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NYC BOARD OF HEALTH PROPERLY ISSUED REGULATION REQUIRING CERTAIN RESTAURANTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SODIUM IN THE RESTAURANT FOOD.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, determined the NYC Board of Health properly issued a regulation requiring certain restaurant to provide factual information about the level of sodium in the restaurant food. The decision is comprehensive and cannot fairly be summarized here. Applying the Boreali factors, the First Department held the rule was well within the board’s rule-making authority. In addition, the court found the rule did not violate the First Amendment (commercial speech):

Salt is both an essential ingredient of our diet and, when consumed in excess, a significant health hazard. Excess consumption of sodium, the primary ingredient of salt, can cause high blood pressure, which is in turn correlated with a higher risk of cardiovascular disease, congestive heart failure and kidney disease, according to the overwhelming consensus among scientists and the federal agencies charged with protecting the nation’s health. To address this issue, defendant New York City Board of Health (the Board) adopted a rule requiring certain restaurants to provide factual information to consumers on this issue. That rule is challenged in this appeal by the National Restaurant Association (NRA). We affirm the trial court’s rejection of that challenge, since the Board acted legally, constitutionally and well within its authority in adopting this limited yet salutary rule. National Rest. Assn. v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene. 2017 NY Slip Op 01140, 1st Dept 2-10-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC BOARD OF HEALTH PROPERLY ISSUED REGULATION REQUIRING CERTAIN RESTAURANTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SODIUM IN THE RESTAURANT FOOD)/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (NYC BOARD OF HEALTH PROPERLY ISSUED REGULATION REQUIRING CERTAIN RESTAURANTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SODIUM IN THE RESTAURANT FOOD)/SODIUM (NYC BOARD OF HEALTH PROPERLY ISSUED REGULATION REQUIRING CERTAIN RESTAURANTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SODIUM IN THE RESTAURANT FOOD)/RESTAURANTS (NYC BOARD OF HEALTH PROPERLY ISSUED REGULATION REQUIRING CERTAIN RESTAURANTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEVEL OF SODIUM IN THE RESTAURANT FOOD)

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A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to dismiss the complaint alleging fraud should not have been granted, and the motion to amend the complaint to allege negligent misrepresentation should have been granted. Supreme Court ruled that plaintiff was a sophisticated lender and made the loan without performing due diligence (and therefore could not allege justifiable reliance on any misrepresentations). The First Department held that plaintiff’s request for and receipt of written assurances was sufficient due diligence:

A sophisticated party is generally required to exercise due diligence to verify the facts represented to it before entering into a business transaction … . The Court of Appeals has recognized, however, that, “where a plaintiff has gone to the trouble to insist on a written representation that certain facts are true, it will often be justified in accepting that representation rather than making its own inquiry” … . In this case, plaintiff alleges that it made the loan … in reliance on [defendant] Noto’s opinion letter, which was specifically addressed to plaintiff, in which Noto opined that the loan transaction would not put [any party] into breach of any preexisting contract or agreement … . Plaintiff alleges that this representation was false, inasmuch as the undisclosed 2005 letter agreement required [maintenance of] a $2 million cushion of “unencumbered equity” in the property in any refinancing, and — given that the true value of the property was only $1.9 million, based on the terms of the undisclosed 2005 transaction — plaintiff’s $6.6 million loan … wiped out any such equity in the property. Remediation Capital Funding LLC v Noto, 2017 NY Slip Op 01119, 1st Dept 2-10-17

CONTRACT LAW (A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED)/FRAUD (A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED)/MISREPRESENTATION (A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED).SOPHISTICATED PARTY (A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED)/DUE DILIGENCE (A SOPHISTICATED PARTY’S REQUEST FOR AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN ASSURANCES FROM DEFENDANT WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTE FOR A DUE DILIGENCE INQUIRY, SUPREME COURT’S DISMISSAL OF FRAUD ACTION REVERSED)

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THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR NYC PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Saxe, determined that the various record-keeping and inspection statutes and regulations which apply to New York City pawnbrokers did not violate the unreasonable search and seizure prohibition in Article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution. Therefore, the preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statutes, regulations and procedures should not have been granted:

Here, the statutory and regulatory framework at issue consists of two distinct components: not merely inspection requirements involving targeted, on-premises administrative inspections by government officials, but also substantial reporting requirements, involving submission of transactional information to the government.

To the extent the statutory and regulatory framework involves transactional reporting requirements, it does not involve either physical inspections or administrative searches of a business or its records; instead, it merely requires the submission of information in which the businesses have little, if any, expectation of privacy. * * *

Even if we focus on those provisions that authorize inspections, and characterize them as administrative searches, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood that they will prevail. The Court of Appeals … acknowledged the continued viability of an “administrative search” exception to the constitutional requirements of probable cause and warrants. While that exception “cannot be invoked where … the [administrative] search is undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality’ and the underlying regulatory scheme is in reality, designed simply to give the police an expedient means of enforcing penal sanctions'” … , a regulatory administrative search scheme can pass muster under New York’s Constitution where it is “pervasive and include[s] detailed standards in such matters as, for example, the operation of the business and the condition of the premises” … . Collateral Loanbrokers Assn. of N.Y., Inc. v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00953, 1st Dept 2-7-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (NYC) (THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION)/CONSITUTIONAL LAW (NYS) (PAWNBROKERS, NYC, THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION)/PAWNBROKERS (NYC) (THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION)/ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES (NYC) (PAWNBROKERS, THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION)/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (PAWNBROKERS, NYC, THE RECORD-KEEPING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR PAWNBROKERS DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROHIBITION IN THE NYS CONSTITUTION)

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NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s notice of claim in this medical malpractice action was timely served as a matter of law under the continuous treatment doctrine. Two justices, in a concurring decision, agreed that the action should not have been dismissed, but argued there was a question of fact whether the continuous treatment doctrine applied:

On January 25, 2006, plaintiff served a notice of claim on defendant HHC. At the 50-h hearing in June 2006, plaintiff testified that while her last actual medical treatment at Lincoln Hospital occurred on October 19, 2005, when hospital personnel removed the sutures from her leg, she received a follow-up appointment to return to Lincoln Hospital on October 24, 2005. Plaintiff stated that she arrived at Lincoln Hospital for treatment on that date, but was informed that the staff could not locate her medical records and that she should return to the Hospital in one week, on October 31, 2005. Plaintiff testified that she did, in fact, return on October 31, only to have the staff inform her that they did not accept her insurance and that she should seek treatment elsewhere.

… [P]laintiff argued, her last treatment date was October 31, 2005 and thus, she had timely served her notice of claim on January 25, 2006. Hill v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 00914, 1st Dept 2-7-17

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE)/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE)/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE)

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PLAINTIFF’S FIRING FOR WORKPLACE DISRUPTION AND CUSTOMER RELATIONS STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT IN A NOTORIOUS ASSAULT CASE [HIS CONVICTIONS WERE VACATED] DID NOT VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW.

The First Department affirmed the dismissal of a former police officer’s complaint which alleged he was fired from his job at Con Edison because of his convictions, in violation of the state and city Human Rights Law. While a police officer, the plaintiff was charged with beating and sodomizing an arrestee in a notorious case. Plaintiff’s assault-related convictions were vacated and the jury deadlocked in the second trial. The only conviction which remained was for perjury. Plaintiff was fired because of workplace disruption and customer relations stemming from plaintiff’s perceived involvement in the assault. The First Department determined the firing was not the result of discrimination based upon the perjury conviction. The vacated convictions were not “convictions” covered by the statutory prohibition:

The assault-related convictions on which plaintiff was retried, and the jury deadlocked, are not covered by article 23-A [of the Correction Law], since the article applies only to individuals who “previously have been convicted,” and the vacatur of plaintiff’s prior assault convictions rendered those convictions nullities … . Although plaintiff maintains that he remains “previously … convicted,” we reject this interpretation since it would permit an employer to deny employment based on a vacated conviction in reliance on the statutory exceptions … .

The legislative intent is to rehabilitate, and therefore avoid recidivism by, “ex-offenders,” not those whose convictions have been vacated, who generally do not need rehabilitation and are not at risk of recidivism … . “Although ex-offenders were urged when released from prison to find employment as a part of their rehabilitation, they had great difficulty in doing so because of their criminal records…. Failure to find employment … injured society as a whole by contributing to a high rate of recidivism … Thus, [article 23-A] sets out a broad general rule that employers and public agencies cannot deny employment or a license to an applicant solely based on status as an ex-offender” … . Schwarz v Consolidated Edison, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00927, 1st Dept 2-7-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (DISCRIMINATION, PLAINTIFF’S FIRING FOR WORKPLACE DISRUPTION AND CUSTOMER RELATIONS STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT IN A NOTORIOUS ASSAULT CASE [HIS CONVICTIONS WERE VACATED] DID NOT VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, PLAINTIFF’S FIRING FOR WORKPLACE DISRUPTION AND CUSTOMER RELATIONS STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT IN A NOTORIOUS ASSAULT CASE [HIS CONVICTIONS WERE VACATED] DID NOT VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)/CONVICTIONS (HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, PLAINTIFF’S FIRING FOR WORKPLACE DISRUPTION AND CUSTOMER RELATIONS STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT IN A NOTORIOUS ASSAULT CASE [HIS CONVICTIONS WERE VACATED] DID NOT VIOLATE THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW)

CONFLICTING TESTIMONY RAISED QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment should not have been granted to the transit defendants in this bicycle-bus accident case. Plaintiff’s decedent was riding her bicycle when a car door opened in front of her. She struck the door and fell over into the path of a bus, which ran over her. Summary judgment was granted to the transit defendants under the emergency doctrine. However, the First Department held that evidence the bus driver’s vision to the side may have been blocked by standing passengers raised a question of fact about the applicability of the emergency doctrine:

Given the conflicting testimony in the record, including that there may have been passengers standing in front of the white line, which partially blocked the bus driver’s view as he passed the red light, it was error for the motion court to have determined the reasonableness of the bus driver’s response to the emergency situation presented, as a matter of law. This is an issue of fact that should be decided by a jury. Powers v Kyong Kwan Min, 2017 NY Slip Op 00716, 1st Dept 2-2-17

NEGLIGENCE (CONFLICTING TESTIMONY RAISED QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)/BICYCLISTS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, CONFLICTING TESTIMONY RAISED QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BUS-BICYCLE ACCIDENT, CONFLICTING TESTIMONY RAISED QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)/EMERGENCY DOCTRINE (NEGLIGENCE, BUS-BICYCLE ACCIDENT, CONFLICTING TESTIMONY RAISED QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE)

EXCLUSION FOR INJURY DURING UNLOADING AN INSURED TRAILER APPLIED, EVEN THOUGH THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TRAILER.

The First Department determined an exclusion from plaintiff’s “Truckers Policy” issued to Truck-Rite was unambiguous. The policy excluded coverage for injury arising out of loading and unloading trailers covered by the policy. Plaintiff was unloading a trailer when the trailer’s lift gate collapsed. Despite the fact that the injury was caused by a defective part of the trailer, the injury was not covered by the policy:

“Policy exclusions are subject to strict construction and must be read narrowly, and any ambiguities in the insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer. However, unambiguous provisions of insurance contracts will be given their plain and ordinary meaning” … .

“In the context of a policy exclusion, the phrase arising out of is unambiguous, and is interpreted broadly to mean originating from, incident to, or having connection with'” … . To determine the applicability of an “arising out of” exclusion, the Court of Appeals had adopted a “but for” test … . This test is defined as follows “[I]f the plaintiff in an underlying action or proceeding alleges the existence of facts clearly falling within such an exclusion, and none of the causes of action that he or she asserts could exist but for the existence of the excluded activity or state of affairs, the insurer is under no obligation to defend the action”… .

Here, the underlying plaintiff’s accident occurred while he was unloading material from a shipping trailer, an activity clearly encompassed by the exclusion. The fact that his injury was allegedly caused by the defective nature of the trailer lift does not remove the injury from the policy exclusion. “[T]he focus of the inquiry is not on the precise cause of the accident but the general nature of the operation in the course of which the injury was sustained'” … . “[T]he phrase arising out of’ . . . requires only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided” … . Such a causal relationship between the injury and exclusion clearly exists here and requires dismissal of the complaint. Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Excelsior Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 00718, 1st Dept 2-2-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (EXCLUSION FOR INJURY DURING UNLOADING AN INSURED TRAILER APPLIED, EVEN THOUGH THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TRAILER)/EXCLUSIONS (INSURANCE LAW, EXCLUSION FOR INJURY DURING UNLOADING AN INSURED TRAILER APPLIED, EVEN THOUGH THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE TRAILER)

NONMONETARY SETTLEMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTION SUIT APPROVED, NEW ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ANNOUNCED.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kahn, with a concurring opinion, reversing Supreme Court, determined a nonmonetary settlement of a shareholders’ class action suit should have been approved. The matter was sent back to determine appropriate attorneys’ fees. The opinion is too comprehensive to fairly summarize here. The court revisited the factors to be considered in analyzing nonmonetary settlements, adding two new factors to those announced in Woodrow v Colt Industries in 1990. This action involved the propriety of the purchase of Verizon Wireless by Verizon Communications:

The rise of nonmonetary class action settlements began in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s, when complaints of corporate misconduct in the context of mergers and acquisitions prompted calls for corporate governance reforms. Often, the perceived need for reform led to the commencement of litigation as a means to address the misfeasance, which would result in settlements with provisions for corporate governance reform or other forms of equitable relief, such as additional disclosures to shareholders in proxy statements, and would be accompanied by an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to shareholders’ counsel. * * *

In the ensuing decades, however, the use of nonmonetary settlements became increasingly disfavored. Complaints arose that the remedies of “disclosure-only” and other forms of non-monetary settlements themselves proved problematic because they provided minimal benefits either to shareholders or to their corporations. Both courts and commentators came to view the shareholder class action in this context as a “merger tax” and as a cottage industry for the plaintiffs’ class action bar, used to force settlements of nonmeritorious suits and to generate exorbitant attorneys’ fees, causing waste and abuse to the corporation and its shareholders. * * *

… [W]e now refine our Colt standard of review to add to the five established factors to be used by courts to ensure appropriate evaluation of proposed nonmonetary settlements of class action suits these two additional criteria: whether the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the putative settlement class as a whole, and whether the settlement is in the best interest of the corporation. Gordon v Verizon Communications, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00742, 1st Dept 2-2-17

 

CORPORATION LAW (NONMONETARY SETTLEMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTION SUIT APPROVED, NEW ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ANNOUNCED)/SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTIONS (NONMONETARY SETTLEMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTION SUIT APPROVED, NEW ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ANNOUNCED)/CLASS ACTIONS (SHAREHOLDERS, NONMONETARY SETTLEMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTION SUIT APPROVED, NEW ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ANNOUNCED)/NONMONETARY SETTLEMENTS (SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTIONS, NONMONETARY SETTLEMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS’ CLASS ACTION SUIT APPROVED, NEW ANALYTICAL CRITERIA ANNOUNCED)

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HEATING AGREEMENT WAS A COVENANT WHICH RUNS WITH THE LAND, ORAL WAIVER MAY BE VALID DESPITE WRITING REQUIREMENT IN THE COVENANT.

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether plaintiff building owner waived a heating agreement, which was a covenant running with the land. The covenant obligated defendant to provide heat to plaintiff’s building as long as both buildings existed. The fact that the covenant required any waiver to be in writing was not dispositive. Oral waivers may be valid:

The motion court correctly concluded that the obligation undertaken by the previous owners of a building, currently owned by defendant, to provide steam heat to adjacent buildings, including one owned by plaintiff, as reflected in a written agreement between the previous owners of defendant’s building and the previous owners of the adjacent buildings (Heating Agreement), which was recorded in the Office of the City Register of the City of New York, is a covenant running with the land. Accordingly, it is binding on defendant so long as both buildings are in existence … . * * *

In this case, the agreement provides that “in the event the owner of any of said parcels [including plaintiff] shall elect to terminate and cancel this agreement with respect to said parcel, which election shall be made by written notice to the owner of Parcel I [currently, defendant], then this agreement shall end and terminate with respect to any such parcel as of . . . the date when notice of election to cancel is given.”

Plaintiff’s contention that this language precludes its waiver of the covenant by any means other than a writing is misplaced. “[A] contracting party may orally waive enforcement of a contract term notwithstanding a provision to the contrary in the agreement. Such waiver may be evinced by words or conduct, including partial performance” … . Here, the record reflects that a representative of plaintiff orally advised a member of defendant’s coop board that plaintiff would install its own boiler to provide heat to its own building independently. Condor Funding, LLC v 176 Broadway Owners Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 00719, 1st Dept 2-2-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND, HEATING AGREEMENT WAS A COVENANT WHICH RUNS WITH THE LAND, ORAL WAIVER MAY BE VALID DESPITE WRITING REQUIREMENT IN THE COVENANT)/CONTRACT LAW (WAIVER, HEATING AGREEMENT WAS A COVENANT WHICH RUNS WITH THE LAND, ORAL WAIVER MAY BE VALID DESPITE WRITING REQUIREMENT IN THE COVENANT)/REAL PROPERTY LAW (COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND, HEATING AGREEMENT WAS A COVENANT WHICH RUNS WITH THE LAND, ORAL WAIVER MAY BE VALID DESPITE WRITING REQUIREMENT IN THE COVENANT)/COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE LAND (HEATING AGREEMENT WAS A COVENANT WHICH RUNS WITH THE LAND, ORAL WAIVER MAY BE VALID DESPITE WRITING REQUIREMENT IN THE COVENANT)

SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

The First Department determined the allegation plaintiff bicyclist was going fast in the bike lane raised a question of fact about the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Plaintiff was injured when he stopped fast after defendant taxi driver turned into the bike lane:

Plaintiff, a cyclist, made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to partial summary judgment based on his evidence, including averments of a nonparty witness, that he was lawfully traveling in a designated bicycle lane, with a yield sign in his favor, when defendant taxi driver attempted to make a left turn and, in the process, crossed over the bicycle lane just moments before plaintiff arrived at the same spot, causing plaintiff to brake sharply and be pitched over his handlebars in order to avoid a collision with the taxi (see 34 RCNY 4-12[p][2]…).

In opposition, defendant taxi driver’s observations that plaintiff was riding his bicycle very fast raised factual issues as to plaintiff’s potential comparative negligence … . An accident may have more than one proximate cause … . Bell v Angah, 2017 NY Slip Op 00613, 1st Dept 1-31-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/BICYCLISTS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (BICYCLISTS, SPEED OF PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT RE HIS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE)

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