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PLANNING BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S CHALLENGE TO A WOODLOT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OVERLAY DISTRICT (EPOD) FINDING, PLANNING BOARD DID NOT CONSIDER THE CRITERIA LAID OUT IN THE TOWN CODE.

The Fourth Department determined the respondent town planning board acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied petitioner’s challenge to the finding his property was within the boundaries of a woodlot environmental protection overlay district (EPOD). The Fourth Department held that the respondent was obligated to consider the EPOD criteria laid out in the Town Code and failed to do so:

Petitioner owns property located within a Woodlot Overlay Protection District in the Town of Irondequoit, as set forth on the Woodlots Map of the Town of Irondequoit. Irondequoit Town Code (Town Code) § 235-43 provides that the locations and boundaries of an environmental protection overlay district (EPOD) shall be delineated on the official set of maps, but further states that those maps “shall be used for reference purposes only and shall not be used to delineate specific or exact boundaries of the various overlay districts. Field investigations and/or other environmental analyses may be required in order to determine whether or not a particular piece of property is included within one or more of the overlay districts.” Section 235-44 then provides that the “Town Department of Planning and Zoning shall be responsible for interpreting [EPOD] boundaries based on an interpretation of the Official Town of Irondequoit EPOD Maps, as well as the use of various criteria set forth in this article for determining such district boundaries.” For a Woodlot EPOD, those criteria are set forth at section 235-53 (B) of the Town Code and include, inter alia, that the property have “communities” of certain species of trees. Finally, section 235-44 provides that “[a]ppeals from a determination of the Town Department of Planning and Zoning regarding boundaries of overlay districts shall be made to the Town Planning Board in accordance with the public hearing procedures.” * * *

We conclude that petitioner stated a claim that respondent acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the appeal because the criteria set forth in Town Code § 235-53 (B) were not considered by respondent. Based on Town Code §§ 235-43 and 235-44, respondent is responsible for interpreting the boundary of the particular Woodlot EPOD encompassing petitioner’s property, based on the criteria set forth in Town Code … . Matter of Gilbert v Planning Bd. of Town of Irondequoit, 2017 NY Slip Op 02210, 4th Dept 3-24-17

 

ZONING (PLANNING BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S CHALLENGE TO A WOODLOT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OVERLAY DISTRICT (EPOD) FINDING, PLANNING BOARD DID NOT CONSIDER THE CRITERIA LAID OUT IN THE TOWN CODE)/ENVIROMENTAL LAW (ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OVERLAY DISTRICT, (PLANNING BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S CHALLENGE TO A WOODLOT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OVERLAY DISTRICT (EPOD) FINDING, PLANNING BOARD DID NOT CONSIDER THE CRITERIA LAID OUT IN THE TOWN CODE)/PLANNIG BOARD (PLANNING BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S CHALLENGE TO A WOODLOT ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OVERLAY DISTRICT (EPOD) FINDING, PLANNING BOARD DID NOT CONSIDER THE CRITERIA LAID OUT IN THE TOWN CODE)

FIBER OPTIC CABLES NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined fiber optic cables were not included in the statutory definition of real property and therefore were not taxable under the Real Property Tax Law (RPTL). However, because the fiber optic company paid the taxes voluntarily and without protest, it was not entitled to a refund:

The word distribution means “a spreading out or scattering over an area or throughout a space” or “delivery or conveyance (as of newspapers or goods) to the members of a group” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary [2002]). Examples include “the distribution of the oil throughout the engine parts” and “the distribution of telephone directories to customers” (id.). In other words, distribution implies an “apportioning of something” more or less evenly, or as a due or right, to an “appropriate person or place” … . Given the context in which the word distribution appears in RPTL 102 (12) (f), that definition makes sense. Undoubtedly, the kinds of equipment enumerated in the statute, such as boilers, plumbing, and lighting apparatus, distribute heat, liquids, and light to consumers. By contrast, although “the fiber optic cables at issue undeniably transmit light signals from one end of the network to the other, such transmission does not result in the distribution’ of light, but rather data” … . Thus, we cannot conclude that petitioner’s fiber optic installations distribute light ” without resorting to an artificial or forced construction’ ” … . Matter of Level 3 Communications, LLC v Chautauqua County, 2017 NY Slip Op 02322, 4th Dept 3-24-17

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (FIBER OPTIC CABLES NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW)/TAX LAW (FIBER OPTIC CABLES NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW)/FIBER OPTIC CABLES (FIBER OPTIC CABLES NOT TAXABLE UNDER THE REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW)

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DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LEAD-PAINT CONDITION, DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO TEST FOR LEAD, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Fourth Department determined the lead paint poisoning complaint should have been dismissed because plaintiff was unable to show defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition and defendants were not under a duty to test for lead:

Defendants submitted affidavits and deposition testimony establishing that they were not aware of any peeling or chipping paint on the premises prior to the inspection conducted by the [Monroe County Department of Health]. Defendants also established that neither plaintiff nor the relatives with whom plaintiff resided at the premises ever complained to either defendant of any peeling or chipping paint on the premises. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, he failed to raise an issue of fact whether defendants were aware of chipping and peeling paint on the premises … , or whether defendants retained the requisite right of entry to the apartment to sustain a claim for constructive notice … . Furthermore, “[w]ithout evidence legally sufficient to permit a jury to rationally infer that the defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition, the defendant cannot be held liable for failure to warn or to remedy the defect” … . Consequently, absent evidence raising a triable issue of fact whether defendants had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises, the court erred in denying that part of the motion seeking dismissal of the failure to warn claim. …

“The Court of Appeals in Chapman (97 NY2d at 21) expressly decline[d] to impose a new duty on landlords to test for the existence of lead in leased properties based solely upon the general knowledge of the dangers of lead-based paints in older homes” … . Taggart v Fandel, 2017 NY Slip Op 02177, 4th Dept 3-24-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (LEAD PAINT, DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LEAD-PAINT CONDITION, DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO TEST FOR LEAD, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/LEAD PAINT (DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LEAD-PAINT CONDITION, DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO TEST FOR LEAD, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

FINE BELOW THE MINIMUM STATUTORY AMOUNT WAS ILLEGAL AND WAS THEREFORE VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the $1500 fine imposed in connection with a DWI was illegal because the statute required a minimum fine of $2000.00. The court determined no fine should be imposed. The dissent agreed the fine was illegal but argued the matter should be remitted:

As the People correctly concede, however, the court erred in imposing a $1,500 fine. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (c) (ii) provides that a person convicted of driving while intoxicated as a class D felony “shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars or by a period of imprisonment as provided in the penal law, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” The court therefore had the authority to impose a fine and a sentence of imprisonment, but was required to impose a minimum fine of $2,000 if it chose to impose any fine. We cannot allow the $1,500 illegal fine to stand … and, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, we conclude that no fine should be imposed. We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the fine. People v Neal, 2017 NY Slip Op 02320, 4th Dept 3-24-17

CRIMINAL LAW (FINE BELOW THE MINIMUM STATUTORY AMOUNT WAS ILLEGAL AND WAS THEREFORE VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION)/FINES (CRIMINAL LAW, FINE BELOW THE MINIMUM STATUTORY AMOUNT WAS ILLEGAL AND WAS THEREFORE VACATED BY THE APPELLATE DIVISION)

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LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS.

The Fourth Department determined the application for leave to file a late notice of claim was properly granted, despite the absence of an adequate excuse and the lack of timely notice of the underlying facts:

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that claimants failed to provide a reasonable excuse for their delay, we conclude that the remaining factors support the court’s exercise of discretion in granting their application. Although respondents did not obtain knowledge of the facts underlying the claim until approximately nine months after the expiration of the 90-day period, we conclude under the circumstances of this case that “this was a reasonable time, particularly in light of the fact that respondent[s] do[ ] not contend that there has been any subsequent change in the condition of the [premises] which might hinder the investigation or defense of this action’ ” … . Moreover, claimants made a sufficient showing that the late notice will not substantially prejudice respondents, and respondents failed to “respond with a particularized evidentiary showing that [they] will be substantially prejudiced if the late notice is allowed” … . We therefore conclude that the court “properly exercised its broad discretion in granting [claimants’] application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5)” … . Matter of Diegelman v City of Buffalo, 2017 NY Slip Op 02316, 4th Dept 3-24-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY ALLOWED DESPITE ABSENCE OF REASONABLE EXCUSE AND LACK OF TIMELY NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING FACTS)

CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES.

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Curran, in a matter of first impression, determined the Citizen Review Board of Syracuse (CRB) had the capacity to sue and had standing to bring Article 78/declaratory judgment proceedings against the Syracuse Police Department seeking compliance with the citizen review procedures:

Here, the CRB’s enabling legislation provides that it was formed to “establish an open citizen-controlled process for reviewing grievances involving members of the Syracuse Police Department” and that “citizen complaints regarding members of the Syracuse Police Department shall be heard and reviewed fairly and impartially by the review board.” Further, the CRB is required by the ordinance to report and publish the number of cases in which sanctions were imposed. Inasmuch as the CRB cannot perform its legislative mandate without the Chief of Police’s compliance with the corresponding legislative mandate that he “advise the [CRB] in writing as to what type of actions or sanctions were imposed, and the reasons if none were imposed,” we conclude that the CRB has sustained a sufficiently particularized injury that falls squarely within the zone of interests set forth in the ordinance … . Matter of Citizen Review Bd. of The City of Syracuse v Syracuse Police Dept., 2017 NY Slip Op 02181, 4th Dept 3-24-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)/POLICE (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)/CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD (CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD HAS THE CAPACITY TO SUE AND STANDING TO BRING AN ARTICLE 78-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION SEEKING THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH POLICE-ACTION-REVIEW PROCEDURES)

FALL FROM FIRST FLOOR TO BASEMENT FLOOR IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), THE UNGUARDED OPENING VIOLATED A PROVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE.

The Fourth Department, overruling precedent, determined a fall from the first floor through an unguarded opening to the basement floor was a covered event under Labor Law 240 (1) and the unguarded opening violated a provision of the Industrial Code.  The decision covers a number of other substantive issues (not summarized here) including statutory agent liability, Labor Law 200 and common law negligence liability, and indemnfication:

We agree with plaintiffs that the court erred in denying that part of their motion seeking partial summary judgment on liability on their Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and in granting, instead, those parts of the motion of Gates and cross motion of Nolan seeking dismissal of that claim against them. We therefore further modify the order by denying those parts of the motion and cross motion, reinstating that claim, and granting that part of plaintiffs’ motion. As a preliminary matter, we note that the court relied on our decision in Riley v Stickl Constr. Co. (242 AD2d 936) for its determination that a fall from the first floor through an unguarded opening to the basement is not a fall from an elevated worksite within the meaning of section 240 (1). To the extent that Riley stands for the proposition that a worker falling from the first floor to the basement is not protected by section 240 (1), that decision is no longer to be followed. Instead, we conclude that, because there was a “difference between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level” … , and “[b]ecause plaintiff fell through an opening in the floor, [plaintiffs are] entitled to judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240 (1)”… .

We further conclude that the court erred in denying that part of plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment on the limited issue whether 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (b) (1) was violated, and we therefore further modify the order accordingly. That regulation, which is sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6) … , requires protection from hazardous openings. It is undisputed that the protective railings and the plywood cover had been removed from the stairwell opening and that plaintiff fell through the opening to the floor below. McKay v Weeden, 2017 NY Slip Op 02327, 4th Dept 3-24-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FALL FROM FIRST FLOOR TO BASEMENT FLOOR IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), THE UNGUARDED OPENING VIOLATED A PROVISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE)

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether plaintiff’s fall was caused by the placement of the scaffold or the absence of railings on the scaffold:

We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law under that statute. Specifically, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether the scaffold failed to provide proper protection because it was not properly placed, thereby precipitating plaintiff’s fall, or ” whether plaintiff simply lost his balance and fell’ ” when his head struck the beam … . Plaintiff likewise failed to establish as a matter of law that the lack of safety railings on the scaffold, as required by 12 NYCRR 23-5.18 (b) … , is a sufficient basis for a determination of liability under section 240 (1) that the scaffold failed to provide plaintiff proper protection. Rather, we conclude that there is an issue of fact whether the presence of rails would have prevented his fall … . Kopasz v City of Buffalo, 2017 NY Slip Op 02305, 4th Dept 3-24-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS)/SCAFFOLDS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS)

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SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED.

The Fourth Department determined the language in the SORA guideline which allows a juvenile delinquency adjudication to be used to calculate points in the criminal history category should not be followed because it conflicts with provisions of the Family Court Act:

The risk assessment guidelines issued by the Board provide that a juvenile delinquency adjudication is considered a crime for purposes of assessing points under the criminal history section of the risk assessment instrument (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary [Guidelines], at 6 [2006]). Family Court Act § 381.2 (1) provides, however, that neither the fact that a person was before Family Court for a juvenile delinquency hearing, nor any confession, admission or statement made by such a person is admissible as evidence against him or her in any other court. Section 380.1 (1) further provides that “[n]o adjudication under this article may be denominated a conviction and no person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such adjudication.” Given this conflict between the Guidelines and the plain language of the Family Court Act, we agree with the [2nd] Department[ ] … and conclude that the Board “exceeded its authority by adopting that portion of the Guidelines which includes juvenile delinquency adjudications in its definition of crimes for the purpose of determining a sex offender’s criminal history” … . People v Brown, 2017 NY Slip Op 02323, 4th Dept 3-24-17

CRIMINAL LAW (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT (SORA) (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/FAMILY LAW (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED)/JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (SORA GUIDELINE WHICH ALLOWS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CALCULATION SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED) 

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DEFENDANT THREW BAGS OF COCAINE ONTO THE FLOOR IN PLAIN SIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS, NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE.

The Fourth Department determined the evidence was insufficient for conviction of the tampering with evidence charge. Defendant threw bags of cocaine on the floor. There was insufficient evidence that the act of throwing the drugs on the floor was intended to conceal the evidence:

… [T]he evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of tampering with physical evidence. Insofar as relevant here, a person is guilty of that crime when, “[b]elieving that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent such production or use, he [or she] suppresses it by any act of concealment” … . The People’s theory was that defendant tampered with physical evidence by throwing bags of cocaine onto the floor of a store with the intent of concealing the drugs from the pursuing police officers and thereby preventing the use of the drugs in a prospective official proceeding. The evidence at trial established that officers observed defendant throw bags of suspected crack cocaine onto the floor when he passed through the front entrance of the store. Although the offense of tampering with physical evidence does not require the actual suppression of physical evidence, there must be an act of concealment while intending to suppress the evidence … . We conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that defendant accomplished an act of concealment inasmuch as he dropped the items onto the floor in plain sight of the officers … . People v Parker, 2017 NY Slip Op 02208, 4th Dept 3-24-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT THREW BAGS OF COCAINE ONTO THE FLOOR IN PLAIN SIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS, NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT THREW BAGS OF COCAINE ONTO THE FLOOR IN PLAIN SIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS, NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE)/TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE (DEFENDANT THREW BAGS OF COCAINE ONTO THE FLOOR IN PLAIN SIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS, NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE)

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