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Plaintiff, Who Fell Through an Open Manhole, Entitled to Summary Judgment on Labor Law 240 (1) Cause of Action—Failure to Set Up Guard Rails Was a Proximate Cause–Liability Imposed Regardless of Plaintiff’s Own Negligence and Regardless of Whether the Owner, Contractor or Agent Supervised or Controlled the Work

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, over a two-judge dissent, determined plaintiff, who fell through an uncovered manhole, was entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) claim based on testimony the manhole should have been surrounded by guard rails. The court also determined there was a question of fact whether the safety consultant, IMS, was liable as a “statutory agent” under Labor Law 240 (1). The court explained that the obligation to provide safety devices is a nondelegable duty which imposes liability regardless of whether owner, contractor or agent supervises or controls the work. Where 240 (1) is violated, the plaintiff's negligence is not a defense, unless plaintiff's negligence is the sole proximate cause of the injury:

Section 240 (1) provides, in relevant part:

“All contractors and owners and their agents . . . in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor [certain enumerated] [*4]and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.”

The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work … . “Where an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence will not furnish a defense”; however, “where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability” … . Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury … . Barreto v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 2015 NY Slip Op 03875, CtApp 5-7-15

 

Charging the Defendant with the Use of Two Weapons During a Single Incident Did Not Render the Indictment Duplicitous—Only Proof of the Use of One Weapon Was Required

The indictment alleged the defendant committed assault and reckless endangerment by using a pistol and a rifle.  The proof at trial demonstrated the defendant shot the victim twice, using two weapons, in the course of the same incident. The judge charged the jury using the conjunctive language of the indictment.  When the jury asked if it must find both weapons were used to commit the offenses, the judge explained that only the use of one of the weapons needed to be proved. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the indictment was not duplicitous, i.e., the indictment did not charge two crimes in a single indictment count:

CPL 200.30 (1) requires that “each count of an indictment may charge one offense only.” Thus, a count is duplicitous if it charges more than one offense. …”[W]hether multiple acts may be charged as a continuing crime is resolved by reference to the language in the penal statute to determine whether the statutory definition of the crime necessarily contemplates a single act.” Under Penal Law § 120.10 (1), a person is guilty of assault in the first degree when “with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he [or she] causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.” Thus, the prosecution was not required to prove that defendant used two weapons. Penal Law § 120.25 states that a person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he [or she] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.” Again, the prosecution was not required to prove that defendant used both weapons.

…[T]he evidence at trial did not render the charges duplicitous. There was evidence that defendant attacked the victim out of one impulse – to seek revenge for the fiancée’s alleged assault on defendant’s sister….”[A]s a general rule . . . it may be said that where a defendant, in an uninterrupted course of conduct directed at a single victim, violates a single provision of the Penal Law, he commits but a single crime.” Although defendant used two guns, this was a single incident … . People v Flanders, 2015 NY Slip Op 03768, CtApp 5-7-15

 

Assault and Robbery Committed by Separate Acts Involving the Same Victim–Consecutive Sentences Justified

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent, determined defendant was properly sentenced consecutively for robbery and assault.  The defendant first demanded that the victim turn over a necklace the victim was wearing. As the victim was complying, the defendant shot the victim. The court determined the two crimes were committed by separate acts, thereby justifying consecutive sentences. The dissent dealt with a different issue: i.e., whether CPL 430.10 prohibited Supreme Court from “reconfiguring” defendant's sentence after the case was remitted to it by the Appellate Division. After the Appellate Division determined two of the original sentences should have been imposed concurrently, the original 40-year sentence was reduced to 25. On remand, the sentencing court “reconfigured” the sentences to bring them up again to 40 years. CPL 430.10 prohibits the sentencing court from “modifying” a sentence after it has begun to be served. The “reconfigured” 40-year sentence was affirmed here by the Court of Appeals.  With respect to the consecutive sentences, the court explained:

Penal Law § 70.25 (2) mandates that concurrent sentences be imposed for “two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other.” We have held that, “[t]o determine whether consecutive sentences are permitted, a court must first look to the statutory definitions of the crimes at issue” to discern whether the actus reus elements overlap … . Even where the crimes have an actus reus element in common, “the People may yet establish the legality of consecutive sentencing by showing that the 'acts or omissions' committed by defendant were separate and distinct acts” … . Conversely, where “the actus reus is a single inseparable act that violates more than one statute, [a] single punishment must be imposed” … . The People bear the burden of establishing the legality of consecutive sentencing by “identifying the facts which support their view” that the crimes were committed by separate acts … .

Even if, as defendant contends, the statutory elements of his robbery and assault convictions overlap, the People have demonstrated in this case that the assault count and the robbery count at issue were committed by separate and distinct acts. People v Rodriguez, 2015 NY Slip Op 03877, CtApp 5-7-15

 

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Plea of “Nolo Contendere” to a Sex Offense in Florida Constitutes a “Conviction” of a Sex Offense Requiring Registration in New York

Petitioner pled “nolo contendere” to a sex offense in Florida. Petitioner contended that the offense was based on his having consensual sex with a 15-year-old classmate when petitioner was 18.  The Florida court withheld adjudication. The Court of Appeals determined petitioner was required to register as a sex offender upon his move to New York. The “nolo contendere” plea meets the definition of “conviction” in New York. A “sex offender” in New York is one who has been “convicted” of a “sex offense” which includes a felony in another jurisdiction for which the offender is required to register as a sex offender (the case here):

We held in People v Daiboch (265 NY 125 [1934]), … that the entry of a nolo contendere plea in another jurisdiction, followed by a judgment placing the defendant on probation for two years, was a prior conviction for purposes of sentencing the defendant as a second offender. Although Daiboch did not involve SORA, we confronted the same issue presented by this case: whether a defendant's out-of-state nolo contendere plea for which a non-incarceratory sentence was imposed qualifies as a conviction in New York. Nolo contendere pleas, like Alford pleas, are “no different from other guilty pleas” (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000] [recognizing that an Alford plea may generally be used for the same purposes as any other conviction]). And because New York defines a conviction to include the entry of a guilty plea, regardless of the subsequent sentence or judgment, the ultimate disposition of petitioner's Florida conviction is irrelevant. New York distinguishes between a conviction and a “judgment of conviction,” the latter of which includes “a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon” (CPL 1.20 [15]). As we have previously observed, the Legislature intended the Criminal Procedure Law to provide the “definitive meaning” of the term “conviction” for other criminal statutes, and it meant what it said when it defined “conviction” separately from a judgment or sentence … . Matter of Kasckarow v Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y., 2015 NY Slip Op 03878, CtApp 5-7-15

 

Uncle Was Properly Found to Be a “Person Legally Responsible” for the Abused Child—He Was Therefore a Proper “Respondent” in a Child Abuse/Neglect Proceeding

The Court of Appeals, over a three-judge dissent, determined the abused child’s uncle, as a person legally responsible (PLR) for the child’s care, was a proper “respondent” in the child abuse/neglect proceeding.  The uncle argued he was not a PLR for the abused child and Family Court therefore did not have jurisdiction over the abuse/neglect proceeding against him:

“…[T]he common thread running through the various categories of persons legally responsible for a child’s care is that these persons serve as the functional equivalent of parents” … . We held that deciding whether “a particular person has acted as the functional equivalent of a parent is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry which will vary according to the particular circumstances of each case” … . We listed factors to be considered when determining who is a PLR, which include (1) “the frequency and nature of the contact,” (2) “the nature and extent of the control exercised by the respondent over the child’s environment,” (3) “the duration of the respondent’s contact with the child,” and (4) “the respondent’s relationship to the child’s parents” … . Matter of Trenasia J. (Frank J.), 2015 NY Slip Op 03765, CtApp 5-7-15

 

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Admission of Child Abuse Made by Defendant to Psychiatrist Protected by Physician-Patient Privilege—Even Though the Admission Can Be Disclosed in Child Protective Proceedings, the Privilege Applies in a Criminal Trial

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Pigott, determined that an admission of child sexual abuse made to the defendant's psychiatrist was privileged.  The psychiatrist should not have been allowed to testify about the admission at defendant's trial.  The error was not harmless. The Court made it clear that the relaxed evidentiary standards in child protective proceedings where physicians are required to report abuse, do not extend to the context of a criminal trial where the defendant's liberty is at stake:

The Legislature has determined that the protection of children is of paramount importance, so much so that it has either limited or abrogated the privilege through statutory enactments.

The People erroneously assert that these exceptions place offenders on notice that the physician-patient privilege does not apply to statements or admissions triggering a duty to disclose. But it is one thing to allow the introduction of statements or admissions in child protection proceedings, whose aim is the protection of children, and quite another to allow the introduction of those same statements, through a defendant's psychiatrist, at a criminal proceeding, where the People seek to punish the defendant and potentially deprive him of his liberty. Evidentiary standards are necessarily lower in the former proceedings than in the latter because the interests involved are different. Thus, the relaxed evidentiary standards in child protection proceedings lend no credence to the People's argument that defendant should have known that any admission of abuse he made to his psychiatrist would not be kept confidential. People v Rivera, 2015 NY Slip Op 03764, CtApp 5-7-15

 

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Although Picketing by Teachers Was Protected Speech, the Manner in which the Picketing Was Carried Out Endangered the Safety of Students—Therefore the Teachers Were Properly Disciplined

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Abdus-Salaam, with concurring and dissenting opinions, reversed the Appellate Division and found that teachers had been properly disciplined for picketing in their cars in a manner which made it more difficult for parents to drop off their children at the school.  The court applied the so-called Pickering test (Pickering v Board of Educ…391 US 563 [1968]) which addresses the free speech rights of public employees (which are somewhat curtailed).  Under the court's Pickering analysis, the picketing was protected speech, but the manner in which the picketing was done endangered the students. The teachers, therefore, could be disciplined for the manner in which they exercised their right to free speech:

Under Pickering, the determination whether a public employer has properly disciplined a public employee “for engaging in speech requires 'a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [public] . . . employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees'” … . This balancing test recognizes that the public employer must be permitted a level of control over its employees so it may fulfill essential services, such as public safety and education, efficiently and effectively …, but also that “[v]igilance is necessary” to ensure public employers do not use their authority “to silence discourse[] not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of [the] employees' speech” … . Matter of Santer v Board of Educ of E Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, 2014 NY Slip Op 03189, CtApp 5-6-14

 

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Defendant’s Limited Right to Seek the Advice of an Attorney Before Consenting to a Breathalyzer Test Was Violated When the Sheriff’s Department Administered the Test Without First Telling Defendant an Attorney Had Communicated with the Sheriff’s Department on Her Behalf

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Graffeo, over a dissent, determined defendant's breathalyzer test results were properly suppressed.  After her arrest for Driving While Intoxicated, the defendant did not ask to speak with an attorney and consented to the test.  However, her family communicated with an attorney who called before the breathalyzer test was administered and told the sheriff's department not to test or question the defendant.  The Court of Appeals determined the sheriff's department was obligated to inform the defendant about the attorney's communication before administering the test:

In People v Gursey (22 NY2d 224 [1968])… we recognized a limited right of the accused to seek legal assistance in alcohol-related driving cases. We held that, based on the warning procedure set forth in section 1194 (2) (b), “if a defendant arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol asks to contact an attorney before responding to a request to take a chemical test, the police 'may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and his lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication'” … . Violation of this right to legal consultation generally requires suppression of the scientific evidence …. Because time is of the essence in obtaining accurate chemical test evidence …, we further observed in Gursey that a suspect's communication with a lawyer regarding “the exercise of legal rights should not [] extend so far as to palpably impair or nullify the statutory procedure requiring drivers to choose between taking the test or losing their licenses” … .

It is therefore well established that “there is no absolute right to refuse to take the test until an attorney is actually consulted, nor can a defendant use a request for legal consultation to significantly postpone testing” … . In other words, conferring with counsel is permissible only if “'such access does not interfere unduly'” with timely administration of the test … . * * *

In our view, the statutory right to legal consultation applies when an attorney contacts the police before a chemical test for alcohol is performed and the police must alert the subject to the presence of counsel, whether the contact is made in person or telephonically. Gursey contemplated that a lawyer retained to represent a DWI arrestee can directly communicate with the police, reasoning that “law enforcement officials may not, without justification, prevent access between the criminal accused and [the] lawyer, available in person or by immediate telephone communication, if such access does not interfere unduly” with the administration of alcohol test … . The fact that defendant consented to the breathalyzer about the same time that the attorney was communicating with the police is not dispositive since defendant, after conferring with counsel, could have revoked her consent prior to administration of the test (see generally Vehicle & Traffic Law §§ 1194 [2] [b], 1194-a [3] [c]). The police therefore must advise the accused that a lawyer has made contact on the accused's behalf … . Once so informed, the accused may choose to consult with counsel or forego that option and proceed with the chemical test. People v Washington, 2014 NY Slip Op 04190, CtApp 5-6-14

 

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Names of Retired Teachers Not Protected from Disclosure by Public Officers Law 89

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, determined Public Officers Law 89 (7) did not exempt from disclosure the names of retirees who receive benefits from public employees' retirement systems.  The question boiled down to statutory interpretation:

The answer to the question before us — are retirees' names exempt from disclosure? — is plain from the face of the statute. It exempts “the home address . . . of a retiree,” but not the retiree's name. By contrast, it exempts both the name and home address of “a beneficiary of a public employees' retirement system.” A “beneficiary” of a retirement system, as the term is commonly used, is a family member of an employee or retiree who is entitled to benefits after the employee's or retiree's death; it is so used on the website of one of the retirement systems in this case (NYSTRS,”Glossary of Benefit Terms,” at http://www.nystrs.org/main/glossary/html [last visited April 21, 2014]). In some contexts, “beneficiary” might be read more broadly to include a retiree, for retirees do benefit from retirement systems. But “beneficiary” was obviously not used in that sense in this statute, because the statute provides a separate and more limited exemption for a “retiree.” Matter of Empire Ctr for NY State Policy v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys, 2014 NY Slip Op 03193, CtApp 5-6-14

 

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Comptroller Has Authority to Audit Private Health Care Providers Who Are Paid through an Insurance Company Under Contract with the State for Health Care Provided to State Employees

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, determined the state comptroller had constitutional and statutory authority to audit the billing records of private health care providers (Handler and South) who receive state funds for care provided to state employees through an insurance company under contract with the state. The underlying audit concerned the health care providers' waiver of patients' co-payments which effectively reduced the cost of the care provided by 20%.  Because the state was obligated to pay only 80% of the cost of the care, the comptroller determined the health care providers who waived the copayment were effectively overpaid by the state.  The health care providers argued the comptroller did not have the power to audit them because they were paid by the insurance company, not the state:

Handler and South Island receive State insurance funds in exchange for services rendered to State insurance beneficiaries. The fact that the State relies on a third-party conduit, United [the insurance company], does not change the character of the funds. They remain State dollars directed to pay health care costs incurred by State beneficiaries and charged by Handler and South Island.  Matter of Martin H Handler MD PC v DiNapoli, 2014 NY Slip Op 03191, CtApp 5-6-14

 

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