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THE CITY’S COMPLAINT ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE BASED UPON DEFENDANT’S SALE OF UNSTAMPED, UNTAXED CIGARETTES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff-city’s complaint stated a cause of action for public nuisance against defendant City Tobacco House for selling unstamped, untaxed cigarettes:

… [T]he complaint alleged that City Tobacco House was a commercial establishment where several violations of Tax Law § 1814(b) and Administrative Code § 11-4012(b) had occurred during the six-month period preceding the commencement of this action. On one occasion, law enforcement officers allegedly recovered 8.4 cartons of untaxed cigarettes at the subject premises, and one person was arrested and charged with violating Tax Law § 1814. On another occasion, 28 packs of untaxed cigarettes allegedly were recovered from the subject premises, and one person was arrested and charged with violating Tax Law § 1814. On two other occasions, an undercover police officer allegedly purchased one pack of untaxed cigarettes from an employee in the subject premises. On another occasion, the execution of a search warrant at the subject premises allegedly resulted in the seizure of 64 packs of untaxed cigarettes and the arrest of one person. * * *

The allegations of unlawful conduct … , along with the allegation in the complaint that City Tobacco House knowingly conducted or maintained the subject premises as a place where persons gathered for purposes of engaging in conduct that violated Tax Law § 1814 and Administrative Code § 11-4012(b), were sufficient to allege the commission of criminal nuisance in the second degree, as defined in Penal Law § 240.45. Thus, having alleged facts supporting the proposition that City Tobacco House was a place “wherein there is occurring a criminal nuisance as defined in section 240.45 of the penal law” (Administrative Code § 7-703[l]), the complaint validly alleged the existence of a public nuisance at the subject premises. City of New York v Land & Bldg. Known as 4802 4th Ave., 2022 NY Slip Op 05988, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the city’s allegation defendant sold unstamped, untaxed cigarettes stated a cause of action for public nuisance.

 

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THE ALLEGED INTENTIONAL ACT OF THROWING A HAND TRUCK AT A BUS INJURING PLAINTIFF-PASSENGER DID NOT SUPPORT NEGLIGENCE OR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSES OF ACTION, BUT DID SUPPORT AN INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the allegation plaintiff was injured when defendant (McGregor) threw a hand truck at the bus in which plaintiff was a passenger did not support causes of action for negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress, but did support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress:

… [T]he only inference that may be drawn from the plaintiff’s allegations is that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted solely from McGregor’s intentional acts. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, even if McGregor “lacked any intent to make physical contact with, or otherwise injure, the plaintiff, the conduct attributed to [McGregor] in the amended complaint . . . constituted intentional, rather than negligent, conduct” … . …

“A negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action must fail where, as here, no allegations of negligence appear in the pleadings” … . …

[Re; intentional infliction of emotional distress:] … [T]he complaint sufficiently alleged that McGregor engaged in conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” … . Besides the alleged throwing of the hand truck that is the basis of the plaintiff’s assault and battery causes of action, the plaintiff also alleges that McGregor threw other objects at the bus, attempted to board the bus, prevented the bus from moving, kicked the bus, and yelled threats and expletives. Chiesa v McGregor, 2022 NY Slip Op 05982, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the alleged intentional act of throwing a hand truck at a bus injuring plaintiff-passenger did not support negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of action, even though the injuries to plaintiff may not have been intended. The allegation did support an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.

 

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DEFENDANT WAIVED THE LACK-OF-PERSONAL-JURISDICTION DEFENSE BY COUNSEL’S FILING A NOTICE OF APPEARANCE WITHOUT RAISING THE JURISDICTION OBJECTION (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant waived a lack-of-personal-jurisdiction defense by counsel’s filing a notice of appearance without raising the jurisdictional objection:

“‘By statute, a party may appear in an action by attorney (CPLR 321), and such an appearance constitutes an appearance by the party for purposes of conferring jurisdiction'” … . Here, the defendant appeared in the action by its counsel’s filing of the notice of appearance … , and neither the defendant nor its attorney moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction at that time or asserted lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading. Thus, the defendant waived any objection based on lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to move to dismiss the complaint on this ground at the time its counsel filed a notice of appearance in the action or to serve an answer which raised this jurisdictional objection … . Capital One N.A. v Ezkor, 2022 NY Slip Op 05829, Second Dept 10-19-22

Similar issue and result in: HSBC Bank USA N.A. v Mohammed, 2022 NY Slip Op 05843, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: Counsel’s filing a notice of appearance without raising a lack-of-personal-jurisdiction objection waives the objection.

 

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PLAINTIFF IN THIS STRICT FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORECLOSURE UNDER RPAPL 1503; REFORECLOSURE IS AN OPTION WHEN THE ORIGINAL FORECLOSURE MAY BE VOID OR VOIDABLE AS AGAINST ANY PERSON (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in this strict foreclosure action to add a cause of action for reforeclosure under RPAPL 1503:

Section 1503 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law establishes an action in reforeclosure where an original foreclosure judgment, sale, or conveyance may be void or voidable as against any person. The statute grants a purchaser the right to maintain an action “to determine the right of any person to set aside such judgment, sale or conveyance or to enforce an equity of redemption or to recover possession of the property, or the right of any junior mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage” (id.). “Such action may be maintained even though an action against the defendant to foreclose the mortgage under which the judgment, sale or conveyance was made, or to extinguish a right of redemption, would be barred by the statutes of limitation” … . Bank of N.Y. v Karistina Enters., LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 05828, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: Reforeclosure under RPAPL 1503 may be available when the original mortgage is void or voidable as against any person.

 

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THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS THE HOLDER OF THE NOTE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE POSSESSION OF THE NOTE AT THE TIME THE ACTION WAS BROUGHT BECAUSE THE NOTE ITSELF WAS NOT ATTACHED TO THE LOAN SERVICER’S AFFIDAVIT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff bank should not have been awarded summary judgment in this foreclosure action because it did not demonstrate standing to foreclose:

… [T]here was no evidence that the plaintiff is the assignee of the note, and a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time this action was commenced. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code (see UCC 3-104[2][d] …) “holder” is “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession” (UCC 1-201[b] [21][A] …). In the present case, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the note was properly specially endorsed by an allonge “so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof” when it came into the possession of the plaintiff (UCC 3-202[2] …).

Further, the affidavit of Verdooren [loan servicer employee] and the accompanying business records were insufficient to establish the plaintiff’s standing … . Although the foundation for the admission of a business record may be provided by the testimony of the custodian, “it is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” ( … see CPLR 4518[a]). Here, although Verdooren stated that Wells Fargo had possession of the note on the plaintiff’s behalf at the time the action was commenced, the documents attached to Verdooren’s affidavit failed to establish this fact. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Andersen, 2022 NY Slip Op 05827, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: If the defendant raises the lack-of-standing defense in a foreclosure action, the bank must demonstrate the plaintiff was the assignee of the note and the note was in its possession when the action was brought. Here the plaintiff did not show the note was properly endorsed by an attached allonge when it came into plaintiff’s possession and the note was not attached to the loan servicer’s affidavit, rendering the affidavit hearsay.

 

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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAITED UNTIL AFTER THE PROSECUTOR MADE SEVERAL ARGUABLY IMPROPER REMARKS IN SUMMATION BEFORE OBJECTING “TO ALL OF THIS;” THE OBJECTION WAS DEEMED UNTIMELY, VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS, GENERAL AND NONSPECIFIC; THEREFORE THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PROSECUTOR’S REMARKS WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined defense counsel did not make timely objections to remarks made by the prosecutor in summation. After several arguably improper comments by the prosecutor, defense counsel objected “to all of this.” The judge struck the only last of the prosecutor’s remarks. After the jury was charged and deliberating, defense counsel raised objections to several other remarks made by the prosecutor which were denied as untimely. The Second Department agreed the objections were not timely or specific and affirmed defendant’s conviction:

The objection of defense counsel most relevant to this appeal was to “all of this,” which was interposed only after the prosecutor likened a hypodermic needle to a dangerous instrument. The objection, as interposed, suffers from a number of problems in failing to preserve the issues now raised on appeal. First, the objection was vague and ambiguous. Second, it was untimely. Third, its language was general and nonspecific. The preservation rules … , requiring that objections be timely and specific rather than untimely and general, are basic, well-understood, and time-tested concepts, which should prompt no dispute in their application to this appellate record.

… The prosecutor had been speaking at some length, for a total of 28 uninterrupted sentences, before defense counsel interposed the objection at issue here. …

… As to [the] objection and its timing, the Supreme Court understandably treated it as applying to the last occurring statement of the prosecutor … . …

… For preservation, the defendant’s objection was … general, as it did not identify to the Supreme Court any particular argument or remark by the prosecutor or any specific basis. The basis for the objection was not explained, rendering the entire objection general and insufficient for preservation purposes … . …

Defense counsel initiated further colloquy with the Supreme Court about the subject objection after the jury had been charged and after the jury had begun its deliberations. By then, counsel’s objection was clearly untimely, as there was no longer an opportunity for the court to promptly make a curative ruling to the jury, had one even been indicated. People v Adorno, 2022 NY Slip Op 05856, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: The Second Department used this case to explain that, in order to preserve issues for appeal, objections must be timely and specific such that the trial court has the opportunity to address them. Here the prosecutor made several arguably improper remarks in summation before defense counsel objected “to all of this.” Defense counsel didn’t specify the nature of the objections until after the jury started deliberations. That was too late.

 

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THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff bank did not not submit sufficient proof of compliance with the notice-of-default provisions of RPAPL 1304. Among other deficiencies, the documents necessary to prove the notice was mailed were not attached to the affidavit stating the mailing requirements were met:

… [P]laintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it complied with RPAPL 1304. Although Crystal Jean McClelland, a vice president of loan documentation for the plaintiff, stated in her affidavit that the RPAPL 1304 notices were mailed by certified and regular first-class mail, and attached copies of those notices, the plaintiff failed to attach, as exhibits to the motion, any documents to prove that the mailing actually happened. The plaintiff failed to provide any documentation from the United States Post Office demonstrating that the notice was sent by registered or certified mail. Further, while McClelland attested that she was familiar with the business records maintained by the plaintiff, had personal knowledge of the operation of and the circumstances surrounding the preparation, maintenance, distribution, and retrieval of records in the plaintiff’s record-keeping system, and had knowledge of how the plaintiff drafted, generated, triggered, sent, and stored letters in the servicing process, she did not present proof of a standard office mailing procedure by the plaintiff designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed. Since the plaintiff failed to provide proof of the actual mailing, or proof of a standard office mailing procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed, sworn to by someone with personal knowledge of the procedure, the plaintiff failed to establish its strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kowalski, 2022 NY Slip Op 05887, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: Another example of what the banks get wrong when trying to prove strict compliance with the foreclosure notice-of-default provisions of RPAPL 1304 at the summary judgment stage.

 

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DEFENDANTS’ VAN FAILED TO YIELD TO APPELLANT’S VEHICLE, WHICH HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, WHEN DEFENDANTS’ VAN ATTEMPTED TO MERGE INTO APPELLANT’S LANE; THE DASH CAM VIDEO DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANT-DRIVER VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; APPELLANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT). ​

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a dash cam video demonstrated that defendants’ van failed to yield to appellant’s vehicle. Therefore, appellant was not negligent as a matter of law:

“A driver has a duty not to merge into a lane of moving traffic until it is safe to do so, and a violation of this duty constitutes negligence as a matter of law” ( … see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128[a]). Moreover, a driver of a vehicle with the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that the driver in the lane next to him or her will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield to a driver with the right-of-way … . “‘[A] driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision'” … .

Here, in support of her motion, the appellant submitted evidence which included, among other things, a dash cam video of the accident which demonstrated that the defendant van driver failed to yield the right-of-way to the appellant’s vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a). The video revealed that the defendant van driver suddenly moved into the appellant’s lane of travel as that lane widened to become both a travel lane and an exit ramp lane and, within seconds, the right side of the vehicle of the defendant van driver collided with the driver’s side of the appellant’s vehicle as the appellant’s vehicle was entering the exit ramp lane. Thus, the evidence submitted by the appellant established, prima facie, that the defendant van driver’s failure to yield was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the appellant was free from fault … . Vigdorchik v Vigdorchik, 2022 NY Slip Op 05886, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: Here defendant driver struck appellant’s car while attempting to merge into appellant’s lane, which violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law because appellant had the right of way. The accident was captured in a dash cam video. Appellant was not negligent as a matter of law.

 

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THE BROKER WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND THEREFORE WAS ENTITLED TO THE AGREED 4% COMMISSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over an extensive dissent, determined the broker in this sale of real property was the procuring cause of the sale and was therefore entitled to the agreed 4% commission:

“To prevail on a cause of action to recover a commission, the broker must establish (1) that it is duly licensed, (2) that it had a contract, express or implied, with the party to be charged with paying the commission, and (3) that it was the procuring cause of the sale” … . Here, the issue disputed by the parties was whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale. “To establish that a broker was the procuring cause of a transaction, the broker must establish that there was ‘a direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote'” between the bare introduction of the parties to the transaction and the consummation of the sale … . “[I]n order to qualify for a commission, a broker need not have been involved in the ensuing negotiations or in the completion of the sale,” if such a direct and proximate causal link exists … . …

It was Minetree’s [the broker’s] introduction of the subject properties to, and work with, TNC [the nature conservancy] which brought the County and the defendants together on a bargain sale transaction. Saunders Ventures, Inc. v Catcove Group, Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 05879, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: If a broker is the “procuring cause” of the sale of real property, the broker is entitled to the commission agreed to in the broker’s contract.

 

DEFENDANT’S OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION DID NOT REQUIRE SUMMARY DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SEAL THE RECORDS OF HIS NEW YORK CONVICTION; HOWEVER, THE OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION MUST BE PART OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF SEALING THE NEW YORK RECORDS; SUPREME COURT GRANTED THE MOTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE OUT-OF-STATE CONVICTION; MATTER REMITTED FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Connolly, reversing Supreme Court, determined that an out-of-state conviction should be considered where defendant seeks to seal the records of a New York conviction. Here Supreme Court had granted the motion to seal, finding that only New York convictions need be considered. The matter was remitted for a hearing in which the out-of-state conviction would be part of the analysis:

This appeal presents the question of whether CPL 160.59(3)(f) requires a court to summarily deny a defendant’s motion to seal an eligible offense where the defendant subsequently has been convicted of a crime under the laws of another state. We hold that CPL 160.59(3)(f) does not require summary denial under these circumstances. Instead, a defendant’s subsequent conviction under the laws of another state is a factor that the motion court should consider in its discretionary determination as to whether to seal the eligible offense … . * * *

… [A] hearing is … appropriate in this case. Although the defendant’s 2018 Virginia misdemeanor conviction was not a ground to summarily deny the defendant’s motion to seal, at the hearing, the parties may provide additional evidence related to that conviction, as well as any other evidence relevant to the determination of the defendant’s motion. Further, assuming that the defendant was in fact convicted of a misdemeanor in Virginia, the Supreme Court should consider that conviction and the nature and circumstances of the underlying conduct in making its discretionary determination as to whether to grant the defendant’s motion to seal. The court should also consider how the conviction reflects upon the defendant’s character under CPL 160.59(7)(d). In particular, we note that the defendant’s affidavit failed to disclose the existence of the 2018 Virginia misdemeanor conviction or explain the circumstances surrounding the conviction. Further, the affirmation of the defendant’s attorney affirmatively stated that the defendant had no contact with the criminal justice system since his 1990 New York conviction, which does not appear to be accurate. Upon remittal, the court should consider all of these circumstances, as well as the nonexhaustive list of factors in CPL 160.59(7), in its new determination of the defendant’s motion to seal. …

Although the Supreme Court properly determined that it was not required to summarily deny the defendant’s motion to seal his 1990 conviction for attempted grand larceny in the third degree pursuant to CPL 160.59(3)(f), as the People opposed the defendant’s motion to seal, the court was required to hold a hearing pursuant to CPL 160.59(6). People v Witherspoon, 2022 NY Slip Op 05866, Second Dept 10-19-22

Practice Point: A motion to seal the records of a New York conviction need not be summarily denied because of an out-of-state conviction. However, the out-of-state conviction must be considered as a factor in the analysis of the appropriateness of sealing the New York records.

 

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