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Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

Municipal Law, Real Property Law

City’s Annexation of Town Land Was in the Overall Public Interest

The Fourth Department determined the annexation of vacant town land by the city was demonstrated to be in the overall public interest, despite the loss of tax revenue to the town:

The municipality seeking an article 17 annexation has the burden of proving that the annexation is in the overall public interest” (…see General Municipal Law § 712…). “A reviewing court must weigh[ ] the benefit or detriment to the annexing municipality, the territory proposed to be annexed, and the remaining governmental unit from which the territory would be taken” … . “Benefit and detriment are customarily defined in terms of municipal services such as police and fire protection, health regulations, sewer and water service, public utilities and public education” … . “Another factor to consider is whether the municipality seeking the annexation and the territory proposed to be annexed have the requisite unity of purpose and facilities to constitute a community’ ” … .  Matter of City of Fulton v Town of Grandby, 2014 NY Slip Op 03371, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

May 9, 2015
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Criminal Law

Indictment Dismissed after Trial as Multiplicitous and Duplicitous/Grand Larceny Can Not Be Based Upon the Violation of a Regulation that Is Civil in Nature

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction and dismissed the indictment in a prosecution alleging public assistance fraud in the operation of a daycare home.  The indictment charged the defendant with grand larceny, falsifying business records and offering a false instrument for filing.  Essentially, the charges alleged the defendant billed for services provided by an unlicensed care-giver, and billed for services which were not provided.  The Fourth Department held that the entire indictment was rendered multiplicitous and duplicitous by the trial evidence.  In addition, the court determined that the grand larceny count could not be based upon the violation of a regulation requiring the presence of a licensed assistant.

With respect to multiplicity and duplicity, the court wrote:

Prosecutors and grand juries must steer between the evils known as duplicity’ and multiplicity.’ An indictment is duplicitous when a single count charges more than one offense . . . It is multiplicitous when a single offense is charged in more than one count . . . A duplicitous indictment may fail to give a defendant adequate notice and opportunity to defend; it may impair his [or her] ability to assert the protection against double jeopardy in a future case; and it may undermine the requirement of jury unanimity, for if jurors are considering separate crimes in a single count, some may find the defendant guilty of one, and some of the other. If an indictment is multiplicitous it creates the risk that a defendant will be punished for, or stigmatized with a conviction of, more crimes than he [or she] actually committed” … . An indictment that is not duplicitous on its face may be rendered so based upon the trial evidence … .

Here, the People correctly concede that counts 5 through 7, 9, 15 through 17, and 19 of the indictment are duplicitous and multiplicitous inasmuch as they are based on “distinct but not identifiable vouchers.” Those counts are all based on the same time period and the same vendor number and, according to the People, there is no way to identify which voucher refers to which count … .  …

With respect to the remaining counts of the indictment, we agree with defendant that counts 8, 10, 18, and 20 of the indictment were rendered duplicitous by the trial evidence.. . . As noted above, the People alleged that defendant submitted vouchers for monies to which she was not entitled because, at various dates and times, she (1) billed for hours when neither she nor her certified assistant were at the daycare, and (2) she billed for hours when the children were not at the daycare. There is no basis in the record to determine, with respect to each of those counts, whether the jury convicted defendant based upon the first act (billing for hours when the children were watched by uncertified assistants) or the second act (billing for hours when the children were not at daycare), or whether certain jurors convicted defendant upon the former and others upon the latter. Thus, “it is impossible to verify that each member of the jury convicted defendant for the same criminal act”… .

With respect to grand larceny based upon the violation of a regulation, the court wrote:

Count one of the indictment alleges that, between October 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008, defendant “stole property having a value in excess of [$3,000], to wit: a sum of money, belonging to [DSS].” Under Penal Law § 155.05 (1), “[a] person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself [or herself] or to a third person, he [or she] wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” Larceny includes “obtaining property by false pretenses” (§ 155.05 [2] [a]). A defendant commits larceny by false pretenses when he or she “obtain[s] possession of money of another by means of an intentional false material statement about a past or presently existing fact upon which the victim relied in parting with the money” … .

Here, the People alleged that defendant committed larceny by false pretenses by charging for times when unlicensed assistants were watching the children in violation of OCFS regulations, and by billing for times when the children were not receiving daycare services. We question whether submitting vouchers for daycare services rendered by an uncertified assistant falls within the definition of larceny. OCFS’s regional manager testified that, although it is a “regulatory violation” for an uncertified assistant to watch children at a group day care, the regulations do not state that daycare providers are not permitted to bill for services rendered by an uncertified assistant. Indeed, the DSS special investigator referred to those hours as “billable” on his charts, although unauthorized by the regulations.

Even assuming, arguendo, that billing for services provided by an uncertified assistant constitutes a “wrongful[ ] tak[ing]” within the meaning of Penal Law § 155.05 (1), we note that “[c]onduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes” … .  People v Casiano, 2014 NY Slip Op 03362, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

May 9, 2015
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Animal Law, Negligence

Owner of Animal Which Strays Can Be Liable in Tort for Related Motorcycle Accident

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff’s complaint should not have been dismissed.  Plaintiff’s decedent was killed when his motorcycle struck a cow which had wandered off defendant’s land:

The Court [of Appeals has] held that “a landowner or the owner of an animal may be liable under ordinary tort-law principles when a farm animal—i.e., a domestic animal as that term is defined in Agriculture and Markets Law § 108 (7)—is negligently allowed to stray from the property on which the animal is kept” … . Sargent v Mammoser, 2014 NY Slip Op 03372, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

May 9, 2015
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Criminal Law

Sworn Allegations About the Conduct of a Juror in Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside the Verdict Were Sufficient to Require a Hearing About Whether a Substantial Right Had Been Prejudiced

The Fourth Department determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to set aside the verdict:

The sworn allegations in defendant’s moving papers, i.e., that he learned after the verdict was rendered that a juror who had allegedly been “holding out” contacted defendant’s aunt between the first and second days of deliberation and discussed the likelihood of a guilty verdict when the jury reconvened the following morning, “required a hearing on the issue whether the juror’s alleged misconduct prejudiced a substantial right of defendant” … . People v Tucker, 2014 NY Slip Op 03415, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

May 9, 2015
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Civil Procedure, Real Property Law

Attorney-in-Fact Used His Power to Create a Gift (by Deed) to Himself and/or Third Parties—Deed Declared Null and Void

The Fourth Department determined the deed purporting to transfer a life estate to the attorney-in-fact was null and void. Essentially, the attorney-in-fact used his power to make a gift to himself and/or third parties, which created an unrebutted presumption of impropriety:

It is well settled that “[a] power of attorney . . . is clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that power for the benefit of the principal” … . “The relationship of an attorney-in-fact to his principal is that of agent and principal . . . and, thus, the attorney-in-fact must act in the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward the principal, and must act in accordance with the highest principles of morality, fidelity, loyalty and fair dealing’ . . . Consistent with this duty, an agent may not make a gift to himself or a third party of the money or property which is the subject of the agency relationship” … . “In the event such a gift is made, there is created a presumption of impropriety [that can] be rebutted [only] with a clear showing that the principal intended to make the gift” …, or that the gift was in the principal’s best interest … . Borders v Borders, 2015 NY Slip Op 04022, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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Negligence, Products Liability

Injury While Trying to Pick Up a Fallen 3000 Pound Roll of Paper Was a Foreseeable Consequence of an Alleged Equipment Defect Which Caused the Roll to Fall

The Fourth Department determined the summary judgment motion of the defendants—manufacturers and modifiers of a pallet truck—was properly denied.  The complaint alleged the pallet truck and the roll cradle with which the pallet truck was modified were defective, causing a 3000 pound roll of paper to fall off the truck.  Plaintiff was severely injured while trying to lift the fallen roll.  The defendants’ arguments that any defects in the pallet truck and roll cradle were not the proximate cause of the injury, and the attempt to pick up the fallen roll was the superseding cause of the injuries, were rejected. The court determined the cause of the injury was within the class of foreseeable hazards associated with a fallen roll and the risk of the intervening act (lifting the fallen roll) was the same risk that renders the actor negligent:

“As a general rule, the question of proximate cause is to be decided by the finder of fact, aided by appropriate instructions” … . Where the cause of an accident is “within the class of foreseeable hazards that [a] duty exists to prevent, the [defendant] may be held liable, even though the harm may have been brought about in an unexpected way” … . We conclude that the hazard that caused plaintiff’s injury, i.e., the movement of the roll while it was being placed back in an upright position, was “within the class of foreseeable hazards” associated with a roll falling off the allegedly defective pallet truck …, and thus a jury “could rationally [find] that . . . there was a causal connection between [defendants’ alleged] negligence and plaintiff’s injuries” … . We thus reject the contention of defendants that the falling roll merely “furnished the occasion” for plaintiff’s accident.

We also reject the contention of defendants that the actions of plaintiff and his coworkers in attempting to upright the roll were a superseding cause of plaintiff’s injuries. “An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent” … . As noted above, the risk of the roll falling while being uprighted is the same risk underlying plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence, and we conclude that the actions of plaintiff and his coworkers were not “of such an extraordinary nature” as to relieve defendants of liability … . Ard v Thompson & Johnson Equip. Co., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 03985, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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Civil Procedure, Insurance Law, Privilege

Reports by Attorneys Which Relate to an Insurer’s Decision to Accept or Reject a Claim Are Discoverable—Reports by Attorneys Made After the Claim Is Rejected Are Not Discoverable

The Fourth Department determined the records generated by attorneys which related to an insurer’s decision whether to accept or reject a claim were discoverable as records made in the regular course of business—even if the records relate in part to potential litigation.  Records generated by attorneys after the claim was denied are privileged and not discoverable:

“It is well settled that [t]he payment or rejection of claims is a part of the regular business of an insurance company. Consequently, reports which aid it in the process of deciding which of the two indicated actions to pursue are made in the regular course of its business’ ” … . “Reports prepared by . . . attorneys before the decision is made to pay or reject a claim are thus not privileged and are discoverable . . . , even when those reports are mixed/multi-purpose’ reports, motivated in part by the potential for litigation with the insured” … . Here, the documents submitted to the court for in camera review constitute multi-purpose reports motivated in part by the potential for litigation with plaintiff, but also prepared in the regular course of defendant’s business in deciding whether to pay or reject plaintiff’s claim, and thus plaintiff is entitled to disclosure of those documents.  Lalka v Aca Ins. Co., 2015 NY Slip Op 03995, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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Insurance Law

Whether the Insurer Is Obligated to Indemnify the Driver Turns on Whether the Driver Acted Intentionally When His Vehicle Struck the Rear of Decedent’s Vehicle—-There Was a Question of Fact Whether the Incident Was an Accident or the Result of Intentional Conduct

The Fourth Department determined there was a question of fact whether the striking of decedent’s car from behind was intentional or accidental.  If the rear driver acted intentionally, his insurer had no duty to indemnify the rear driver. The court explained the terms “accidental” and “intentional” in this context:

“In deciding whether a loss is the result of an accident, it must be determined, from the point of view of the insured, whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen” … . We must look to the allegations of the complaint in the underlying action, but may also consider extrinsic facts … .

Insurable ” [a]ccidental results can flow from intentional acts’ ” … . On the other hand, “when the damages alleged in the [underlying] complaint are the intended result which flows directly and immediately from [the insured’s] intentional act, . . . there is no accident, and therefore, no coverage” … . “[M]ore than a causal connection between the intentional act and the resultant harm is required to prove that the harm was intended” … . The exclusion for an intentional injury, however, will apply where the injuries are ” inherent in the nature’ of the wrongful act”… . Kemper Independence Ins. Co. v Ellis, 2015 NY Slip Op 04011, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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Contempt, Family Law, Municipal Law

County Department of Human Services Was Entitled to a Hearing On Whether It Should Be Held In Contempt for Failing to Place a Person In Need of Supervision In Foster Care

The Fourth Department determined the County Department of Human Services should not have been held in contempt without a hearing for failing to return the respondent (a person in need of supervision) to foster care.  The Department had raised a defense, i.e., the Department had tried but was unable to place the respondent, and was therefore entitled to a hearing. Matter of Andrew B., 2015 NY Slip Op 03999, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Municipal Law

Ordinance Prohibiting “Unnecessary Noise” Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

The defendant was stopped by the police for a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting “unnecessary noise” (a loud car stereo).  The defendant argued that the stop, which resulted in drug charges, was not justified by probable cause because the “unnecessary noise” ordinance is “unconstitutionally vague.” The Fourth Department determined the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it is tailored to the context of what can be heard more than 50 feet from a vehicle on a public highway and is sufficiently definite to put defendant on notice his conduct was forbidden:

Municipal ordinances “enjoy an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality’ ” …, and such legislative enactments “are to be construed so as to avoid constitutional issues if such a construction is fairly possible”… . “The void-for-vagueness doctrine embodies a rough idea of fairness’ ” …, and “an impermissibly vague ordinance is a violation of the due process of law” … . In addressing such a challenge, courts first “must determine whether the statute in question is sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his [or her] contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute” … . “Second, the court must determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement”

* * * … [T]he City Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because the section under which defendant was convicted was tailored to a specific context—the creation of “unnecessary noise” beyond 50 feet of a motor vehicle on a public highway (City Ordinance § 40-16 [b]). In our view, “[w]hat is usual noise in the operation of a car [radio or other sound production device] has become common knowledge . . . and any ordinary motorist should have no difficulty in ascertaining” whether the noise in question violates the applicable standard … . Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the ordinance in question was “sufficiently definite” to put defendant on notice that his conduct was forbidden, and that it provided the police “with clear standards for enforcement” … . People v Stephens, 2015 NY Slip Op 03991, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

May 8, 2015
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