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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE “SEPARATE ENVELOPE” RULE AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action failed to demonstrate the 90-day notice required by RPAPL 1304 was sent to the defendant in a separate envelope:

RPAPL 1304(2) also provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he notices required by this section shall be sent by the lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice.”

The plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it sent 90-day notices to the defendant “in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice” … . Since the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and dismissing his answer with affirmative defenses and for an order of reference, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Bonal, 2022 NY Slip Op 03230, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: To warrant summary judgment in a foreclosure action, the bank must demonstrate that the RPAPL 1304 notice was sent to each borrower in a separate envelope which includes no other materials.

 

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A MONETARY PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY, AS OPPOSED TO DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined sanctioning plaintiff’s attorney for failing to provide discovery, rather than dismissal of the complaint, was the best way to handle plaintiff’s inaction:

… [T]he plaintiff’s attorneys failed to comply with the defendants’ demands for a bill of particulars and discovery, did not object to those demands, and did not respond in any way to follow-up communications from the defendants’ attorneys until opposition to the motions was filed. Moreover, in response to the motions, the plaintiff’s attorneys failed to articulate any excuse for this series of failures … .

Notwithstanding this dereliction of responsibility, at the time the defendants moved … to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, the plaintiff was not in violation of any court-ordered deadlines … . In fact, the defendants also both moved … to compel the plaintiff to comply with their respective discovery demands by a date certain. And … not long after the defendants’ motions were filed, the plaintiff began to produce the requested materials, albeit with some alleged deficiencies.

Under these circumstances, we are of the view that reinstatement of the complaint conditioned upon the payment of a penalty by the plaintiffs’ trial counsel personally to both defendants would be more appropriate than the outright denial of the plaintiff’s right to a day in court … . Cook v SI Care Ctr., 2022 NY Slip Op 03225, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: Here a monetary penalty imposed personally upon plaintiff’s attorney, as opposed to dismissal of the complaint, was deemed the appropriate penalty for plaintiff’s failure to provide discovery.

 

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ABSENT “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES,” A JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS A COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint because there were no “extraordinary circumstances:”

The Supreme Court erred … in, sua sponte, directing dismissal of the complaint … . “‘A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal'” … . Here, although the plaintiff’s submissions were insufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to a default judgment, no extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant dismissal of the complaint … . Binder v Tolou Realty Assoc., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03223, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: Absent so-called “extraordinary circumstances.” a judge does not have the authority to, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint. Here plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient to support a default judgment, but that insufficiency did not justify dismissing the complaint.

 

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THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE INTEREST CALCULATION WAS DONE USING THE METHOD REQUIRED BY THE NOTE AND THE RELEVANT BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED; THE REFEREE’S REPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the referee’s report in this foreclosure action should not have been confirmed. There was no evidence the interest calculation was done in the manner required by the note and the relevant business records were not submitted:

… Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion to confirm the referee’s report and for a judgment of foreclosure and sale because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the interest on the loan was calculated using the method set forth in the note, and the referee’s computations, including the amount due and owing and payments for taxes, insurance, and other advances, were premised upon unproduced business records … . Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Singh, 2022 NY Slip Op 03221, Second Dept 5-18-22

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, the interest must be calculated using the method required by the note, and any relevant business records must be produced in order to warrant confirmation of the referee’s report.

 

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TO BE ENFORCABLE, AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE MUST BE CLEAR, EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL; HERE THE WORD “DISAGREEMENTS” IN THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WAS TOO VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS OF UNPAID COMMISSIONS AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the arbitration clause in the employment agreement was ambiguous and vague. The clause could not be the basis for forcing plaintiff to arbitrate her claims that she was not paid commissions owed to her and was wrongfully terminated:

… “[A] party will not be compelled to arbitrate and, thereby, to surrender the right to resort to the courts, absent ‘evidence which affirmatively establishes that the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate their disputes'” … . “The agreement must be clear, explicit and unequivocal and must not depend upon implication or subtlety” … .

Here, the provision, “[t]hird party in case of a disagreement: Rabbi Shlomo Gross (Belze Dayan) or Rabbi Meir Labin,” does not expressly and unequivocally establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate the plaintiffs’ claims for unpaid commissions or wrongful termination … . Moreover, this provision ambiguously refers to a disagreement, but does not specify the types of disagreements to which it applies … . Rubinstein v C & A Mktg., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03136, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: Plaintiff alleged the defendant employer did not pay her commissions she was owed and wrongfully terminated her. Although the employment contract called for the arbitration of “disagreements,” that term was not specific enough to serve as a basis for forcing plaintiff to arbitrate her unpaid-commission and wrongful-termination claims.

 

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DESPITE THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED A DECISION TO GO TO TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN RATIONALE BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILY OBLIGATIONS; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS; DEFENDANT ALLEGED HIS ATTORNEY MISADVISED HIM ON THE DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant should have been afforded a hearing on his motion to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds. Defendant alleged he was misadvised of the deportation consequence of his guilty plea.

… [N]either the fact that the defendant had previously been convicted of an offense that may subject him to removal, nor the seemingly strong evidence against him with respect to the instant offense, nor the favorable plea bargain he received, necessarily requires a finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged misadvice … . The defendant’s averments, including that he has resided in the United States since he was 10 years old, that he is married to his spouse with whom he has two minor children, that his spouse is unable to work due to a medical condition, that he is gainfully employed, and that he is the sole source of financial support to his family, sufficiently alleged that a decision to reject the plea offer would have been rational … . People v Samaroo, 2022 NY Slip Op 03128, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: Even if the evidence of defendant’s commission of the crime is strong, a defendant may demonstrate a decision to go to trial, rather than accept a plea offer, would have been rationale based upon family obligations. Here defendant, who is a legal resident and has lived in the US since he was ten, has two minor children, is employed, and his wife can’t work because of medical problems. Defendant brought a motion to vacate his conviction (by guilty plea) on the ground his attorney did not inform him of the deportation consequences of the plea. Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion.

 

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THE “ABANDONMENT” EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT; MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the petitioner did not prove mother had abandoned her children. Mother’s parental rights should not have been terminated:

… [T]he petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the mother evinced an intent to forego her parental rights. The record demonstrates that, during the six-month abandonment period, the mother visited with the children on two occasions, saw the children on at least one additional occasion at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children, spoke with the case worker on the phone multiple times, and objected to the goal for the children’s placement changing to a kinship adoption rather than returning the children to the mother. Under these circumstances, the Family Court should have denied the petitions on the merits, insofar as asserted against the mother … . We further note that the record contains testimony from a case worker that, during family visits subsequent to the filing of the petitions, the mother’s interactions with the children were “very positive.” “While a parent’s conduct outside the abandonment period is not determinative in an abandonment proceeding, it may be relevant to assessing parental intent” … .  Matter of Grace E. W.-F. (Zanovia W.), 2022 NY Slip Op 03119, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: The petitioner did not present clear and convincing evidence that mother abandoned her children. The termination of parental rights petition should not have have been granted. Mother had visited the children, seen the children at a family gathering, purchased clothing for the children and frequently talked to the case worker.

 

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THE NOTICE SENT TO THE BORROWERS IN 2012 WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCELERATE THE MORTGAGE DEBT; THEREFORE THE FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the notice sent to the defendants was not sufficient to accelerate the mortgage debt and, therefore, the debt had not been accelerated at the time this foreclosure action was brought: Supreme Court properly dismissed the foreclosure complaint:

\… [T]he defendants’ submissions in support of that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint demonstrated that the loan matured in 2038 and that the defendants had not commenced a prior foreclosure action. The defendants also submitted a copy of the 2012 notice, which did not demand the entire outstanding balance on the loan, but, as the Supreme Court found, only demanded the amount due as of that date. Notably, the 2012 notice stated that if the plaintiffs were unable to pay the arrears, there were “various options that may be available . . . to prevent a foreclosure sale of [the] property” such as a repayment plan, loan modification, sale of the property, or deeding the property to the noteholder. Thus, the 2012 notice did not set forth the defendants’ clear and unequivocal election to accelerate the debt, but instead, was a letter discussing acceleration as a possible future event … . Accordingly, the defendants established, prima facie, that the consolidated mortgage had not been accelerated at the time the plaintiffs commenced this action.

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the plain meaning of the word “may” as it appears in paragraph 22 of the consolidated mortgage renders that provision optional, and “[w]here, as here, the acceleration of the maturity of a mortgage debt is made optional with the holder of the note and mortgage, ‘some affirmative action must be taken evidencing the holder’s election to take advantage of the accelerating provision, and until such action has been taken the provision has no operation'” … . Knox v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 03107, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: Here the notice sent by the bank to the borrowers in 2012 did not unambiguously accelerate the debt within the meaning of the mortgage document. Therefore the foreclosure complaint was properly dismissed.

 

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PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, WHICH RELIEVES THE OWNER OF A LEASED VEHICLE FROM LIABILITY FOR A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, DID NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT OWNER; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate the Graves Amendment did not apply to the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, relieving the owner of a leased vehicle of liability:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1), “[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” However, pursuant to the Graves Amendment, which “preempt[s] conflicting New York law” … , the owner of a leased or rented motor vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner) cannot be held liable by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner) for personal injuries resulting from the use of such vehicle if: (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) (see 49 USC § 30106[a] …). Keys v PV Holding Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 03105, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: If the owner of a leased vehicle is not negligent (i.e., improper maintenance, etc.), the Graves Amendment relieves the owner of liability for a traffic accident involving the leased vehicle. Here the plaintiff did not demonstrate the Graves Amendment didn’t apply. Therefore the burden to prove the amendment did apply never shifted to the defendant vehicle-owner and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted.

 

 

DEFENDANT RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ADDRESS AT WHICH SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS ATTEMPTED WAS DEFENDANT’S ACTUAL PLACE OF BUSINESS; AN AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE MAY NOT BE AMENDED TO CURE AN ERRONEOUS ADDRESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant’s affidavit demonstrated that the address at which service of process was made was not his business address and the affidavit of service could not be amended to cure the address-error:

… [A]n affidavit submitted by [defendant] Harooni … was sufficient to demonstrate that the address where service was alleged to have been effected in the affidavit of service … , was not in fact the address of Harooni’s ‘actual place of business’ (CPLR 308[2] …). … Pursuant to CPLR 305(c), a court, ‘[a]t any time, in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, . . . may allow any . . . proof of service of a summons to be amended, if a substantial right of a party against whom the summons is issued is not prejudiced’ … . An ‘erroneous address’ contained in an affidavit of service affects a defendant’s substantial right to notice of the proceeding against him or her, and may not be corrected by an amendment …”. Jampolskaya v Ilona Genis, MD, P.C., 2022 NY Slip Op 03104, Second Dept 5-11-22

Practice Point: An affidavit of service may be amended, but not to correct the wrong address.

 

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