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INTERMEDIARY BANK OWES NO DUTY TO BENEFICIARY OF AN ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY A GOVERNMENT ORDER.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, reversing Supreme Court, dismissed the lawsuit by the intended beneficiary of an electronic funds transfer (EFT) against an intermediary bank which complied with a government order to freeze the transfer. The court held the intermediary bank owed no duty to the intended beneficiary and properly returned the funds to the originator’s bank when the government order was lifted. An intermediary bank simply facilitates the transfer from the originator’s bank to the beneficiary’s bank:

…[B]ased on the allegations of [the beneficiary’s] complaint, … the originator’s bank — rather than … the intended beneficiary of the failed EFT — was plainly “the entity that passed the EFT on to … the [intermediary] bank where it . . . rest[ed]” … until the federal block was released. It follows that [the originator’s bank] was “the only entity with a property interest in the stopped EFT …” and that, upon the release of the block, [the intermediary bank] properly refunded [the originator’s bank’s] payment for the EFT pursuant to UCC 4-A-402(4), given that the EFT had long since been cancelled by operation of law under UCC 4-A-211(4). It also follows that, pursuant to UCC 4-A-212, [the beneficiary] has no claim against [the intermediary bank] with respect to this transaction. [The intermediary bank] “owed nothing to … the beneficiary since an intermediary bank has no legal obligation to the beneficiary” … . Receivers of Sabena SA v Deutsche Bank A.G., 2016 NY Slip Op 05546, 1st Dept 7-14-16

 

BANKING LAW (INTERMEDIARY BANK OWES NO DUTY TO BENEFICIARY OF AN ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY A GOVERNMENT ORDER)/UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (INTERMEDIARY BANK OWES NO DUTY TO BENEFICIARY OF AN ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY A GOVERNMENT ORDER)/UCC (INTERMEDIARY BANK OWES NO DUTY TO BENEFICIARY OF AN ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER WHICH WAS BLOCKED BY A GOVERNMENT ORDER)

IN A REAR-END COLLISION, INNOCENT PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF FAULT, BUT CONFLICTING FACTS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE OR BOTH DEFENDANTS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick clarifying the precedents, found that plaintiff, an innocent driver struck from behind, was entitled to summary judgment only on the issue of his lack of culpability in the accident. Because plaintiff submitted the depositions of the two defendant drivers which presented conflicting evidence about their culpability, plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment against one or both defendants:

Plaintiff has established his lack of culpable conduct as an undisputed innocent driver, which entitles him to summary judgment on lack of fault pursuant to CPLR 3212(g) … . However … plaintiff has not established entitlement to summary judgment on liability against either defendant driver because of the conflicting and unresolved facts concerning the accident and which vehicle was responsible for the accident. Oluwatayo v Dulinayan, 2016 NY Slip Op 05455, 1st Dept 7-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (IN A REAR-END COLLISION, INNOCENT PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF FAULT, BUT CONFLICTING FACTS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE OR BOTH DEFENDANTS)/REAR END COLLISIONS (IN A REAR-END COLLISION, INNOCENT PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF FAULT, BUT CONFLICTING FACTS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE OR BOTH DEFENDANTS)/VEHICLE ACCIDENTS (IN A REAR-END COLLISION, INNOCENT PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF FAULT, BUT CONFLICTING FACTS PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ONE OR BOTH DEFENDANTS)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES.

The First Department determined there was question of fact whether the UPS truck parked in a no-standing zone was a proximate cause of plaintiff-bicyclist’s injuries. Plaintiff alleged the protrusion of the UPS into the lane of travel forced him to swerve toward a bus and then jump from his bicycle:

Defendant UPS argues that, although its truck was parked in a no-standing zone in violation of 34 RCNY 4-08(a)(3) at the time of the accident involving plaintiff’s bicycle and defendant MTA’s bus, its truck was not a proximate cause of the accident. However, the record presents issues of fact as to how far the UPS truck was protruding into the lane of travel, whether plaintiff swerved toward the bus in an effort to avoid the UPS truck, and whether plaintiff was forced to jump from his bicycle in order to avoid being slammed into the UPS truck as his bicycle was being dragged by the bus. Since a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the accident was a foreseeable consequence of UPS’s illegal parking, summary judgment was properly denied … . Santana v MTA Bus Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 05450, 1st Dept 7-7-16

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)/BICYCLE ACCIDENTS (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)/PARKED VEHICLES (QUESTION OF FACT WHERE PARKED TRUCK WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A BICYCLIST’S INJURIES)

BAR AT ENTRANCE TO A SHOPPING-CART CORRAL WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case because the alleged defect was trivial. Plaintiff alleged tripped over a 3/8-inch-high bar at the entrance to an enclosure for shopping carts (cart corral):

The submissions on the motion establish that “the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses” … . [Defendant] presented photographs taken by plaintiff’s photographer, which show that the metal bar was only three-eighths of an inch above the surface of the parking lot. Those photographs, and others in the record that were shown to plaintiff at her deposition, establish that the bar was not hidden or covered in any way and did not constitute a trap. Myles v Spring Val. Marketplace, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05351, 1st Dept 7-5-16

NEGLIGENCE (BAR AT ENTRANCE TO A SHOPPING-CART CORRAL WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT)/SLIP AND FALL (BAR AT ENTRANCE TO A SHOPPING-CART CORRAL WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT)/TRIVIAL DEFECT (BAR AT ENTRANCE TO A SHOPPING-CART CORRAL WAS A TRIVIAL DEFECT)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE.

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by defendant skier because defendant acted recklessly. Plaintiff was standing at the bottom of the ski slope when defendant collided with her:

Plaintiff snowboarder was injured when, while standing at the base of a beginner ski slope and speaking with a friend, defendant struck her while skiing at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Although there are inherent risks in the sports of skiing and snowboarding, “participants do not consent to conduct that is reckless, intentional or so negligent as to create an unreasonably increased risk” … .

Here, the record presents triable issues as to whether defendant had engaged in reckless conduct as he skied into a crowded area at the base of a beginner’s slope, which was at or near a marked safety zone, and that he did so despite his awareness of his limited abilities to safely handle such speed under the snow surface conditions presented. Furthermore, in view of the significant injuries sustained by plaintiff, reasonable inferences may be drawn that she endured a violent collision, which raises an issue as to whether the speed at which defendant was skiing was reckless under the circumstances … . Horowitz v Chen, 2016 NY Slip Op 05335, 1st Dept 7-5-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)/ASSUMPTION OF RISK (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)/SKI ACCIDENT (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SKIER ACTED RECKLESSLY, THEREBY RENDERING THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE)

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ACCIDENT WAS GRAVITY-RELATED, MOTORIZED WHEELBARROW SLID DOWN HILL.

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether the accident was related to a gravity-related risk or merely part of the usual dangers of construction work. Plaintiff was operating a motorized wheelbarrow and was stopped near the top of a hill when it slid down the hill:

Issues of fact exist here as to whether plaintiff’s accident was the result of a gravity-related risk or part of the usual and ordinary dangers of the work site …  . Hence partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim should have been denied, and summary dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims was properly denied. Ankers v Horizon Group, LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05342, 1st Dept 7-5-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER ACCIDENT WAS GRAVITY-RELATED, MOTORIZED WHEELBARROW SLID DOWN HILL)

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5 1/2 YEAR DELAY BEFORE INDICTMENT ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED; HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE.

The First Department determined the People offered an adequate explanation of the 5 1/2 year delay between when defendant’s DNA was matched to evidence collected from the victims and the indictment. The court further determined the hearsay evidence of third-party culpability was properly excluded as unreliable:

In the intervening years, the prosecution had sought to obtain evidence to strengthen their case, which was based on circumstantial evidence, and the investigative delays were satisfactorily explained … . Furthermore, the resulting prejudice, if any, was minimal. While one potential witness, of questionable reliability, told police that two other men had committed the crimes, and that witness died during the period of delay at issue, the jury nevertheless heard testimony that one of those men had been arrested early in the case. Moreover, ‘a determination made in good faith to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons will not deprive defendant of due process even though there may be some prejudice to defendant’ … .

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying, on the ground of lack of sufficient indicia of reliability, defendant’s motion to admit hearsay evidence of third-party culpability … . The declarant, the above-discussed man who died during the pendency of the investigation, contradicted himself in numerous statements … . Moreover, other evidence in the case directly undermined the reliability of his statements. People v Fleming, 2016 NY Slip Op 05334, 1st Dept 7-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (5 1/2 YEAR DELAY BEFORE INDICTMENT ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED; HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE)/PRE-INDICTMENT DELAY (5 1/2 YEAR DELAY BEFORE INDICTMENT ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED)/THIRD PARTY CULPABILITY (CRIMINAL LAW, HEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THIRD-PARTY CULPABILITY PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS UNRELIABLE)

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PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION.

The First Department determined a reporter’s videotaped interview with the defendant in this murder case must be turned over to the prosecution. Although the substance of some of defendant’s statements to the reporter was summarized in the portion of the interview which was aired on the news, relevant statements made by the defendant were not aired. The First Department determined the relevant unaired portions of the interview were not protected by qualified privilege under the Shield Law (Civil Rights Law 79-h):

Here, the outtakes of an interview of defendant taken at a detention center in which he discusses, inter alia, the charges against him and his relationship with the victim, are on their face “highly material and relevant” (Civil Rights Law § 79-h[c]). In a circumstantial murder case, evidence which, standing alone, might appear innocuous can be deemed critical when viewed in combination with other circumstantial evidence … . Here, the reporter described on air statements made by defendant in unaired portions of the interview to the effect that Ms. Moore was a good tenant and a good person who always paid her rent on time and was friendly with fellow neighbors. While these statements out of context might seem benign, the People argue persuasively that they are “critical or necessary” to the People’s effort to prove motive, intent, and consciousness of guilt, since they contradict defendant’s earlier statements to police … . Although the People have access to the substance of what defendant said from [the reporter’s] paraphrase on the News 12 broadcast, defendant’s actual words and his demeanor as he said them are available only on the unpublished video of the interview in News 12’s possession. ,,, [W]e find that the People have made the “clear and specific showing” required to overcome News 12’s qualified privilege as to nonconfidential journalistic material under article I, section 8 of New York’s Constitution and the Shield Law only as to those portions of the unaired News 12 footage of its interview with defendant in which defendant makes any statement concerning killing Ms. Moore, and discusses their relationship and his impressions and observations of her, including her conduct as a tenant … . People v Bonie, 2016 NY Slip Op 05331, 1st Dept 7-5-16

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (SHIELD LAW, PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (REPORTERS, SHIELD LAW, PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION)/CRIMINAL LAW (CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, REPORTERS, SHIELD LAW, PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION)/REPORTERS (SHIELD LAW, PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION)/PRIVILEGE (REPORTERS, PORTIONS OF A REPORTER’S VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEW WITH DEFENDANT NOT PROTECTED BY SHIELD LAW BECAUSE OF RELEVANCE TO A MURDER PROSECUTION)

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THREE-YEAR TIME LIMIT FOR STARTING EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS AFTER A COURT CHALLENGE STARTS TO RUN WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSES THE APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, determined the three-year time limit within which a municipality must commence eminent domain proceedings begins to run when the Court of Appeals dismisses the appeal:

EDPL 401, entitled “Time for acquisition,” prescribes the time during which a condemnor may commence proceedings “to acquire the property necessary for the proposed public project” (EDPL 401[A]). Specifically, section 401(A) provides that the condemnor may commence such proceedings “up to three years” after the latest of “(1) publication of its determination and findings pursuant to [EDPL 204], or (2) the date of the order or completion of [an exemption procedure under EDPL 206], or (3) entry of the final order or judgment on judicial review pursuant to [EDPL 207]” (EDPL 401[A][1]-[3]). Section 401(B) provides that if the condemnor does not commence EDPL article 4 proceedings within the specified time, “the project shall be deemed abandoned, and thereafter, before commencing [EDPL article 4 proceedings,] the condemnor must again comply with the provisions of article two” (EDPL 401[B]).

The plain and common-sense interpretation of the statute is that “the final order or judgment on judicial review” is the final order or judgment disposing of any EDPL 207 challenge and terminating judicial review. Our October 12, 2010 decision did not finally terminate judicial review, as the challengers filed a notice of appeal which entailed further review by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals could not be known until such time as it issued its order dismissing the appeal. Matter of City of New York v 2305-07 Third Ave., LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 05352, 1st Dept 7-5-16

 

EMINENT DOMAIN (THREE-YEAR TIME LIMIT FOR STARTING EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS AFTER A COURT CHALLENGE STARTS TO RUN WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSES THE APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION)/MUNICIPAL LAW (EMINENT DOMAIN, THREE-YEAR TIME LIMIT FOR STARTING EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS AFTER A COURT CHALLENGE STARTS TO RUN WHEN THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSES THE APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DIVISION DECISION)

BROADER FLORIDA STATUTE COULD NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS.

The First Department determined a Florida statute was broader than its New York counterpart and the Florida conviction (for a violation of the Florida statute) could not be the basis of second felony offender status in New York:

The court incorrectly adjudicated defendant a second felony offender based on a conviction under a Florida statute that is broader than its New York counterpart for enhanced sentencing purposes … . Florida Statutes Annotated § 831.02 is broader than Penal Law § 170.25 because the Florida statute could be violated by uttering or publishing an instrument that merely contained false information, while under the New York statute an instrument is only considered forged if it is falsely made, completed or altered; a genuine instrument containing false information does not suffice … .  People v Catmon, 2016 NY Slip Op 05228, 1st Dept 6-30-16

CRIMINAL LAW (BROADER FLORIDA STATUTE COULD NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS)/SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (BROADER FLORIDA STATUTE COULD NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SECOND FELONY OFFENDER STATUS)

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