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Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

Civil Procedure, Debtor-Creditor

Sheriff Entitled to Poundage Even If No Money Collected—Execution by Sheriff Triggered Settlement

The Fourth Department determined the sheriff was entitled to poundage even though no money was actually collected by the sheriff (the execution by the sheriff triggered a settlement):

The Sheriff …. moved for an order awarding the payment of poundage pursuant to CPLR 8012.  We conclude that the court erred in denying that motion.  “ ‘Poundage is a fee awarded to the Sheriff in the nature of a percentage commission upon moneys recovered pursuant to a levy or [an] execution of attachment’ . . . The Sheriff’s right to receive poundage fees is wholly statutory . . . , and the statute must be strictly construed . . . Under the statute, the Sheriff is entitled to poundage fees ‘for collecting money by virtue of an execution’ (CPLR 8012 [b] [1])” … .  Although it is undisputed that the Sheriff did not actually collect any money, an award of poundage may still be made where, inter alia, “a settlement is made after a levy by virtue of an execution” (…see CPLR 8012 [b] [2]; …). …[W]here, as here, “payment by the debtor is made directly to the creditor after a sheriff levies, the payment constitutes a settlement, and the sheriff will be entitled to poundage” … .  Pursuant to the unambiguous language of the statute, the Sheriff is entitled to $24,500 in poundage based on the settlement amount of $650,000 (see CPLR 8012 [b] [1], [2]). Foley v West-Herr Ford Inc…, 1040, 4th Dept 11-8-13

 

November 8, 2013
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Attorneys, Criminal Law

Indictment Should Not Have Been Dismissed Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct

In determining the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment based upon the prosecutorial misconduct, the Fourth Department explained:

“ ‘[D]ismissal of an indictment under CPL 210.35 (5) must meet a high test and is limited to instances of prosecutorial misconduct, fraudulent conduct or errors which potentially prejudice the ultimate decision reached by the [g]rand [j]ury’ ” … .  As the Court of Appeals has stated, “not every improper comment, elicitation of inadmissible testimony, impermissible question or mere mistake renders an indictment defective.  Typically, the submission of some inadmissible evidence will be deemed fatal only when the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain the indictment” … .

Here, the prosecutor was required to establish that the four-year-old victim could provide unsworn testimony, but failed to do so… . The prosecutor also violated the unsworn witness rule during an attempt to persuade the child to testify about the incident … .  Nevertheless, we conclude that the prosecutor did not thereby engage in conduct that was fraudulent in nature, nor was the prosecutor’s conduct so egregious as to impair the integrity of the grand jury proceedings … .  We further conclude that the remaining evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the indictment.  People v Elioff, 1002, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Suppression Motion Should Have Been Granted—Defendant Arrested Before Police Had Probable Cause

The Fourth Department reversed the suppression court and granted defendant’s motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment. The Fourth Department concluded that the evidence of which the police were aware at the time defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police care did not amount to probable cause.  A baggie containing drugs and a dagger were not found until after the illegal arrest:

…[T]he police were justified in approaching the vehicle outside the bar because they had a “founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot,” rendering the police encounter lawful at its inception … . We further conclude that the police were justified in pursuing the vehicle inasmuch as “defendant’s flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that [he] may be engaged in criminal activity, [gave] rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit” … .  Such reasonable suspicion also gave the police the authority to stop the vehicle … .

…[W]e conclude that an arrest occurred here when defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car.  Under such circumstances, “a reasonable man innocent of any crime, would have thought” that he was under arrest … .  “[V]arious factors, when combined with the street exchange of a ‘telltale sign’ of narcotics, may give rise to probable cause that a narcotics offense has occurred.  Those factors relevant to assessing probable cause include the exchange of currency; whether the particular community has a high incidence of drug trafficking; the police officer’s experience and training in drug investigations; and any ‘additional evidence of furtive or evasive behavior on the part of the participants’ ” … .  Here, the police observed neither a “ ‘telltale sign’ ” of narcotics, such as a glassine baggie, nor the exchange of currency … .  Thus, despite the observations of the police outside the bar, their experience in drug investigations, and defendant’s flight, we conclude that the police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant before the dagger and first baggie were observed. People v Lee, 1005, 4th Dept 10-4-13

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESSION

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Case Sent Back to Suppression Court for Hearing to Determine Admissibility of Statements

The Fourth Department sent the case back to the suppression court for a hearing to determine the admissibility of statements that had not been included in the initial 710.30 notice provided in connection with a prior indictment that had been dismissed. The statements were included in the 710.30 notice provided in connection with the superseding indictment. The Fourth Department determined the defendant was entitled to a hearing on the admissibility of the statements:

…[W]e conclude that the court properly refused to preclude the additional statements included in the CPL 710.30 notice served by the People after the superseding indictment was filed … .  “Those [statements] were not referenced in the CPL 710.30 notice that was served in connection with the original indictment, but the record establishes that the People filed the superseding indictment out of necessity after the court dismissed . . . the original indictment” … .  We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in determining the admissibility of the additional statements without reopening the Huntley hearing and affording defendant a further opportunity to contest their admissibility.  The court concluded that the statements were spontaneously made and therefore not subject to suppression.  At the time of the Huntley hearing conducted in conjunction with the initial indictment, however, the only issue before the court with respect to the additional statements was whether they should be precluded on the ground that they had not been included in the first CPL 710.30 notice.  Consequently, inasmuch as the voluntariness of the additional statements was not at issue at that time, defendant had no reason or opportunity to explore the issues of spontaneity or the effect of the previously-given Miranda warnings, or to raise any other issues regarding the admissibility of those statements.  Thus, “the hearing must be reopened” to afford him that opportunity… . People v Roberts, 945, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law

Restitution to Police Department Re: Expenses of Drug Bust Proper

The Fourth Department determined defendant was properly ordered to pay restitution to the police department in a drug case, but that payment of a surcharge should not have been ordered:

… [A] defendant convicted of, inter alia, a class C “ ‘felony involving the sale of a controlled substance’ may be ordered to repay a law enforcement agency ‘the amount of funds expended in the actual purchase’ of a controlled substance” … .  Section 60.27 (9) was amended in 1991 “to authorize restitution to law enforcement agencies for unrecovered funds utilized to purchase narcotics as part of investigations leading to convictions” … .  We therefore conclude … that the court properly directed defendant to pay restitution to the City of Oswego Police Department for the funds it expended in buying drugs from him.

The People correctly concede with respect to defendant’s further contention … that the court erred in imposing a surcharge on that restitution order.  Penal Law § 60.27 (9) further provides that “[a]ny restitution which may be required to be made to a law enforcement agency pursuant to this section . . . shall not include a designated surcharge.”  People v Boatman, 940, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Case Sent Back to Suppression Court to Determine Whether Police Had Sufficient Reason for Asking About Drugs and Weapons After Traffic Stop

The Fourth Department sent the case back for a determination whether the police had a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an inquiry about the presence of drugs of weapons after a traffic stop:

We agree with defendant that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress the gun recovered from the vehicle based upon the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The testimony at the suppression hearing established that, during a lawful traffic stop, one of the police officers asked defendant whether there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle before instructing defendant to exit the vehicle.  After defendant admitted to having marihuana on his person, the police officer asked defendant to exit the vehicle and, following suspicious behavior by another occupant of the vehicle, searched the vehicle and found a gun in plain view.  Notably, the court did not address whether the officer had the requisite founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify an inquiry concerning the presence of drugs or weapons in the vehicle … . Instead, the court refused to suppress the gun on the ground that the police “could” have taken various actions after the traffic stop that would have inevitably led to the discovery of the gun.  The People, – however, did not raise the inevitable discovery doctrine as a ground for denying suppression of the gun, nor did they meet their burden of “demonstrat[ing] a very high degree of probability that normal police procedures would have uncovered the challenged evidence independently of [a] tainted source”… . People v Sykes, 849, 4th Dept 10-4-13

STREET STOPS, SUPPRESSION

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Erroneous Molineux Rulings Required Reversal

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction, finding error in the trial court’s ruling evidence of prior bad acts was admissible:

Before the trial, the court granted the People’s motion to present Molineux evidence for the limited purpose of proving the absence of mistake in defendant’s possession of the forged checks (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293-294).  Pursuant to the court’s ruling, the People presented evidence on their direct case concerning three of defendant’s prior convictions as well as one investigation that did not result in criminal charges, arising from defendant’s conduct in writing checks on his accounts with knowledge that those accounts either were closed or had insufficient funds.  The court erred in ruling that such evidence was relevant to establish the absence of mistake.  The disputed issues at trial were whether defendant knew that the checks were forged and whether defendant was a knowing participant in, or an innocent victim of, a fraudulent check scheme.  Defendant’s prior bad acts were not “directly relevant” to the absence of mistake in defendant’s possession of the forged checks because those prior bad acts are not probative of defendant’s ability to recognize that the checks were forgeries or that he had become knowingly involved in a fraudulent check scheme … .  Contrary to the People’s contention, the Molineux evidence was not admissible to prove defendant’s “familiarity with check frauds and his ability to deceive individuals through banking schemes” inasmuch as such evidence “tends only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged” .. .  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has expressly declined to create a “ ‘specialized crime’ exception to Molineux” when the charged crime is one “that require[s] unusual skills, knowledge and access to the means of committing it” … .  We therefore conclude that evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts was inadmissible as a matter of law … .

We further conclude in any event with respect to the court’s Molineux ruling that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect … .  The evidence was “of slight value when compared to the possible prejudice to [defendant]” and therefore should not have been admitted … .  We further conclude that the error in admitting the evidence is not harmless …, even in view of the court’s limiting instruction.  People v Mhina, 871, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Mode of Proceedings Error Re: Jury Note Required Reversal, Molineux Rulings Flawed

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction finding the trial court committed a mode of proceedings error in responding to a jury note. The judge instructed the jury in the jury room outside the presence of the defendant.  In addition, the Fourth Department found fault with the procedure used by the trial court to address the admission into evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts, as well as some of the rulings that such evidence was admissible:

We agree with defendant that County Court committed a mode of proceedings error when it responded to a jury note off the record, in the jury room, and outside the presence of defendant, with no indication that defendant had waived his right to be present.  CPL 310.30 provides that, upon receiving a request for further instruction or information from the jury during deliberations, “the court must direct that the jury be returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the people and counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of the defendant, must give such requested information or instruction as the court deems proper.”  It is beyond cavil that “[a] defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all material stages of a trial . . . [and] CPL 310.30 makes a defendant’s right to be present during instructions to the jury absolute and unequivocal” … .  The court properly read the jury note on the record in the presence of defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, and it then obtained a clear stipulation from both attorneys concerning the accuracy of its intended response to the jury’s request for information.  We nevertheless conclude that the court committed reversible error by subsequently instructing the jury off the record, in the jury room, and outside the presence of defendant (see CPL 310.30…).

Because there must be a retrial, we deem it appropriate to address defendant’s contention that the court abused its discretion by permitting testimony concerning defendant’s prior bad acts in the days, months, and years preceding the subject arson.  “[A] defendant is not entitled as a matter of law to pretrial notice of the People’s intention to offer evidence pursuant to People v Molineux (168 NY 264) or to a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of such evidence” ….  Nevertheless, “a prosecutor seeking to introduce Molineux evidence ‘should ask for a ruling out of the presence of the jury’ . . . and . . . any hearing with respect to the admissibility of such evidence should occur either before trial or, at the latest, ‘just before the witness testifies’ ” … .

Here, that procedure was not followed.  Instead, the court improperly afforded defense counsel a standing objection with respect to testimony concerning defendant’s prior bad acts while affording the prosecutor the opportunity to ask one of the victims of the arson, who was defendant’s neighbor, about defendant’s prior bad acts over a period as long as 10 years before the arson.  It was particularly improper to allow that witness to testify that, as a result of defendant’s prior bad acts, he had concerns about the safety of his children and pets.  “It is fundamental that evidence concerning a defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only to demonstrate that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime charged” … .  Although defendant’s bad acts within a few days of the arson could be deemed relevant to such issues as motive and intent, testimony concerning defendant’s bad acts in the preceding weeks, months or years was irrelevant to any issue in the case and only could have prejudiced defendant by suggesting to the jury that he was an erratic and potentially dangerous person who had the propensity to commit the crime at issue … . People v Cornell, 870, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Arbitration, Contract Law, Education-School Law, Employment Law

Stay of Arbitration Properly Denied, Collective Bargaining Agreement Allowed Issue to Be Determined in Arbitration

In affirming Supreme Court’s dismissal of an Article 75 petition seeking a permanent stay of arbitration (with respect to a collective bargaining agreement [CBA]), the Fourth Department explained the operative analysis:

In determining whether an issue is subject to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), a court must apply the two-step analysis set forth in Matter of Acting Supt. of Schs. of Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Assn.) (42 NY2d 509, 513).  “First, a court must determine whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance” … .  If the court determines that there is no such prohibition and thus that the parties have the authority to arbitrate the grievance, it proceeds to the second step, in which it must determine whether that authority was in fact exercised, i.e., whether the CBA demonstrates that the parties agreed to refer this type of dispute to arbitration … .  With respect to the second step, where there is a broad arbitration clause such as the one in the CBA at issue, “[a] determination of arbitrability is limited to ‘whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA’ ” … .  “Succinctly, the test centers on two distinct inquiries as to the public parties’ purported entry into the arbitral forum:  may they do so and, if yes, did they do so” … .  Here, with respect to the issue whether petitioner properly followed the procedures mandated by the CBA in terminating the employee in question, we conclude that the court properly determined that the parties had the authority to agree to arbitrate this grievance, and that they in fact agreed to do so.  Matter of Arbitration…, 1019, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

October 4, 2013
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Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), Real Property Law, Trusts and Estates

Right of First Refusal Not Triggered by Partition Action

In a partition action, the Fourth Department determined the agreement between the parties was a right of first refusal, not an option to purchase, which was not triggered by the partition action.  The court explained the operative law:

Plaintiff and Waite [one of the defendants] are tenants in common and acquired the property at issue by an executor’s deed pursuant to the settlement of their mother’s estate.  In settling that estate, plaintiff, Waite and the other named defendants signed a settlement agreement providing that plaintiff and Waite “agree to grant to [each of the other named defendants] the option to purchase the . . . property, in the event that [plaintiff and Waite], either jointly or severally, determine to sell, assign or transfer the . . . property to someone other than each other.  The option price shall be [$120,000] plus the costs of any improvements made by [plaintiff and Waite] to the premises subsequent to [their] purchase of the premises.  Said option may be prepared in recordable form by any or all of the [other named defendants] at their own cost and expense, and [plaintiff and Waite] will execute any said recordable option.  Upon receipt of an offer to purchase the premises, except from [each other], [plaintiff and Waite] shall notify each of the [other named defendants] then living, in writing of the proposed sale of the premises, and the [other named defendants] shall have sixty (60) days to exercise their option as granted herein.” * * *

We conclude that the right bestowed by the settlement agreement … is a right of first refusal, not an option to purchase, despite the use of the term “option” therein …, and thus that Supreme Court mistakenly treated the contractual right as an option to purchase.  “A right of first refusal is a dormant right that is triggered when an owner decides to sell the property to a third party at an agreed-upon price” …, and those are the applicable facts set forth in the settlement agreement.

We agree with Waite on her appeal that the court erred in determining that the contractual right was triggered upon plaintiff’s commencement of the instant action, for partition and sale.  It must first be determined in a partition action whether the property may be partitioned, i.e., divided among the owners in some fashion, without great prejudice to them, and “partition sale” is a secondary consideration only in the event that partition greatly prejudices the owners (see RPAPL 901 [1]…).  Thus, commencement of the partition action did not trigger the right of first refusal inasmuch as a partition, as opposed to a partition sale, would not result in a transfer of the property to a third party.  Furthermore, no offer of purchase from a third party triggered either the right of first refusal or the contractual obligation of plaintiff or Waite pursuant to the settlement agreement or recorded document. Tuminno v Waite…, 915, 4th Dept 10-4-13

 

 

October 4, 2013
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