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Defense Counsel Deemed Ineffective/Failed to Examine Evidence

The First Department determined defense counsel was ineffective (requiring a new trial) because he emphasized the difference between the Ziploc bags (containing drugs) the defendant was alleged to have sold to an undercover officer and the bags which were in defendant’s possession upon his arrest without ever comparing them.  When the jury asked to see the bags which were in defendant’s possession, defense counsel was forced to acknowledge that they matched those purchased by the undercover officer:

In focusing on the Ziploc bags, counsel eviscerated his entire strategy. No longer could the jury believe that no physical evidence tied defendant to the charges; to the contrary, counsel pointed them in the direction of strong physical evidence. Further, the jury could not be expected to acquit defendant on the theory that the People’s case lacked credibility when his own counsel demonstrated a lack of believability on a critical issue at trial. In addition, defendant’s own credibility was directly undermined by counsel’s failure to conduct due diligence, since he testified about a discrepancy between the drugs purchased by the undercover and those recovered from him by the police. There was no sound strategy underlying counsel’s decision to focus the jury on the evidence bags. By his own admission, it was a mistake, and he would not have highlighted the Ziploc bags had he known their actual contents. This self-sabotage of counsel’s defense strategy, albeit inadvertent, was inherently unreasonable and prejudiced defendant’s right to a fair trial under New York law… .  People v Barnes, 2013 NY Slip Op 03757, 1st Dept, 5-23-13

 

Fall from Unfolded Step Ladder Stated Claim​

In determining plaintiff’s use of a step ladder that was not unfolded did not warrant dismissal of the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action for a fall from the ladder, the First Department wrote:

Plaintiff established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim as against defendants …by his testimony that: (1) the ladder was the only one available; (2) the ladder could not be properly opened into an A-frame stance due to excess debris in his narrowly confined work space; (3) he asked his foreman for another ladder, to no avail; (4) the ladder was unusual in that the step treads contained spikes which unexpectedly caught hold of his shoe as he was descending the improperly leaning ladder; (5) he was caused to fall backwards, from a height of approximately six feet; and (6) his right shoulder was injured when it struck the wooden work-zone barrier as he fell.  Keenan v Simon Prop Group, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03622, 1st Dept, 5-22-13

 

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New York City Administrative Code Imposing a $2000 Fine for Removal Recyclable Material from Curb Violated Excessive-Fines Clauses​

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, the First Department determined the New York City Administrative Code provision which imposed a $2000 fine for the removal of recyclable material from the curb violated the Eighth Amendment as applied.  The code provision was designed to prevent large scale removal of recyclable material which deprived the City of recycling income. The petitioner was an artist who used recyclable material in his work.  He picked up a television antenna which had been put out on the curb.  He was pulled over by the NYC sanitation police, given a summons mandating a $2000 fine, and his vehicle was seized.  The First Department wrote:

It is undisputed that petitioner violated the relevant Administrative Code provision—he removed and transported a recyclable object using a motor vehicle. Nevertheless, under the specific circumstances here, we conclude that the mandatory $2,000 penalty amounts to an unconstitutionally excessive fine. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids the imposition of “excessive fines.” The New York State Constitution contains the same prohibition (art I, § 5). The Excessive Fines Clause ” limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense””… . A fine is unconstitutionally excessive if it “notably exceeds in amount that which is reasonable, usual, proper or just” …. Thus, the Excessive Fines Clause is violated where the fine is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the] offense”… . Matter of Prince v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03623, 1st Dept, 5-21-1

 

No Proof of Service of Notice of Entry of Default Judgment; One Year Deadline Never Triggered​

The First Department noted that the one-year deadline for a motion to vacate a default judgment (CPLR 5015) was never triggered because the record included no proof that the notice of entry of the default judgment was served.  Gottlieb v Northriver Trading Co, LLC, 2013 NY Slip Op 03618, 1st Dept, 5-21-13

 

Time of the Essence Adequately Stated​

In holding that an attorney’s letter sufficiently stated “time of the essence,” the First Department wrote:

“A party need not state specifically that time is of the essence, as long as the notice specifies a time on which to close and warns that failure to close on that date will result in default”… . [The attorney’s] February 11, 2009 letter warned, “[I]n the event you do not close, I shall release the escrow funds to [the seller].” Such language informs a buyer that he risks default by not appearing at the closing… . Accordingly, because this was a time-of-the-essence closing, plaintiffs defaulted by failing to appear, and defendant … was entitled to keep the down payment … .  Westreich v Bosler, 2013 NY Slip Op 03604, 1st  Dept, 5-21-13

 

New York City’s Decision Not to Apply Increased Take Home Pay Benefit to Police Officers and Firefighters Struck Down

In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, the First Department determined that the “City of New York’s decision to not apply an increased-take-home-pay (ITHP) benefit to police officers and firefighters placed into Tier III of the retirement system after July 1, 2009, and to continue deducting 3% of their wages towards their retirement benefits, violates Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL) [section] 440(b)” and supports a cause of action for “common-law conversion of the deducted wages.”  Lynch v City of New York, 2013 Slip Op 03581, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

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Teachers’ and School Administrators’ Grievances Re Staff Cuts Stemming from School Closings Deemed Arbitrable​

The First Department determined the teachers’ and school administrators’ unions’ grievances concerning staff cuts inherent in the Department of Education’s (DOE’s) plan to close 24 underperforming schools were arbitrable, rejecting the DOE’s argument.  The arbitrator ruled the plan violated the collective bargaining agreement’s (CBA’s) requirements that staff cuts be done on the basis of seniority:

While broadly referencing educational laws and regulations, the DOE fails to identify any law that “prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, [the] particular matters [to be] decided”… [“[i]t is only when the interest in maintaining adequate standards is attached to a well-defined law that public policy is implicated”]). The underlying grievance in no way impinges on the authority of the SED (State Education Department] to approve a plan for the closure or the reopening of the 24 underperforming schools as new schools under the Education law (Education Law § 2590-h). Nor can the DOE rely on its own inclusion of proposed staffing changes in its plan to close schools to support its argument that staffing issues are now a state policy, law or regulation having the effect of law, which removes them from the dispute resolution regimen provided in the CBAs. Matter of Board of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of NY v Mulgrew, 2013 NY Slip Op 03580, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

“Sole Proximate Cause” Defense Not Demonstrated

In reversing Supreme Court and granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the First Department determined the facts did not support the defense that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff was injured when a drill rig fell after safety chains had been removed. The First Department determined the facts demonstrated plaintiff was not solely responsible for removing the safety chains and, therefore, the “sole proximate cause” defense was not available:

The sole proximate cause defense generally applies where the worker misused, removed, or failed to use an available safety device that would have prevented the accident, or knowingly chose to use an inadequate device despite the availability of an adequate device …. However, “the Labor Law does not require a plaintiff to have acted in a manner that is completely free from negligence” … .

Plaintiff did not unilaterally elect to remove the chains and chain binders. Clark, the dock builder foreman who had the discretion to make the determination in the field as to the manner in which the drill rig would be moved, determined that the drill rig could not be pivoted with the chain binders attached, a belief plaintiff shared … .  Boyd v Schiavone Constr Co, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03578, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

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Ratified Release Precluded Employment Discrimination Action

The First Department reversed Supreme Court and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs employment discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment claims.  Plaintiffs signed a release and received severance pay based upon the terms of the release.  The First Department determined plaintiffs’ claims that the signed the release under duress were foreclosed by their ratification of the release (accepting the severance pay):

The motion court should have dismissed the complaint in its entirety. “Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” …. A release will not be treated lightly because it is a “a jural act of high significance without which the settlement of disputes would be rendered all but impossible” …. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the release is binding on the parties unless it is shown that it was procured by fraud, duress, overreaching, illegality or mutual mistake … . *  *  *

Assuming arguendo that issues of fact exist as to duress and overreaching, plaintiffs are nevertheless barred from challenging the releases on those grounds because they ratified the releases. Ratification occurs when a party accepts the benefits of a contract and fails to act promptly to repudiate it…. Thus, a plaintiff cannot claim that he or she was compelled to execute an agreement under duress while simultaneously accepting the benefits of the agreement …  Allen v Riese Org, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 03547, 1st Dept, 5-16-13

 

“Sophisticated and Well-Counseled Entity” Did Not Make Prima Facie Claim of Fraud; No Due Diligence Demonstrated

In reversing the motion court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s causes of action for fraud, the First Department, over a strong dissent, determined the complaint did not, as a matter of law, establish justifiable reliance upon alleged misrepresentation.  In essence, the First Department determined that “sophisticated and well-counseled entities,” to preserve a prima facie claim of fraud, must demonstrate due diligence in taking measures to protect against fraud:

Plaintiff alleges that it was fraudulently induced to issue a financial guaranty for a portion of an investment by defendant’s misrepresentation that a nonparty hedge fund was taking a long position in the investment when in fact, such fund was actually a short seller, which was influencing the selection of the reference portfolio it was effectively betting against. ……[P]laintiff’s amended complaint …fails to establish justifiable reliance as a matter of law. Indeed, plaintiff fails to plead that it exercised due diligence by inquiring about the nonpublic information regarding the hedge fund with which it was in contact prior to issuing the financial guaranty, or that it inserted the appropriate prophylactic provision to ensure against the possibility of misrepresentation…. ACA Fin Guar Corp v Goldman, Sachs, & Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03429, 1st Dept, 5-14-13

 

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