felony and other portions were not. Therefore, whether the Connecticut conviction could serve as a predicate for second felony offender status cannot be determined without examining the Connecticut accusatory instrument. The issue was not preserved for appeal but was considered in the interest of justice. Matter remitted for a hearing.​

 

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