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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact in this slip and fall case. Plaintiff tripped on a step defendant claimed was open and obvious. Plaintiff raised a question of fact about optical confusion with photographs and an affidavit from an expert:

Plaintiff tripped and fell on a step on a walkway on defendant’s premises while crossing the campus during her lunch break. Assuming that defendant established prima facie that the step was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous … , plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether the condition was open and obvious by demonstrating through an expert’s affidavit and photographs that the color and position of the step created optical confusion, i.e., “the illusion of a flat surface, visually obscuring … [the] step[]” … . Buonchristiano v Fordham Univ., 2017 NY Slip Op 00586, 1st Dept 1-31-17

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (STEP, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/OPTICAL CONFUSION (STEP, SLIP AND FALL, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER OPTICAL CONFUSION OBSCURED A STEP, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

REQUEST FOR DNA PATERNITY TEST PROPERLY DENIED, NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST.

The First Department determined it was in the child’s best interest to deny respondent’s request for a DNA paternity test:

Family Court properly determined that it is in the child’s best interest to equitably estop respondent from having a DNA test to establish paternity (see Family Ct Act § 532[a]). Clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent held himself out as the father of the child and that the now 10-year-old child considers respondent to be his father … . The child lived with respondent, his mother and siblings for about two years, calls respondent “dad” and spends time with him on birthdays and holidays, including Father’s Day. Respondent introduced the child to his family and friends as his son, and allowed the child to spend time and develop relationships with his family. Issues of credibility were for Family Court to resolve and its determination to credit the testimony of the mother and the child and to reject that of respondent is supported by the record … . Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v Dwayne W., 2017 NY Slip Op 00595, 1st Dept 1-31-17

FAMILY LAW (REQUEST FOR DNA PATERNITY TEST PROPERLY DENIED, NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST)/PATERNITY (REQUEST FOR DNA PATERNITY TEST PROPERLY DENIED, NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST)/DNA (FAMILY LAW, PATERNITY, REQUEST FOR DNA PATERNITY TEST PROPERLY DENIED, NOT IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST)/

A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined defendants were properly convicted of kidnapping and, under the facts, unlawful imprisonment was not a lesser included offense. The defendants taped the victim’s wrists behind his back, taped his arms to his body, and then transported the victim by car from New York to Philadelphia, where the victim was released at night in a deserted area:

We reject defendants’ argument that a car on a public thoroughfare may not, as a matter of law, be considered “a place where [the victim] is not likely to be found” [within the meaning of the kidnapping statute]  (Penal Law § 135.00  [2]). …

Defendants suggest that a car may only be treated as a place where the victim is “not likely to be found” if (1) the defendant used or threatened to use a weapon to put or keep the victim in the vehicle, (2) the defendant used the vehicle to take the victim to a secluded place, or (3) the victim was not visible to the public within the car. However, neither Penal Law § 135.00(2) nor any case law imposes such requirements of proof. …

Unlawful imprisonment does not qualify here as a lesser included offense of the kidnapping charge, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence that defendants unlawfully imprisoned [the victim] but did not kidnap him. People v Grohoske, 2017 NY Slip Op 00617, 1st Dept 1-31-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)/KIDNAPPING (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)/UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT (A MOVING CAR IS A PLACE WHERE THE VICTIM IS NOT LIKELY TO BE FOUND WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE KIDNAPPING STATUTE, UNDER THE FACTS, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT WAS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, ENTERED BY THE CLERK AT THE DIRECTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AFTER REVERSAL, DOES NOT BRING UP TRIAL INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS FOR APPEAL.

The First Department rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to appeal evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. Plaintiff had successfully moved to set aside the defense verdict in this personal injury case. The First Department reversed and directed the clerk to enter a judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff then appealed that order, raising trial evidentiary issues. The First Department held that the order appealed from was not the order of the trial court, therefore the interlocutory evidentiary rulings could not be raised:

Although an appeal from a final order or judgment of Supreme Court brings up for review, inter alia, certain evidentiary rulings made at trial (CPLR 5501[a][3] …), once this Court decides the issues raised on appeal and directs the Clerk of the court from which the appeal originated to enter judgment, such judgment finally disposes of all the issues in the action (CPLR 5701[a][1]…). The judgment that the Clerk entered … was entered in accordance with and pursuant to an order of this Court (the Appellate Division) which “dispose[d] of all the issues in the action” (CPLR 5701[a][1]). Stated differently, the … judgment is not a judgment of the trial court bringing up interlocutory issues for review … . …

Plaintiff did not move to set aside the verdict based upon erroneous evidentiary rulings. Although as plaintiff correctly argues, there is no interlocutory appeal as of right from an evidentiary ruling during trial (see CPLR 5701[a]…), plaintiff had the opportunity to raise legal arguments regarding the evidentiary rulings made by the trial court in support of her motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.

These issues could have also been raised to support her position in the prior appeal. Powell v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00576, 1st Dept 1-31-17

 

APPEALS (ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, ENTERED BY THE CLERK AT THE DIRECTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AFTER REVERSAL, DOES NOT BRING UP TRIAL INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS FOR APPEAL)/INTERLOCUTORY EVIDENTIARY RULINGS (APPEALS, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, ENTERED BY THE CLERK AT THE DIRECTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AFTER REVERSAL, DOES NOT BRING UP TRIAL INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS FOR APPEAL)/REVERSAL (APPEALS, (ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, ENTERED BY THE CLERK AT THE DIRECTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AFTER REVERSAL, DOES NOT BRING UP TRIAL INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS FOR APPEAL)

LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LIGHTING BAR FELL ON PLAINTIFF WHEN HE WAS DISMANTLING AN EXHIBITION BOOTH.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) claims should not have been granted.  Plaintiff was dismantling an exhibition booth when a lighting bar fell on him:

Since [plaintiff’s] specific task at the moment the accident occurred was ancillary to and part of the larger demolition job of dismantling the booths, in which he was to participate, plaintiff was engaged in an activity within the purview of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) … .

… The lighting bar was an object that required securing to prevent it from becoming dislodged or falling during the work … . Further, in view of the weight of the lighting bar, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the distance it fell was de minimis … . Nor did defendants demonstrate that any securing device would have defeated the task of removing the lighting bar .. .

12 NYCRR 23-1.8(c)(1), which mandates approved safety hats for persons “required to work or pass within any area where there is a danger of being struck by falling objects or materials,” is sufficiently concrete to give rise to Labor Law § 241(6) liability … . Rutkowski v New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 00555, 1st Dept 1-26-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LIGHTING BAR FELL ON PLAINTIFF WHEN HE WAS DISMANTLING AN EXHIBITION BOOTH)/DEMOLITION (LABOR LAW, LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LIGHTING BAR FELL ON PLAINTIFF WHEN HE WAS DISMANTLING AN EXHIBITION BOOTH)/HARD HATS (LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LIGHTING BAR FELL ON PLAINTIFF WHEN HE WAS DISMANTLING AN EXHIBITION BOOTH)

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NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY BETWEEN LAW SCHOOL AND AN ALLEGED DIPLOMA MILL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The First Department determined there was no ‘justiciable controversy” between Touro College (law school) and Novus University (law school). The declaratory judgment action was therefore properly dismissed. Touro, after admitting a Novus graduate into its LLM program, was sued by the Novus graduate when Touro refused to grant the LLM degree upon his successful completion of the program. The Novus graduate had misrepresented Novus as a foreign law school. Touro had successfully defended the lawsuit brought by the Novus graduate:

Touro, an institute of higher education, accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA), alleges that it and similarly-situated institutions have been harmed by Novus in that individuals who have received degrees from Novus, an online, non-ABA accredited law school, have applied to Masters of Law programs at law schools, including Touro, while falsely representing that Novus was a foreign institution. Touro maintains that there is a justiciable controversy between Touro and Novus warranting declaratory relief (CPLR 3001), since Touro was forced to defend against “meritless” litigation instituted by a Novus graduate who was denied a Touro LLM, after he was admitted to the program based on such a misrepresentation … .

A declaratory judgment is intended “to declare the respective legal rights of the parties based on a given set of facts, not to declare findings of fact” … . The general purpose of a “declaratory judgment is to serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation either as to present or prospective obligations” … . Thus, a declaratory judgment requires a “justiciable controversy,” in which not only does the plaintiff “have an interest sufficient to constitute standing to maintain the action but also that the controversy involve present, rather than hypothetical, contingent or remote, prejudice to plaintiffs” … . Touro’s allegations fail to identify any present controversy or disputed jural relationship between the parties to this action that would be resolved by issuance of the requested declaration. Touro Coll. v Novus Univ. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 00546, 1st Dept 1-26-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY BETWEEN LAW SCHOOL AND AN ALLEGED DIPLOMA MILL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED)/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY BETWEEN LAW SCHOOL AND AN ALLEGED DIPLOMA MILL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED)/JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERY BETWEEN LAW SCHOOL AND AN ALLEGED DIPLOMA MILL, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED)

PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION.

The First Department, over a substantial partial dissent, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate the transaction of business in New York by agents of the defendant. Therefore, New York could not exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant and defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly granted:

Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) a New York court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if the nondomiciliary has purposefully transacted business within the state and there is “a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” … . “Purposeful activities are volitional acts by which the non-domiciliary avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws” … . “More than limited contacts are required for purposeful activities sufficient to establish that the non-domiciliary transacted business in New York” … . * * *

To establish that a defendant acted through an agent, a plaintiff must “convince the court that [the New York actors] engaged in purposeful activities in this State in relation to [the] transaction for the benefit of and with the knowledge and consent of [the defendant] and that [the defendant] exercised some control over [the New York actors]” … . “[T]]o make a prima facie showing of control, a plaintiff’s allegations must sufficiently detail the defendant’s conduct so as to persuade a court that the defendant was a primary actor’ in the specific matter in question; control cannot be shown based merely upon a defendant’s title or position within the corporation, or upon conclusory allegations that the defendant controls the corporation” … . Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 2017 NY Slip Op 00532, 1st Dept 1-26-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)/JURISDICTION (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)/LONG-ARM JURISDICTION (PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)/AGENTS (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)/TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS (LONG-ARM JURISDICTION, PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEMONSTRATE ​DEFENDANT’S AGENTS TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN NEW YORK, NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE LONG-ARM JURISDICTION)

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PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS; HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED; THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The First Department determined the legal malpractice action by plaintiff (Brookwood) against defendant law firm (A & B) was properly dismissed. The law firm defended plaintiff in a patent infringement action which eventually won (with new lawyers). Plaintiff incurred legal fees of $10 million. In this malpractice action, plaintiff alleged its legal fees would have been much lower had the law firm won certain motions early on in the case:

A focal point of this appeal is Brookwood’s claim that A & B, in the patent action, negligently litigated defenses that were available to Brookwood pursuant to 28 USC § 1498. 28 USC § 1498 provides that when a patent is infringed for the benefit of the United States government, the patent holder’s remedy is against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Brookwood alleges that had A & B not been negligent, the motions that A & B eventually brought based on 28 USC § 1498 would have been granted and Brookwood would have avoided the approximately $10 million it expended on defending itself at trial and on appeal. Important in this analysis is the fact that Brookwood ultimately prevailed in the underlying patent action, achieving a judgment of noninfringement. The theory of Brookwood’s malpractice case is not that but for A & B’s negligence it would have prevailed in the patent action; rather Brookwood’s claim is that but for the manner in which A & B interposed the defenses available to Brookwood under 28 USC § 1498, Brookwood would have prevailed without incurring the additional legal fees it expended. In other words, but for A & B’s negligence, Brookwood could have achieved the same result more expeditiously and economically. The Supreme Court granted A & B’s motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety, holding, among other things, that the allegations did not support a finding of attorney negligence or of proximate cause. We now affirm. * * *

Decisions regarding the evidentiary support for a motion or the legal theory of a case are commonly strategic decisions and a client’s disagreement with its attorney’s strategy does not support a malpractice claim, even if the strategy had its flaws. “[A]n attorney is not held to the rule of infallibility and is not liable for an honest mistake of judgment where the proper course is open to reasonable doubt” … . Moreover, an attorney’s selection of one among several reasonable courses of action does not constitute malpractice … . Brookwood has not alleged facts supporting its claim that A & B’s evidentiary decision, to rely on [the plaintiff’s] expert, rather than compromise the merits of Brookwood’s position on other arguments, was an unreasonable course of action. Brookwood Cos., Inc. v Alston & Bird LLP, 2017 NY Slip Op 00535, 1st Dept 1-26-17

 

ATTORNEYS (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (LEGAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF, WHICH ULTIMATELY WON THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT SUIT, ALLEGED MALPRACTICE IN THE BRINGING OF CERTAIN MOTIONS, HAD THE MOTIONS WON, IT WAS ALLEGED, $10 MILLION IN LEGAL FEES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, THE MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED)

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DEUTSCHE BANK BREACHED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS.

The First Department, in a decision too detailed to fairly summarize here, determined the defendant Deutsche Bank breached credit default swap agreements with plaintiff Good Hill Master Fund. Good Hill was found to have acted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in negotiating the price of the notes at issue. In addition Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting expert testimony offered by Deutsche Bank because interpretation of the contracts was within the ken of the trial judge:

We find no basis to disturb the court’s determination that Deutsche Bank breached the credit default swap agreements at issue here … . As the trial court found in awarding judgment in Good Hill’s favor, Good Hill negotiated at arm’s length with Bank of America to sell six tranches of notes the Bank had previously sold Good Hill at $.29 on the dollar, so that the Bank of America could unwind and terminate a securitization in the then-declining mortgage market. Bank of America’s resulting writedown of the B6 notes would trigger a negative credit event under the swap agreements. As a result, Good Hill negotiated with Bank of America to forgive only 17% of the principal amount, resulting in a smaller payout to Deutsche Bank under the swap agreements, as opposed to forgiving principal of 71% across the board on all the tranches of notes based on the $.29 purchase price. Bank of America was free to accept or reject that 83% allocation and had rejected several prior proposals from Good Hill that would have resulted in no payment or an even smaller payment to Deutsche Bank. Good Hill Master Fund L.P. v Deutsche Bank AG, 2017 NY Slip Op 00428, 1st Dept 1-24-17

SECURITIES (DEUTSCHE BANK BREACHED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS)/RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES (CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENT, DEUTSCHE BANK BREACHED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS)/CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS (DEUTXCHE BANK BREACHED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS)/CONTRACT LAW (CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENT, DEUTSCHE BANK BREACHED CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENTS)/EVIDENCE (CONTRACT LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENT)/EXPERT OPINION (CONTRACT LAW, EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AGREEMENT)

FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined defendant’s conviction for unlawful use of secret scientific information should not have been set aside:

Defendant was formerly employed by Goldman Sachs as a computer programmer. Prior to leaving Goldman to work for a potential competitor, defendant made a digital copy of Goldman’s proprietary computer source code by uploading and saving it to a hard drive of a server located outside the Goldman network. After surreptitiously uploading the source code, defendant transferred copies of it to several of his personal computing devices, and subsequently shared it with his new employer. As a result, defendant was charged with unlawful use of secret scientific material (Penal Law § 165.07). After a jury convicted defendant of this crime, the trial court set aside the verdict.

In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether defendant’s actions constitute legally sufficient evidence to establish that he made a “tangible reproduction or representation” of the source code, and did so with the “intent to appropriate . . . [its] use,” within the meaning of the unlawful use statute. We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence was legally sufficient as to both of these elements. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision, reinstate the jury’s verdict and remand the matter for sentencing. People v Aleynikov, 2017 NY Slip Op 00449m 1st Dept 1-24-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL (FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/CODE (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE, FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)/COMPUTERS (COPYING PROPRIETARY COMPUTER SOURCE CODE, FORMER GOLDMAN SACHS EMPLOYEE’S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF SCIENTIFIC MATERIAL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE, VERDICT REINSTATED)

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