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Tag Archive for: Court of Appeals

Employment Law, Fiduciary Duty, Negligence

Medical Corporation Not Responsible for Unauthorized Disclosure of Medical Information by Employee Acting Outside the Scope of Employment

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals answered a certified question from the Second Circuit in the negative.  The question was: “Whether, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may run directly against medical corporations, even when the employee responsible for the breach is not a physician and acts outside the scope of her employment?”:

… [A] medical corporation's duty of safekeeping a patient's confidential medical information is limited to those risks that are reasonably foreseeable and to actions within the scope of employment.  Doe v Guthrie Clinic Ltd, 224, CtApp 1-9-14

 

January 9, 2014
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Negligence

“Equitable Medical Monitoring” Cause of Action Rejected; Plaintiffs, Who Had No Signs of Cancer from Heavy Smoking, Were Not Entitled to Bring an Action to Cover the Costs of CT Scans to Periodically Check for Cancer

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, with two dissenting judges, the Court of Appeals determined New York does not recognize a “medical monitoring” cause of action.  The plaintiffs were all heavy smokers.  None of the plaintiffs is currently sick.  The lawsuit sought damages to pay for “medical monitoring” (low dose CT scans “LDCT”) as a way to ensure early diagnosis of cancer:

Plaintiffs do not claim to have suffered physical injury or damage to property.  They assert, rather, that they are at an “increased risk” for developing lung cancer and would benefit from LDCT monitoring, which they claim would allow them to discover the existence of cancers at an earlier stage, leading to earlier treatment.

A threat of future harm is insufficient to impose liability against a defendant in a tort context … .  The requirement that a plaintiff sustain physical harm before being able to recover in tort is a fundamental principle of our state’s tort system … .  The physical harm requirement serves a number of important purposes: it defines the class of persons who actually possess a cause of action, provides a basis for the fact-finder to determine whether a litigant actually possesses a claim, and protects court dockets from being clogged with frivolous and unfounded claims.

Having alleged no physical injury or damage to property in their complaint, plaintiffs’ only potential pathway to relief is for this Court to recognize a new tort, namely, an equitable medical monitoring cause of action. Caronia v Philip Morris USA Inc, 227, CtApp 12-17-13

 

December 17, 2013
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Contract Law, Insurance Law

Issuer of Excess Policy Was Required (by the Terms of the Policy) to Pay “All Sums,” Including Interest, Over and Above the Policy-Limit Paid Out Under the Primary Policy

In reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals determined that the issuer of the excess policy (HIC) was obligated to pay all sums, including interest, after the $1,000,000 policy limit was paid out under the primary policy.  The issuer of the primary was insolvent and the $1,000,000 primary policy limit was paid by the liquidator:

Applying the plain meaning of the primary and excess policies to the particular medical malpractice judgment against plaintiff at issue here, it is clear that the primary insurer’s liquidator fulfilled its obligations under the primary policy, thereby triggering HIC’s responsibility to pay the interest in excess of the primary policy’s $1,000,000 liability limit.  Upon entry of the initial judgment against plaintiff, the liquidator paid plaintiff $1,000,000 toward that judgment.  At that point, the liquidator was no longer required to pay interest under the “supplementary payments” provision of the primary policy because that further amount accrued only after the liquidator had already satisfied the liability limit of the primary policy in the manner specified by the “supplementary payments” provision.  Thus, the additional interest on the judgment, as amended, constituted a “sum[ ] in excess of the limits of liability of the Underlying Policy,” which is covered by the excess policy.  Accordingly, HIC had to pay the additional interest.  Ragins… v Hospitals Insurance Company, Inc, 234, CtApp 12-17-13

 

December 17, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Police Officers Properly Allowed to Testify About Victim’s Identification of Defendant Shortly After the Crime/Prior Consistent Statements Not Hearsay

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined that two police officers, as well as the victim, were properly allowed to testify about the victim’s identification of the defendant shortly after the crime, extending the rule announced by the Court of Appeals in People v Huertas (75 NY2d 487):

Velez [the victim] identified defendant at trial as one of the robbers and also testified, without objection, to a description he had given the police on the night of the crime of a black man “about 5’6, short hair, round face, thick eyebrows” and wearing a white shirt.  The description fits defendant, but in the video the man alleged to be defendant is wearing a blueish-gray shirt.  Velez testified that, before he saw the video, he realized that his description of the shirt was in error, and corrected it.

Two police officers also testified, over objection, that Velez had given a description on the night of the crime. The officers’ accounts of the description were brief, and consistent with Velez’s.  One said that Velez had described a man “between 5’6 to 5’7 in height wearing shorts and . . . a white T-shirt.”  The other said only that Velez had described “a short black male, dark skinned.” * * *

Huertas involved a … prior consistent statement: a witness’s description, given shortly after the crime, of the person who committed it.  Huertas held testimony about a description to be admissible not under any exception to the hearsay rule, but because the testimony is not hearsay at all. It is admitted not for the truth or accuracy of the prior description, but as “evidence that assists the jury in evaluating the witness’s opportunity to observe at the time of the crime, and the reliability of her memory at the time of the corporeal identification” (Huertas, 75 NY2d at 493).  * * *

The issue here is whether the rule of Huertas, like CPL 60.30’s hearsay exception for prior eyewitness identifications, is limited to a witness’s account of his or her own previous statement.  We see nothing to justify such a limitation.  A statement that is not hearsay when the declarant testifies to it does not become hearsay when someone else does so. People v Smith, 226, CtApp 12-17-13

 

December 17, 2013
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Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Municipal Law

Six-Year Breach of Contract Statute of Limitations Applied to Third Party Beneficiaries (Here the Plaintiff Villages and Towns) of Contracts Between the Counties and the Defendant Sewer-Construction Companies

The Court of Appeals, with two concurring judges, determined that the causes of action alleging the faulty construction of sewers resulting in settling of the roadways within the plaintiff villages and towns was time-barred. The plaintiff villages and towns were third-party beneficiaries to the sewer-construction contracts entered into by the counties encompassing the plaintiff villages and towns. The complaints alleged a “continuing nuisance.”  The court held that the actions were time-barred whether analyzed under a contract or nuisance theory (the continuing nuisance theory was rejected on the merits).  The court further held that the six-year breach of contract statute of limitations applied to third-party beneficiaries of the contracts (here the plaintiff villages and towns):

A breach of contract action must be commenced within six years from the accrual of the cause of action (see CPLR 203 [a]; 213 [2]).  “In cases against architects or contractors, the accrual date for Statute of Limitations purposes is completion of performance” (Newburgh, 85 NY2d at 538…).  This rule applies “no matter how a claim is characterized in the complaint” because “all liability” for defective construction “has its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” (Newburgh, 85 NY2d at 538 …). Even if the plaintiff is not a party to the underlying construction contract, the claim may accrue upon completion of the construction where the plaintiff is not a “stranger to the contract,” and the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is the “functional equivalent of privity” (Newburgh, 85 NY2d at 538-539 … ). * * *

The Appellate Division properly applied Newburgh to these actions commenced by third-party beneficiaries to the construction contracts.  Newburgh extended the completion of performance accrual rule to actions against architects or contractors brought by “intended beneficiar[ies]” of construction contracts (id.).  Here, the Counties contracted with defendants to install the sewer system for the benefit of municipalities like plaintiffs, a fact which was surely “known to all parties at the time the contracts were negotiated” (id.).  Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Industries Inc …, 214, 215, 217, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, CtApp 12-17-13

 

December 17, 2013
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Contract Law

Writing Requirement of Statute of Frauds Met By a Number of Documents Associated With Absentee Bidding at a Public Auction

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, reversed the Appellate Division and determined the plaintiff had not failed to comply with the statutory (statute of frauds) requirement of a writing in support of its breach of contract claim.  The defendant, as an absentee bidder at a public auction held by the plaintiff, successfully bid over $400,000 on an item but subsequently refused to pay for it.  The Appellate Division determined that the name of the seller was not in any of the relevant documents and therefore there was no writing which could be enforced.  The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that, because it was clear the plaintiff was acting as the seller’s agent in the bidding process, the absence of the seller’s name from the documents was not fatal to the writing requirement:

…[T]he absentee bidder form, along with the clerking sheet, provide the necessary information to establish the name of Rabizadeh as the buyer.  …

In addition to the buyer’s name, the GOL requires disclosure of “the name of the person on whose account the sale was made”.    * * *

[T]he GOL does not reference the “seller”, making it clear that the seller’s name need not be provided in order to satisfy the requirement of “the name of the person on whose account the sale was made”.

* * * It is well settled that an auctioneer serves as a consignor’s agent … . … Here, the clerking sheet lists Jenack [plaintiff] as the auctioneer, and as such it served as the agent of the seller. The clerking sheet, therefore, provides “the name of the person on whose account the sale was made” and satisfies GOL § 5701(a)(6).    …

It bears repeating in such a case as this that:

‘The Statute of Frauds was not enacted to afford persons a means of evading just obligations; nor was it intended to supply a cloak of immunity to hedging litigants lacking integrity; nor was it adopted to enable defendants to interpose the Statute as a bar to a contract fairly, and admittedly, made’ … .

Using the Statute of Frauds as a “means of evading” a “just obligation” is precisely what Rabizadeh attempts to do here, but the law and the facts foreclose him from doing so.  Rabizadeh took affirmative steps to participate in Jenack’s auction, including executing an absentee bidder form with the required personal information.  He then successfully won the bidding for item 193, closing out other interested bidders, with his $400,000 bid.  He cannot seek to avoid the consequences of his actions by ignoring the existence of a documentary trail leading to him.  Willam J Jenack Estate Appraisers and Auctioneers, Inc v Rabizadeh, 229, CtApp 12-17-13

 

December 17, 2013
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Contract Law, Employment Law

Language of Collective Bargaining Agreements Entitled Retirees to the Same Health Benefits As Were In Effect at the Time of Retirement

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, the Court of Appeals determined the language used in successive collective bargaining agreements established a vested right to a continuation of the same health coverage in effect at the time of an employee’s retirement:

We hold that the contracts establish a vested right to a continuation of the same health coverage under which plaintiffs retired, until they reach age 70, and that the Insurance Moratorium Law does not provide a basis for abrogating retirees’ vested contractual rights.  However, because issues of fact remain as to the intended scope of plaintiffs’ right, remittal for further factual development is required to determine whether the challenged increases in co-pays for prescription drugs amount to a breach of contract. Kolbe… v Tibbetts…, 235, CtApp 12-12-13

 

 

December 12, 2013
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Criminal Law, Evidence

Defense Counsel Should Have Been Allowed to Refresh Witness’s Recollection With a Prior Statement/Conviction Reversed

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction because the trial judge refused to permit defense counsel to refresh a witness’s recollection with the witness’s prior statement.  Defendant had the victim in a headlock during a fight. The victim subsequently died.  A central issue at trial was how long defendant held the victim in a headlock.  One witness (Flynn) gave a statement indicating the headlock lasted 6 to 10 seconds.  The People did not call her.  The defense called her and she testified the headlock could have lasted “a minute or so.”  Defense counsel then attempted to refresh her recollection with her prior statement.  The trial court didn’t allow it, saying the witness had “given no indication she needs her memory refreshed:”

When a witness, describing an incident more than a year in the past, says that it “could have” lasted “a minute or so,” and adds “I don’t know,” the inference that her recollection could benefit from being refreshed is a compelling one.  More fundamentally, it was simply unfair to let the jury hear the “a minute or so” testimony -testimony damaging to the defense, from a defense witness’s own lips — while allowing the defense to make no use at all of an earlier, much more favorable, answer to the same question.  The trial court suggested to defense counsel that this was “an effort to impeach your own witness,” but counsel had not yet got to the point of impeachment; she only wanted to refresh the witness’s recollection.  And in any event, technical limitations on the impeachment of witnesses must sometimes give way, in a criminal case, to a defendant’s right to a fair trial (Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 [1973]). People v Oddone, 236, CtApp 12-12-13

 

December 12, 2013
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Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Penal Law 70.85, Which Allows Resentencing without a Period of Post-Release Supervision to Remedy a Defective Sentence, Is Constitutional

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, the Court of Appeals determined Penal Law 70.85 is constitutional.  Section 70.85 allows the resentencing of a defendant who was not informed about post-release supervision to a sentence that does not include post-release supervision.  The statute was enacted to provide a remedy, other than vacation of the guilty plea, when a plea was entered in the absence of an explanation of the post-release supervision part of the sentence:

By now it is well established that the State Constitution requires a trial court to ensure that a defendant has a “full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences” … .  A guilty plea made without notification from the court about the direct consequence of a PRS term violates the Constitution because it could not have been “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action”… . * * *

Mindful of the constitutional rights at issue…, we find that section 70.85 is a constitutionally permissible legislative remedy for the defectiveness of the plea.  Defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary because the Legislature has changed the sentencing laws governing pleas vulnerable to …challenge.  Section 70.85 ensures that defendant, who is no longer subject to PRS, pleaded guilty with the requisite awareness of the direct consequences of his plea.  People v Pignataro, 213, CtApp 12-12-13

 

December 12, 2013
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Criminal Law

Resentencing to a Sentence Technically Different from the Sentence Agreed to in a Plea Bargain Okay—Resentence Comported With Defendant’s Reasonable Expectations

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined the defendant was properly resentenced even though the sentence imposed was technically different from the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.  The defendant had agreed to a sentence of 25 years and five years for the two crimes, with the sentencing court retaining the option to sentence consecutively, which it did.  It turned out that the five-year sentence was illegal (it had to be a minimum of ten). The defendant was resentenced to the two crimes, but this time concurrently.  Effectively, therefore, the defendant’s original sentence was 30 years, but he was resentenced to 25:

“[A] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … .  “The choice rests in the discretion of the sentencing court” and “there is no indicated preference for one course over the other” … .

The sentencing court may have good reason to reject a defendant’s request to withdraw his plea.  Where, as here, years have gone by since the original plea, it may be difficult for the People to locate witnesses, obtain their renewed cooperation and proceed to trial on the “then stale indictment[]” … .  Under these circumstances, allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea would give him “more than he was entitled” to under the bargain he struck … .  Thus, the People “can hold a defendant to an agreed sentence rather than allow vacation of the plea when it would otherwise be prejudiced” … .

Moreover, specific performance of a plea bargain does not foreclose “technical divergence from the precise terms of the plea agreement” so long as the defendant’s reasonable expectations are met … .  * * *

Thus, if the originally promised sentence cannot be imposed in strict compliance with the plea agreement, the sentencing court may impose another lawful sentence that comports with the defendant’s legitimate expectations.  Again, “the reasonable understanding and expectations of the parties, rather than technical distinctions in semantics, control the question of whether a particular sentence imposed violates a plea agreement”… .  People v Collier, 228, CtApp 12-12-13

 

 

December 12, 2013
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