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Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

Arbitration, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

Arbitrator’s Misapplication of Law Is Not Reviewable by a Court

In affirming the denial of an application to vacate an arbitrator’s award (in which petitioners were found to have wrongfully removed trees), the Fourth Department noted that the misapplication of law by an arbitrator is not reviewable by a court:

We reject, however, petitioners’ contention that the arbitrator’s alleged misapplication of RPAPL 861 is a sufficient ground to vacate the award in its entirety. “An arbitrator’s resolution of questions of substantive law or fact is not judicially reviewable” … . Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the arbitrator misapplied RPAPL 861, we conclude that such error is beyond our review. Matter of Svenson v Swegan, 2015 NY Slip Op 08525, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

November 20, 2015
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Criteria for a Warrantless Blood Swab

In affirming defendant’s murder conviction, the Fourth Department noted that a swab of a blood stain on defendant’s body was properly taken without a warrant. The DNA in the swab matched the victim’s. The court explained the criteria for a warrantless swab:

Defendant agreed to give his clothing to the police and, when he removed his shirt, an officer noticed a reddish brown stain on defendant’s chest that appeared to be blood. When asked what it was, defendant responded that it was a bruise. The officer swabbed the area, which later tested positive for blood and matched the victim’s DNA. Where, as here, the police did not obtain a warrant for the seizure of the blood evidence, “the police had to satisfy two requirements in order to justify the action taken. First, the police had to have reasonable cause to believe the [blood stain] constituted evidence, or tended to demonstrate that an offense had been committed, or, that a particular person participated in the commission of an offense . . . Second, there had to have been an exigent circumstance of sufficient magnitude to justify immediate seizure without resort to a warrant” … . We agree with the court that the police had reasonable cause to believe that the blood stain on defendant’s chest constituted evidence, and that the seizure was appropriate because it could have been easily destroyed by defendant … . People v Johnson, 2015 NY Slip Op 08540, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

November 20, 2015
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Erroneous Admission of Evidence of Specific Prior Crimes and Bad Acts Required Reversal

The Fourth Department determined evidence of prior crimes and bad acts on the part of the defendant (which took place just prior to defendant’s arrest) were properly admitted to provide background information explaining the actions taken by the police. But other evidence of defendant’s prior crimes and bad acts should not have been admitted and the errors warranted a new trial:

… [A]lthough the court properly permitted the People to present evidence of the fact that he was on parole at the time of his arrest, the court erred in permitting the People to detail that he was on parole for a conviction of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. The specific crime of which defendant was convicted does not constitute necessary background information, and it does not fit within any other recognized exception to the Molineux rule, i.e., motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake, or common plan or scheme … .

… [T]he court erred in ruling that defense counsel [in cross-examining a police officer] opened the door to the admission of additional evidence of uncharged crimes and prior bad acts that the court had initially precluded by an earlier determination. * * *

…[D]efense counsel did not challenge on cross-examination the officer’s credibility on the issue whether such prior interactions with defendant took place, thereby permitting the officer to fully explain the nature of the interactions… . People v Dowdell, 2015 NY Slip Op 08567, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

November 20, 2015
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Administrative Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law

New Relicensing Regulations Can Be Applied Retroactively (Re: Alcohol-Related Driving Convictions)

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles had the power to retroactively apply regulations re: the relicensing of persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions:

… [T]here is no merit to petitioner’s contention that the Commissioner erred in retroactively applying the amended regulations to his application … . “[P]etitioner’s driver’s license is not generally viewed as a vested right, but merely a personal privilege subject to reasonable restrictions and revocation by [the Commissioner] under her discretionary powers . . . Thus, [the Commissioner] remained free to apply her most recent regulations when exercising her discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny petitioner’s application for relicensing. This is especially so in light of the rational, seven-month moratorium placed on all similarly-situated applicants for relicensing— i.e., persons with three or more alcohol-related driving convictions” … . Matter of Underwood v Fiala, 2015 NY Slip Op 08545, 4th Dept 11-20-15

 

November 20, 2015
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Civil Procedure, Municipal Law

Supreme Court Should Not Have Deemed a Verified Claim to Be a Summons and Complaint Under the Authority of CPLR 2001 (Allowing Correction of Mistakes in the Method of Filing)

Reversing Supreme Court, the Fourth Department determined that a verified claim filed by the plaintiff should not have been deemed a summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 2001 (which allows correction or clarification of a mistake in the method of filing):

Plaintiff filed a verified claim in this action and, before answering, defendant filed a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiff had “yet to file a Summons or a Complaint” and that “a complete failure to file is a jurisdictional defect.” Relying upon CPLR 2001, Supreme Court deemed the claim to be a complaint and excused the failure to file a summons as “an irregularity that shall be disregarded in this case.” That was error. We agree with defendant that CPLR 2001 does not permit a court to disregard the complete failure to file a summons, i.e., an initial paper necessary to commence an action … . As recognized by the Court of Appeals in quoting from the Senate Introducer’s Memorandum in support of the bill that amended CPLR 2001, the statute may be invoked as a basis to correct or clarify ” a mistake in the method of filing, AS OPPOSED TO A MISTAKE IN WHAT IS FILED’ “… . Fox v City of Utica, 2015 NY Slip Op 08267, 4th Dept 11-13-15

 

November 13, 2015
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Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)

State’s Violation of Inmate Disciplinary-Hearing Due Process Rules Did Not Entitle Inmate to Summary Judgment In His Unlawful Confinement Action

The Fourth Department determined the 3rd Department’s finding that the state violated inmate disciplinary-hearing (due process) rules did not entitle the inmate to summary judgment in his unlawful confinement action. The 3rd Department annulled the inmate’s disciplinary determination based upon the state’s (due process) rule violations. The inmate then sued the state for unlawful confinement (apparently based upon the discipline imposed by the annulled determination). The Fourth Department found that the state’s rule violation merely removed the state’s absolute immunity, allowing the unlawful confinement action to go forward. However, the inmate must prove all the elements of unlawful confinement to prevail. A question of fact remained on the “privilege” element:

It is well settled that, where, as here, the actions of correction personnel have violated the due process safeguards contained in 7 NYCRR parts 252 through 254, those actions “[will] not receive immunity” … . Contrary to claimant’s contention, however, the absence of an immunity defense does not entitle claimant to partial summary judgment on liability on his unlawful confinement cause of action. As defendant correctly contends, the “removal of immunity . . . does not result in absolute liability to defendant because claimant is still required to prove the merits of his claim” … . “Where, as here, a prison inmate contends that he was wrongfully confined as a result of the flawed prison disciplinary proceeding, once the absolute immunity is removed by showing that the governing rules and regulations were not followed, he [or she] may recover damages if he [or she] is able to prove the traditional elements of the tort of [unlawful confinement]: (1) that the confinement was intentional; (2) that Claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) that Claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) that the confinement was not otherwise privileged” … . “In other words, not every violation of the rules and regulations governing the imposition of prison discipline will result in liability on the part of the State; the rule violations merely remove the cloak of absolute immunity and make the State potentially liable, if liability would be imposed under common law tort principles” … .

Here, there is no dispute concerning the first three elements of the unlawful confinement cause of action, and the dispositive issue is whether claimant established as a matter of law that the confinement was not otherwise privileged. He did not. Moustakos v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 08318, 4th Dept 11-13-15

 

November 13, 2015
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Possession of Modest Amount of Drugs Is Not Sufficient to Make Out a Prima Facie Case of an Intent to Sell

The Fourth Department determined the defendant’s possession of less than an ounce of drugs was not sufficient to make out a prima facie case of defendant’s intent to sell:

We reject the People’s contention that the evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case that defendant possessed the cocaine with the intent to sell it. Although “defendant’s possession of a substantial’ quantity of drugs can be cited as circumstantial proof of an intent to sell . . . , it cannot be said as a matter of law that the quantity of uncut and unpackaged drugs possessed in this case permitted an inference that defendant intended to sell them. More than mere possession of a modest quantity of drugs, not packaged for sale and unaccompanied by any other saleslike conduct, must be present for such an inference to arise” … .Consequently, the court properly concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant possessed a controlled substance with intent to sell it … . People v Nellons, 2015 NY Slip Op 08305, 4th Dept 11-13-15

 

November 13, 2015
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Criminal Law

Probationers Do Not Lose All Privacy and Fourth Amendment Rights; Condition that Probationer Waive His Fourth Amendment Rights and Consent to the Search of His Home Struck

The Fourth Department determined the condition of probation requiring the probationer to consent to the search of his home, which was not part of the plea agreement, was not enforceable. A probationer does not lose all Fourth Amendment protections:

We agree with defendant … that the waiver of the right to appeal does not encompass his challenge to the condition of probation that required him to sign a consent to waive his Fourth Amendment rights against a search of his home on the ground that it is related to defendant’s “drug/alcohol abuse,” inasmuch as that condition was not part of the plea agreement … . We also agree with defendant that the condition does not relate to “the probationary goal of rehabilitation” and thus is not enforceable on that ground … . Indeed, the presentence report indicated that the 51-year-old defendant, a first-time offender, does not have a history of drug or alcohol abuse and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense. It is well established that “a probationer’s home is protected by the constitutional requirement that searches be reasonable . . . [A] probationer loses some privacy expectations and some part of the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but not all of both” … . We therefore modify the judgment by striking as a condition of probation the requirement that defendant consent to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights against a search of his home. People v Mead, 2015 NY Slip Op 08304, 4th Dept 11-13-15

 

November 13, 2015
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Pedigree Question “Where Do You Reside,” Under the Circumstances, Was Designed to Elicit an Incriminating Response, the Answer, Therefore, Should Have Been Suppressed; New Trial on Possessory Counts Ordered

The Fourth Department ordered a new trial on the drug possession and drug paraphernalia counts. Defendant was convicted based upon a “constructive possession” theory (i.e., possession of contraband based upon defendant’s dominion and control over the premises where the contraband is found). As police officers were conducting a search, and as defendant was handcuffed and lying on the floor, an officer asked defendant where he resided. Defendant answered “here.” The People relied heavily on defendant’s answer to prove constructive possession of contraband found on the premises. Under these circumstances, the pedigree question (where do you reside) was designed to elicit an incriminating response and, because the statement was “unwarned,” the answer should have been suppressed:

Generally, a defendant’s answer concerning his address, when “elicited through routine administrative questioning that [is] not designed to elicit an incriminating response” … , will be considered pedigree information not subject to CPL 710.30 notice requirements even if the statement later proves to be inculpatory … . That is “[b]ecause responses to routine booking questions—pedigree questions . . . —are not suppressible even when obtained in violation of Miranda [and, therefore, a] defendant lacks a constitutional basis upon which to challenge the voluntariness of his [or her] statement” … . “[W]here there is no question of voluntariness, the People are not required to serve defendant with notice” … .

As the Court of Appeals recognized, however, “the People may not rely on the pedigree exception if the questions, though facially appropriate, are likely to elicit incriminating admissions because of the circumstances of the particular case” (id.). Although the question concerning defendant’s address appears to have been a facially appropriate question, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case and, more specifically, under the circumstances in which the question was asked, the question was likely to elicit an incriminating admission and had a “necessary connection to an essential element of [the possessory] crimes charged” under Penal Law §§ 220.16 and 220.50 (2) … . We agree with defendant that the error in admitting that statement cannot be considered harmless insofar as it relates to the possessory counts of the indictment inasmuch as the People relied heavily on that statement to establish defendant’s constructive possession of the drugs and drug paraphernalia … . People v Slade, 2015 NY Slip Op 08252, 4th Dept 11-13-15

 

November 13, 2015
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Criminal Law

Failure to Warn Defendant that Failure to Appear Would Result in a Harsher Sentence Required Vacation of the Harsher Sentence

The Fourth Department vacated defendant’s enhanced sentence because defendant was not warned that his failure to appear at sentencing would result in a harsher sentence. The matter was remitted for imposition of the bargained-for sentence or the opportunity to withdraw the plea:

“Although defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review by objecting to the enhanced sentence or by moving to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction …, we nevertheless exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice” … . We agree with defendant that the court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence inasmuch as it did not advise defendant at the time of his plea that “a harsher sentence than he bargained for could be imposed if [he] failed to appear at sentencing” … . We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the sentence, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to impose the promised sentence or to afford defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea … . People v Donald, 2015 NY Slip Op 07399, 4th Dept 10-9-15

 

October 9, 2015
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