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AN APPELLATE COURT MAY CONSIDER A SUPPRESSION RULING GROUNDED ON A THEORY NOT RELIED UPON OR ARGUED BY THE PARTIES AS LONG AS THE RULING IS BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND IS FULLY LAID OUT AND EXPLAINED BY THE MOTION COURT; HERE THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined: (1) the appellate court can consider an appeal of a suppression ruling which was not based on a theory argued by the parties below, but which was based upon the hearing evidence and fully laid out and explained by the motion court; and (2) the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and the evidence seized from defendant’s vehicle should have been suppressed:

The narrow reading of Tates [189 AD3d 1088] advocated by the People is consistent with the approach taken by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, and the Appellate Division, First Department, in comparable cases involving the suppression court’s application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement …  The general rule articulated in these cases is that the suppression court is “entitled to consider legal justifications that were supported by the evidence, even if they were not raised explicitly by the People” … . * * *

“[A]bsent probable cause, it is unlawful for a police officer to invade the interior of a stopped vehicle once the suspects have been removed and patted down without incident, as any immediate threat to the officers’ safety has consequently been eliminated” … . Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted when the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband, a weapon, or evidence of a crime … .

Here, “the circumstances known to the police at the time of the search did not rise to the level of probable cause” … . People v Marcial, 2022 NY Slip Op 06142, Second Dept 11-2-22

Practice Point: An appellate court may consider a suppression court’s ruling which is grounded upon a theory (here the automobile exception to the warrant requirement) not raised or argued by the parties, as long as the ruling is based upon the evidence and is fully laid out and explained by the motion court.

Practice Point: Here the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and the evidence seized from defendant’s vehicle should have been suppressed.

 

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THE CONTENTION DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY SENTENCED AS A SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER NEED NOT BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL; DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE INSTANT OFFENSE BEFORE HE WAS SENTENCED ON THE PRIOR VIOLENT FELONY CONVICTION; SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION VACATED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, noted that the contention defendant was illegally sentenced as a second violent felony offender need not be preserved for appeal:

As the People properly concede, the defendant’s contention that he was illegally sentenced as a second violent felony offender is not subject to the preservation rule … . Here, the defendant was illegally sentenced as a second violent felony offender since he committed the instant offense before he was sentenced on the prior violent felony conviction … . Thus, the prior violent felony conviction cannot serve as a predicate violent felony offense for sentencing purposes (see Penal Law § 70.04[1][b][ii]). People v Lynch, 2022 NY Slip Op 06141, Second Dept 11-2-22

Practice Point: Here the defendant committed the instant offense before he was sentenced on the prior violent felony. Therefore he should not have been adjudicated a second violent felony offender. The issue need not be preserved for appeal.

 

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A MOTION TO VACATE AN ORDER SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE JUDGE WHO MADE THE ORDER; THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined: (1) a motion to vacate an order should be transferred to the judge who made the order; and (2) the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the foreclosure complaint:

A motion to vacate an order “shall be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order, unless he or she is for any reason unable to hear it” (CPLR 2221[a]). “A motion made to other than a proper judge . . . shall be transferred to the proper judge” (CPLR 2221[c]). Here, instead of denying the first motion with leave to renew before Justice Schulman, the Supreme Court should have transferred the first motion to Justice Schulman … . …

“‘A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal'” … . Here, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the directives of the order … was not a sufficient ground upon which to direct dismissal of the complaint in the first action … . Citimortgage, Inc. v Dedalto, 2022 NY Slip Op 06105, Second Dept 11-2-22

Practice Point: A motion to vacate an order should be transferred to the judge who made the order.

Practice Point: A judge’s power to, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint is limited and should only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances (not present in this case).

 

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THE EXPERT DISCLOSURE COMBINED WITH THE BILL OF PARTICULARS GAVE SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE NATURE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT’S OPINION; THE TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s expert in this medical malpractice action should not have been precluded from testifying on the ground the expert disclosure did not provide notice of topic the expert was prepared to testify about. The notice, in combination, with the pleadings was deemed to have provided sufficient notice. The essence of the complaint was defendant doctor’s (Ascencio’s) alleged failure to diagnose and treat a surgery-related infection. Plaintiff’s expert was going to testify the infection originated internally:

… [T]he Supreme Court precluded the plaintiff’s expert from testifying regarding his opinion that the plaintiff’s infection originated internally during the surgery on the ground that the expert disclosure referenced only the alleged failure to timely diagnose and appropriately treat a postoperative wound infection. However, in light of the other allegations in the expert disclosure and the incorporated bills of particulars, including those that addressed the alleged failure to discover a “festering infection” and/or a “surgical site infection” prior to the plaintiff’s discharge, “‘the expert witness [disclosure] statement was not so inadequate or inconsistent with the expert’s [proposed] testimony as to have been misleading, or to have resulted in prejudice or surprise'” … . Moreover, in this “prototypical battle of the experts” … , the preclusion of expert testimony concerning the origin of the plaintiff’s infection, and its effect on Ascencio’s alleged ability to discover the infection prior to the plaintiff’s discharge, prejudiced the plaintiff in presenting her case, such that the error cannot be deemed harmless … . Owens v Ascencio, 2022 NY Slip Op 06133, Second Dept 11-2-22

Practice Point: In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff’s expert’s disclosure notice, in combination with the bill of particulars, sufficiently alerted defendants to the nature of the expert’s opinion. The preclusion of the expert’s testimony was reversible error.

 

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IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, PLAINTIFF’S 50-H EXAMINATION TESTIMONY DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED HIS AFFIDAVIT OPPOSING THE CITY’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; THE “FEIGNED ISSUE OF FACT” DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the city’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition directly contradicted his testimony at the General Municipal Law 50-h examination:

“[A] defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing, inter alia, that it did not create the alleged hazardous condition” … . Here, the defendant made a prima facie showing that it did not engage in any snow removal activity within the subject triangular area, and therefore was not responsible for creating the icy condition that caused the plaintiff to fall. In opposition to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he averred that, in the afternoon of the day before his accident, he “observed City personnel shoveling the snow from the [subject triangular area] and making piles of snow upon the perimeters.” Yet, at his examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, the plaintiff had been asked “At any point between the snowfall and the morning before the accident happened, had you seen anyone clearing snow from that [triangular area],” and he had responded “No, no.” Since the assertion made for the first time in the plaintiff’s affidavit directly contradicted the testimony he had given at his General Municipal Law § 50-h examination, and he has not provided a plausible explanation for the inconsistency between the two statements, the assertion made in his affidavit must be viewed as presenting a feigned factual issue designed to avoid the consequences of his earlier testimony, and it is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact … . Nass v City of New York, 2022 NY Slip Op 06132, Second Dept 11-2-22

Practice Point: Here the plaintiff’s 50-h examination testimony directly contradicted his affidavit opposing defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The “feigned issue of fact” did not raise a question of fact.

 

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CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES RENDERED THE RECORD ON APPEAL INADEQUATE IN THIS CHILD CUSTODY CASE; MATTER SENT BACK TO FAMILY COURT FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that changed circumstances brought to the court’s attention by the attorney for the child in this child custody matter rendered the record on appeal in sufficient. The matter was sent back for a hearing:

… [N]ew developments have arisen since the orders appealed from were issued, which have been brought to this Court’s attention by the attorney for the child and acknowledged by the father. These developments include the father’s incarceration, allegations of neglect against the father, and the Family Court’s issuance of an order temporarily placing the child in the custody of the child’s paternal grandmother. As the Court of Appeals has recognized, changed circumstances may have particular significance in child custody matters and may render a record on appeal insufficient to review whether the Family Court’s determination is still in the best interests of the child … . In light of the new developments brought to this Court’s attention, the record is no longer sufficient to review whether the Family Court’s determination regarding custody and parental access is in the best interests of the child … . Matter of Baker v James, 2022 NY Slip Op 06125, Second Dept 11-2-22​

Practice Point: Where changed circumstance in a child custody case render the record on appeal inadequate, the appellate court will sent the case back to Family Court for a hearing.

 

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A FINE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLEA AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, vacating the fine imposed at sentencing, determined the sentencing judge should not have imposed a fine that was not part of the plea agreement:

County Court improperly enhanced the defendant’s sentence by imposing a fine that was not part of the negotiated plea agreement … . Under the circumstances of this case, we find it appropriate to vacate so much of his sentence as imposed a fine, so as to conform the sentence imposed to the promise made to the defendant in exchange for his plea of guilty … . People v Ruiz, 2022 NY Slip Op 06016, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the imposition of a fine at sentencing which was not contemplated by the plea agreement was deemed an improper enhancement of the sentence.

 

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THE SENTENCING JUDGE IMPROPERLY SPECULATED AND CONSIDERED UNCHARGED CRIMES; SENTENCE VACATED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence, determined the sentencing judge improperly speculated and considered uncharged crimes:

… [C]ertain remarks made by the County Court demonstrate that, in imposing sentence, it improperly speculated and considered that the defendant had committed additional similar crimes for which she had not been apprehended. Consequently, the defendant must be resentenced … . People v Jeffriesel, 2022 NY Slip Op 06012, Second Dept 10-2622

Practice Point: Here the judge’s remarks at sentencing revealed improper speculation and consideration of uncharged crimes. The sentence was vacated and resentencing ordered.

 

THE DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND VIOLENT CONDUCT MISBEHAVIOR DETERMINATIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) the superintendent’s determination, held that the disorderly conduct and violent conduct determinations were not supported by substantial evidence:

… [T]he determination that the petitioner was guilty of violating rule 100.15, which provides that an incarcerated individual shall not engage in unauthorized sparring, wrestling, body-punching, or other forms of disorderly conduct, was not supported by substantial evidence. The misbehavior report does not state that the petitioner engaged in any particular act of disorderly conduct set forth in the rule, or any other similar act that could be defined as disorderly conduct within the meaning of the rule, which contemplates some form of physical contact by an inmate with another individual. Nor does the misbehavior report constitute substantial evidence to establish that the petitioner was guilty of violating rule 104.11, prohibiting violent conduct. The report does not indicate that the petitioner committed any particular violent act, merely stating that “[f]orce became necessary,” without indicating what the petitioner did to necessitate the use of such force. Furthermore, there is no evidence outside the report to support the determination that the petitioner was guilty of disorderly conduct or violent conduct … . Matter of White v LaManna, 2022 NY Slip Op 06010, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here in these prison disciplinary proceedings there was no proof of violence on the part of the inmate. Therefore the disorderly conduct and violent conduct determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. The allegation that “force became necessary,” referring to the actions of the guards, was not enough.

 

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THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRIALS OF TWO ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME FIRE, WHERE ONE PARTY WAS BOTH A DEFENDANT AND A PLAINTIFF, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ANY PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE JURY’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE (ONE OF THE ACTIONS IS AGAINST AN INSURER) CAN BE HANDLED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the motion to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire which damages two adjoining properties should have been granted. The court noted that one party is both a plaintiff and a defendant:

Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court … , consolidation or joinder for trial is favored to avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts … . “Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion [pursuant to CPLR 602(a)] to consolidate [or for a joint trial] should be granted, absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion” … .

Here … the two actions involve common questions of law and fact. Assuming, arguendo, that the respondents would be prejudiced if the two actions are tried before the same jury since it would bring to the jury’s attention the existence of insurance … , any such prejudice is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts if separate trials ensue … . Furthermore, the possibility of such prejudice can be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions … . Moreover, a joint trial, rather than consolidation, is appropriate where a party is both a plaintiff and a defendant … . Calle v 2118 Flatbush Ave. Realty, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 05981, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the motion pursuant to CPLR 602 to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire should have been granted. One party was both a defendant and a plaintiff. The fact that consolidation would bring the existence of insurance to the jury’s attention (one of the parties is an insurer), although prejudicial, can be handled by jury instructions.

 

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