You are here: / Fourth Department

Tag Archive for: Fourth Department

RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED.

The Fourth Department determined a mode of proceedings error required reversal of a murder conviction. The record was silent about whether defense counsel was apprised of the contents of a jury note requesting further instruction:

… [A] mode of proceedings error occurred and reversal is required because the record fails to show that defense counsel was advised of the contents of a jury note requesting, inter alia, further instruction on reasonable doubt, murder in the second degree and manslaughter in the first degree … . Moreover, because the record does not establish that the court advised defense counsel of the contents of the note, we cannot assume that the court complied with its core responsibilities pursuant to CPL 310.30 and People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270) … . People v Owens, 2016 NY Slip Op 07431, 4th Dept 11-10-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)/JURY NOTE (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)/MODE OF PROCEEDINGS ERROR (RECORD SILENT ON WHETHER DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS APPRISED OF A JURY NOTE, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED)

UNDER THE DEALER ACT, GENERAL MOTORS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP OF GM’S APPROVAL OF THE RELOCATION OF ANOTHER CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN THE SAME AREA.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, determined defendant General Motors (GM) did not violate the Dealer Act (Vehicle and Traffic Law 463(2)(ff)(1)) by failing to notify plaintiff Chevrolet dealership of GM’s approval of the relocation of another Chevrolet dealership to an area about four miles from plaintiff’s dealership. The opinion focuses on statutory interpretation principles, the terms of the plaintiff’s dealership agreement with GM, and the application of federal and Michigan law:

We reject plaintiff’s contention that GM’s approval of Sharon’s relocation request ipso facto results in a modification of plaintiff’s franchise for which notice may be required under section 463 (2) (ff) (1). To construe section 463 (2) (ff) (1) to require notice to a dealer when a franchisor approves a relocation request of another dealer would essentially render section 463 (2) (cc) (1), which requires notice to certain dealers of relocations of other dealers, superfluous. It is well settled that “[a] court must consider a statute as a whole, reading and construing all parts of an act together to determine legislative intent . . . , and, where possible, should harmonize[] [all parts of a statute] with each other . . . and [give] effect and meaning . . . to the entire statute and every part and word thereof’ “… . Courts should construe a statute “to avoid rendering any of its language superfluous” … . Van Wie Chevrolet, Inc. v General Motors, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 06583, 4th Dept 10-7-16

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (DEALER ACT, UNDER THE DEALER ACT, GENERAL MOTORS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP OF GM’S APPROVAL OF THE RELOCATION OF ANOTHER CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN THE SAME AREA)/DEALER ACT (DEALER ACT, UNDER THE DEALER ACT, GENERAL MOTORS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP OF GM’S APPROVAL OF THE RELOCATION OF ANOTHER CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN THE SAME AREA)

,

APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES.

The Fourth Department determined claimant’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim should not have been granted. Apparently plaintiff’s daughter was injured by a student from defendant school district who was subject to an order of protection requiring the student to stay away from the school attended by claimant’s daughter. Although claimant demonstrated defendant had timely knowledge of the order of protection but not demonstrate the defendant had timely knowledge of any injuries resulting from the violation of the order:

 

Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting claimant’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) approximately one year after the incident in which her daughter was injured occurred. “It is well settled that key factors for the court to consider in determining an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim are whether the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining a defense on the merits” … . “While the presence or absence of any single factor is not determinative, one factor that should be accorded great weight is whether the [municipality] received actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim in a timely manner” … . It is well established that “[k]nowledge of the injuries or damages claimed . .. , rather than mere notice of the underlying occurrence, is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the meaning of General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” … , and the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the respondent had actual timely knowledge … . Matter of Turlington v Brockport Cent. Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 06572, 4th Dept 10-7-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)/MUNICIPAL LAW (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (APPLICATION TO FILE LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED. NO SHOWING OF DEFENDANT’S TIMELY AWARENESS OF THE INJURIES)

LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined a lawsuit brought by a charter school network and students (infant plaintiffs), alleging deficient funding for charter-school facilities violated the Education Article and equal protection, should have been dismissed in its entirety. Although the network was deemed to have the capacity to sue under the Education Article, it did not have standing to sue because the article protects students not schools. The infant plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Education Article was deficient because it did not plead a district-wide funding problem. The disparity in facilities funding between charter and public schools was deemed to have a rational basis. The “disparate impact” cause of action failed to allege discriminatory intent.  Brown v State of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06566, 4th Dept 10-7-16

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY)/CHARTER SCHOOLS (LAWSUIT ALLEGING CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT FUNDING FOR CHARTER SCHOOL FACILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY)

,

CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s sexual abuse conviction, which was based solely on defendant’s confession, was against the weight of the evidence:

CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of such a confession: “A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” Here, there is no such corroboration. The People assert that defendant’s confession “was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the child victim and her numerous hearsay disclosures solicited by the defense.” The record does not support that assertion, however, inasmuch as the victim never testified that she touched defendant’s penis with her hand, and there is no other evidence—hearsay or otherwise—independent of defendant’s confession to support defendant’s conviction of sexual abuse. Although it is well settled that “additional proof need not corroborate every detail of the confession,’ ” we conclude that defendant’s conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree was “based solely on [defendant’s] uncorroborated [confession]” … . Since there was “no corroborating proof of whatever weight,’ [count two of the indictment] must be dismissed” … . People v Maynard, 2016 NY Slip Op 06573, 4th Dept 10-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE)/CONFESSIONS (CONVICTION BASED SOLELY ON DEFENDANT’S CONFESSION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

, ,

DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE.

The Fourth Department reversed defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct to which defense counsel did not object. The prosecutor grossly exaggerated the nature and importance of DNA evidence found on a weapon. Defense counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance:

At trial, the People presented testimony of a forensic expert to discuss DNA evidence collected from the gun, but the testimony was not conclusive. The expert testified that she analyzed the DNA mixture and determined that defendant was among 1 in 15 Americans who could not be excluded as a contributor. Nevertheless, on summation, the prosecutor grossly exaggerated the DNA evidence as “overwhelming” proof establishing defendant’s “guilt beyond all doubt” and posited: “If the defendant had not possessed the gun, wouldn’t science have excluded him?” In our view, the prosecutor’s flagrant distortion of the DNA evidence caused defendant such substantial prejudice that he was denied due process of law, particularly in light of the circumstantial nature of the People’s case … . In light of the foregoing, we agree with defendant’s related contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel owing to defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct during summation … . People v Rozier, 2016 NY Slip Op 06577, 4th Dept 10-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DNA, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)/PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)/DNA (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTOR’S EXAGGERATING THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF DNA EVIDENCE)

, ,

STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS.

The Fourth Department, reversing the Court of Claims, determined the Court of Claims did not have the power to order the state to pay for liability insurance to allow claimant’s expert to test soil and water for contamination by highway deicing agents. Under the Court of Claims Act, the state cannot be required to pay fees for claimant’s witnesses:

In this real property tort action, claimants assert that deicing agents have run off of the Thruway and onto their farm located adjacent to the Thruway, thereby contaminating the soil and water. In order to prove their claim, claimants sought to inspect, test, and sample the Thruway shoulder and median adjacent to their farm. The testing would include, among other things, air, soil, and water testing and would involve “six visits to the site during the winter and early spring.” Claimants located a professor who agreed to perform the testing as their expert in exchange for permission to use the tests in his research and teaching; however, neither claimants nor the professor could afford the liability insurance routinely required by defendant in connection with inspections performed on its property.

Defendant moved for a protective order “requiring [c]laimants to provide satisfactory liability insurance in connection with proposed testing.” The Court of Claims issued an order stating, inter alia, that “[d]efendant shall be required to obtain or pay the costs of the insurance necessary to cover the anticipated testing activities” and that “the amount of insurance necessary shall be as determined by [d]efendant.” * * *

Under Court of Claims Act § 27, “costs, witnesses’ fees and disbursements shall not be taxed . . . by the court to any party.” Frederick v New York State Thruway Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 06585, 4th Dept 10-7-16

COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS, STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS)/REAL PROPERTY (STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS)/HIGHWAYS (STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS)/DEICING AGENTS  (STATE CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR CLAIMANT’S EXPERT RE: TESTING FOR CONTAMINATION BY HIGHWAY DEICING AGENTS)

,

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT.

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court should have sanctioned plaintiff for disregarding a court order and submitted a materially false affidavit:

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (a), a court may award to any party fees and costs resulting from frivolous conduct, i.e., conduct that is “completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; . . . [or that is] undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or . . . asserts material factual statements that are false” (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]). Factors to consider in determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous include “the circumstances under which the conduct took place,” and whether “the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party” (id.).

Here, plaintiff’s conduct was clearly frivolous inasmuch as she submitted an affidavit that disregarded a court order and, in response to a second order, she submitted a second affidavit that contained a material falsehood. When that conduct is viewed along with plaintiff’s failure to comply with discovery demands and other orders, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to sanction plaintiff. Place v Chaffee-Sardinia Volunteer Fire Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 06588, 4th Dept 10-7-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)/FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)/SANCTIONS (PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR DISREGARDING A COURT ORDER AND SUBMISSION OF A MATERIALLY FALSE AFFIDAVIT)

,

DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS.

The Fourth Department determined defendant was entitled to a hearing on her motion to vacate her conviction on ineffective assistance grounds. Defendant testified her husband’s neck was cut in a struggle for the knife her husband had used to attack her. The People apparently argued defendant’s wounds were self-inflicted. There was evidence of a wound behind defendant’s left armpit which could not have been self-inflicted. The Fourth Department held that defense counsel’s failure to show the jury the wound, failure to engage an expert concerning the wound, failure to examine defendant’s clothing and failure to show the clothing to the jury could amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because such evidence would demonstrate the wound behind the armpit was not surgical in origin (as was argued at trial). A hearing, therefore, should have been held:

Defendant … submitted an affirmation from her appellate counsel, who examined the shirts and asserted that, contrary to the testimony of the … prosecution witness, the holes in the shirts matched precisely the location of defendant’s alleged stab wound behind her left armpit. At oral argument of the motion, appellate counsel urged the court to examine the garments before ruling on the motion. The court declined to do so and denied defendant’s motion without a hearing.

We conclude that, if, as appellate counsel asserts, there are holes in the shirts defendant was wearing at the time of the altercation matching the wound behind her left armpit, in the absence of some strategic explanation, the failure of defendant’s trial attorney to examine that clothing, coupled with his failure to call a medical expert to discuss the wound and to show the wound to the jury, would have been so ” egregious and prejudicial’ ” as to deprive defendant of a fair trial … . Because defendant’s “submissions [thus] tend[ ] to substantiate all the essential facts’ necessary to support [her] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel” … , we conclude that the court should have held a hearing on the motion … . People v Smith, 2016 NY Slip Op 06565, 4th Dept 10-7-16

 

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS)/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS)/VACATE CONVICTION, MOTION TO (DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION,DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS)

STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRAND JURY PRESENTATION STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED, CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY DEFENDANT OF THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE PRESENTATION.

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the People’s notice to defendant about the time and place the grand jury presentation would take place was deficient. The prosecutor told defense counsel the presentation would take place the next day:

Here, we conclude that, after receiving defendant’s March 1, 2013 request to appear before the grand jury, the People did not provide defendant with notice “of the time and place of the grand jury presentation” … , as is required by CPL 190.50 (5) (b), and we therefore reverse. We note that, on March 25, 2013, the People sent a letter to defense counsel stating that, “during the week of April 8, 2013, the Erie County Grand Jury will hear testimony concerning this matter. In accordance with CPL 190.50, should your client wish to testify, please clearly state so, in writing, no later than April 5, 2013, so that I can make the necessary arrangements to receive his testimony.” Although that letter would have been sufficient to satisfy the initial and separate requirement set forth in CPL 190.50 (5) (a) that the People notify defendant of his right to appear before the grand jury … , the letter did not satisfy the requirements of CPL 190.50 (5) (b) to inform defendant of the time and place of the grand jury presentation, which were triggered by defendant’s March 1, 2013 request to appear before the grand jury. It is of no moment that defendant did not respond to the People’s letter because nothing in CPL 190.50 requires a defendant to resubmit a valid notice pursuant to CPL 190.50 (5) (a) when he has already done so. We further note that the prosecutor’s oral statement to defense counsel on April 10, 2013 that “he will be presenting the matter to the Erie County Grand Jury the next day” was insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement inasmuch as it did not provide defendant with the requisite notice of the time and place of the grand jury presentation … . People v Moss, 2016 NY Slip Op 06587, 4th Dept 10-7-16

CRIMINAL LAW (STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRAND JURY PRESENTATION STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED, CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY DEFENDANT OF THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE PRESENTATION)/GRAND JURY (STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRAND JURY PRESENTATION STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED, CONVICTION REVERSED FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY DEFENDANT OF THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE PRESENTATION)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy