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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IS A DEFENSE TO A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted that comparative negligence is a defense to a Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action. Here plaintiff alleged he slipped and fell on ice and snow in a parking lot which functioned as a passageway and Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Fourth Department found defendant had raised a question of fact about whether it had discharged its duty to keep the passageway clear by salting it and sent the matter back for a trial:

… [G]iven the need for a trial on liability and, if necessary, a new trial on damages, we note our agreement with defendant that the court erred in granting plaintiff’s request to preclude defendant from introducing at the prior damages trial any evidence of plaintiff’s comparative fault with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action. The court determined that defendant was precluded from offering evidence of plaintiff’s comparative fault at trial because that issue had been decided when the court granted plaintiff’s motion. Contrary to the court’s determination, however, consideration of comparative fault is still required even “[w]hen a defendant’s liability is established as a matter of law before trial” because the jury must still “determine whether the plaintiff was negligent and whether such negligence was a substantial factor” in causing his or her injuries … , “comparative negligence remains a cognizable affirmative defense to a section 241 (6) cause of action” … . Baum v Javen Constr. Co., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 03678, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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ALTHOUGH THE POLICE IN THIS STREET STOP CASE MAY HAVE HAD CAUSE FOR A LEVEL ONE INQUIRY (A CAN IN A PAPER BAG), THEY IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED IN LEVEL TWO INVASIVE QUESTIONING FOCUSED ON DEFENDANT’S POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE OPEN CONTAINER LAW; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant’s guilty plea, over a two-justice dissent, determined defendant’s motion to suppress based upon the illegal street stop should have been granted. The police may have been justified in a level one (DeBour) inquiry based upon an apparent violation of the open-container law (a can in a paper bag), but the police immediately moved to a level two encounter with invasive questioning about the container in the paper bag:

At the first level of a police-civilian encounter, i.e., a request for information, a police officer may approach an individual “when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality” (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223), and “[t]he request may ‘involve[] basic, nonthreatening questions regarding, for instance, identity, address or destination’ ” … .”The next degree, the common-law right to inquire, is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion in that a [police officer] is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible seizure” (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223).

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the officers possessed a level one right to approach defendant and his companion … the officers nonetheless immediately “engaged in a level two intrusion, i.e., ‘a more pointed inquiry into [the] activities [of defendant and his companion]’ . . . , by asking ‘invasive question[s] focusing on the possible criminality of the subject’ ” … . Notably, the officers did not see defendant or his companion drinking from whatever item was in the paper bag, and there were no other attendant circumstances indicative of criminal behavior that would warrant the more pointed inquiry at the outset … . People v Wright, 2021 NY Slip Op 03675, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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THE CITY OF ROCHESTER LOCAL LAW WHICH PURPORTED TO TRANSFER THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE POLICE OFFICERS TO THE POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD (PAB) IS INVALID AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice NeMoyer, determined the City of Rochester Local Law which transferred the power to discipline police officers from the police chief to the Police Accountability Board (PAB) is invalid and cannot be enforced:

… [t]he challenged Local Law No. 2 necessarily falls insofar as it takes police discipline out of collective bargaining because, in that respect, it conflicts with the general law mandating collective bargaining over police discipline (see Civil Service Law § 204 [2] … ). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “a local law is inconsistent [with the general law] where local laws prohibit what would be permissible under State law”… , and by creating a permanent administrative apparatus for disciplining police officers that is impervious to alteration or modification at the bargaining table, Local Law No. 2 necessarily and structurally prohibits something that … is statutorily mandated for the City of Rochester: collective bargaining of police discipline. The court therefore properly invalidated Local Law No. 2 insofar as it imbues PAB with disciplinary authority over Rochester police officers without regard to collective bargaining. Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 2021 NY Slip Op 03787, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED STRANGULATION SECOND DEGREE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ON THAT CHARGE ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of strangulation second degree, determined the request to instruct the jury to consider the lesser included offense of attempted strangulation second degree should have been granted. There was a reasonable view of the evidence which would have allowed the jury to find the victim did not suffer physical injury:

… [T]he disputed issue is whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting a determination of guilt on the lesser count but not the higher count. Strangulation in the second degree requires proof that the victim suffered stupor, loss of consciousness, or physical injury or impairment (Penal Law § 121.12). Inasmuch as there was no evidence that the complainant suffered stupor or loss of consciousness, defendant’s guilt of this offense rested entirely on the evidence that the complainant sustained a physical injury. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant … , we conclude that a reasonable view of the evidence would have supported a determination that the complainant did not sustain a physical injury and thus that defendant was guilty of only the lesser offense and not the greater … . People v Swift, 2021 NY Slip Op 03785, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SURROGATE’S FINDING THAT THREE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS WERE PART OF THE ESTATE AS OPPOSED TO JOINT ACCOUNTS WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Surrogate’s Court, determined there were questions of fact about whether three joint bank accounts passed to respondent outside the estate or were part of the estate. The was no evidence of a signature card which included “right of survivorship” language. Respondent argued decedent intended the bank accounts to be gifts to the respondent, but the language of the will raised questions of fact about decedent’s intent:

Absent the necessary survivorship language, the statutory presumption contained in Banking Law § 675 does not apply, even if the documents creating the account provide that it is a “joint” account … . Here, on her motion, respondent failed to establish that the statutory presumption created under Banking Law § 675 is applicable because she failed to submit signature cards or ledgers of the accounts that included the required survivorship language. …

Respondent averred in an affidavit that decedent placed her name on the accounts with the stated intention of gifting them to her. Respondent also submitted related account documents, including bank documents for all four accounts that reference both respondent and decedent’s names and include survivorship or joint tenancy language. Thus, respondent submitted evidence establishing that the four accounts were joint accounts with right of survivorship, and the burden then shifted to petitioners. …

… [P]etitioners submitted decedent’s will, which left the estate to the three children. Thus, the intent of decedent, as evidenced by her will, is inconsistent with respondent’s contention that the three bank accounts were gifts to respondent or joint tenancies with survivorship rights … . … [P]etitioners submitted respondent’s deposition testimony that those three accounts were funded solely by decedent, that one of the … accounts was used as decedent’s primary checking account, and that payments out of that account were for only decedent’s benefit. … [R]espondent, who became joint owner of those three accounts when decedent was in her mid to late eighties, testified that she helped decedent with her banking. Matter of Najjar (Sanzone), 2021 NY Slip Op 03777, Fourth Dept 6-11-21

 

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THE DESIGNATING PETITION WAS PERMEATED BY FRAUD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVALIDATED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the designating petition was permeated by fraud and should have been invalidated:

… [P]etitioner submitted clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that several subscribing witnesses attested to many signatures on the designating petition that they had not actually witnessed, and thus we agree with petitioner that the candidate’s designating petition is permeated with fraud. The parties correctly agree that the candidate was required to obtain signatures from 600 voters registered in the Democratic Party … . Numerous subscribing witnesses, acting on the candidate’s behalf, gathered 1,657 signatures, approximately 700 of which the Board invalidated. Petitioner challenged the signatures collected by five subscribing witnesses, who collected the overwhelming majority of the signatures on the designating petition; indeed, only slightly less than 200 valid signatures were collected by all of the other people who circulated petitions for the candidate. Supreme Court concluded that numerous signatures collected by those five subscribing witnesses were fraudulently procured for various reasons, including that there was no such voter, the voter had died, the voter had signed the designating petition more than once, or the voter was not the person who signed the designating petition. …

It is well settled that, “where the court finds misrepresentations in numerous instances, as it finds here, and nothing is [established] in rebuttal, it may well indulge in the presumption that there were many other misrepresentations and irregularities which time did not permit to be uncovered … . ” Matter of Saunders v Mansouri, 2021 NY Slip Op 03157, Fourth Dept 5-18-21

 

THE FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE DATE OF THE PRIMARY ELECTION IN THE CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION DID NOT INVALIDATE IT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the fact that the date of the primary election was not stated on the certificate of authorization did not invalidate it:

… [T]he statute at issue here, Election Law § 6-120 (3), does not specifically prescribe that the date of the primary election be specified in the certificate of authorization … . We therefore conclude that there was substantial compliance with section 6-120 (3) inasmuch as the omission of the date of the primary election was ” ‘neither a defect invalidating the certificate nor a matter presenting an opportunity for prejudice or possibility of fraud’ ” … . Further, “[t]here is no question that the objectives of Election Law § 6-120 (3) were met here, as no issue was raised as to whether the subject authorization expressed the will of the party committee of the political subdivision involved” … . Matter of Kowal v Bargnesi, 2021 NY Slip Op 03014, Fourth Dept 5-11-21

 

CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON SECOND DEGREE IS AN ARMED FELONY FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES IF THE FIREARM IS LOADED AND OPERABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, diverging from the First Department, determined criminal possession of a weapon second degree can constitute possession of a deadly weapon within the definition of an armed felony if the firearm is loaded and operable:

We disagree with the reasoning in Ochoa [182 AD3d 410, 1st Dept 2020] only to the extent that it held that all convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for possessing a loaded firearm are not armed felonies. It is apparent that where a defendant possesses a firearm that is actually loaded with ammunition and is capable of being fired, he or she possesses a deadly weapon and is guilty of an armed felony offense. We conclude that it is appropriate to look at the particular facts of each case to determine whether the defendant is guilty of an armed felony. For example, a person is guilty of robbery in the first degree under Penal Law § 160.15 (2) when he or she commits a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, which, as noted, includes a switchblade knife or a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged (§ 10.00 [12]). To determine if the defendant committed an armed felony, courts look to the definition of deadly weapon as that phrase is used in the definition of armed felony, which excludes knives. Thus, where a defendant is convicted of robbery in the first degree for the use of a knife, that is not an “armed felony” … . Where, however, the robbery is committed with a loaded, operable firearm, it is an “armed felony” (see People v Jiminez, 165 AD2d 692, 692-693 [1st Dept 1990] … ). In Jiminez, the Court held that “[s]ince defendant pleaded guilty to committing first degree robbery while armed with a pistol he was properly sentenced as an armed felony offender” … , despite the fact that a first-degree robbery conviction is not always an armed felony. Just as courts look to the definition of deadly weapon as that phrase is used in the definition of armed felony to determine that knives are excluded therefrom, so too should courts look to whether the firearm fits within that definition, i.e., a firearm that is actually loaded and capable of being fired. People v Meridy, 2021 NY Slip Op 02894, Fourth Dept 5-7-21

 

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THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW BY REFUSING TO INFORM THE GRAND JURY THE DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE TESTIMONY OF TWO WITNESSES; HOWEVER THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DID NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL OF TWO COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT; COUNTY COURT REVERSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, in a People’s appeal, determined the district attorney violated the Criminal Procedure Law by refusing to tell the grand jury defendant had requested that two witnesses give testimony, but the violation did not warrant dismissal of two counts of the indictment. The decision includes a detailed discussion of the district attorneys duties and discretion with respect to a defendant’s request for witness testimony before a grand jury:

… [A] prosecutor may not “suppress[ a] defendant’s request to call . . . witness[es] nor strip[ ] the grand jury of its discretion to grant or deny that request” … . Instead, “[a]lthough [a] prosecutor [cannot] avoid presenting [a requested] witness’s name for a vote, the prosecutor [is] free, in the role of advisor to the grand jury, to explain that the witness [does] not have relevant information [or] primarily offer[s] inadmissible hearsay testimony, and if unpersuasive in this effort, the prosecutor [may seek] a court order quashing the subpoena or limiting the witness’s testimony as provided in CPL 190.50 (3)” … . … [T]he court properly determined that the People, despite their stated concerns about the admissibility of the proposed testimony, violated their statutory obligation by refusing to present to the grand jury defendant’s request that two of the vehicle’s other occupants be called as witnesses. * * *

We … conclude that “this was not one of the rare cases of prosecutorial misconduct entitling a defendant to the exceptional remedy of dismissal, because there is no showing that, in the absence of the complained-of misconduct, the grand jury might have decided not to indict the defendant” … . … [T]he People did not engage in an overall pattern of willful and pervasive misconduct; instead, the failure to present defendant’s request for witnesses to the grand jury constituted an isolated instance of misconduct involving, at worst, the erroneous handling of an evidentiary matter, which “do[es] not merit invalidation of the indictment” … . People v Wilcox, 2021 NY Slip Op 02893, Fourth Dept 5-7-21

 

PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED DEFENDANTS’ CONSTRUCTION OF A FENCE VIOLATED A VALID RESTRICTIVE COVENANT IN THE PARTIES’ DEEDS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendants violated a restrictive covenant in the parties’ deeds by constructing a fence along the property line:

Plaintiff and defendants own adjoining properties in Wayne County with views of Sodus Bay, and those properties can be traced to one original grantor, nonparty Sodus Bay Heights Land Co., Inc. (Land Company). The Land Company created a subdivision and, between the years of 1924 and 1937, it sold numerous parcels in accordance with its planned development. Plaintiff and defendants obtained title to their property through chains of title that date back to owners who purchased their property directly from the Land Company. Both properties are subject to two relevant restrictive covenants that run with the land. The first stated “[t]hat no line fence shall be erected on said lot without the written consent of the [Land Company], or its successors or assigns.” The second stated “[t]hat no unnecessary trees or other obstructions shall be permitted on said lot which shall hide the view of other residents in Sodus Bay Heights.” * * *

Generally, “[r]estrictive covenants will be enforced when the intention of the parties is clear and the limitation is reasonable and not offensive to public policy”… , and it is well settled that the party seeking to enforce such a restriction “must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the scope, as well as the existence, of the restriction” … . Here, plaintiff established as a matter of law the scope and the existence of a restriction against fences. Dodge v Baker, 2021 NY Slip Op 02891, Fourth Dept 5-7-21

 

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